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Abstract 
This thesis aims to investigate the trajectory of industrialisation in Taiwan’s 
cultural policy from 1994 to 2012. In order to identify significant discursive 
and structural factors that have shaped and underpinned the transformation 
of industrialisation of cultural policy, this research takes the Cultural Political 
Economy (CPE) as the theoretical perspective and adopts Jim McGuigan’s 
three discourses of cultural policy to explain the dialectic process between 
discursive formation and structuration.  
This thesis reveals that the projects of cultural industries, as well as the 
cultural and creative industries, emerged as a strategic response to 
changing political, economic and social structuration over the past two 
decades. In this context, the meaning of industrialisation has been entangled 
in multiple state projects and multiple articulations with local practice and 
diverse imaginaries.  
From the analysis, there are three core research findings and implications. 
Firstly, the hegemonic discourse ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation 
of Industries’ has been mobilised by the state as a strategic fix, in three 
respective phases, to manage the issues of democratisation, the formation 
of national identity, the challenges of economic transformation, rural 
regeneration and cultural citizenship. Secondly, this research highlights 
policy implications for the industrialisation of cultural policy in Taiwan and 
other newly democratised countries. Taiwan’s case indicates that the cultural 
industries do not naturally contain economic discourse; they can bear 
democratic meanings, such as empowerment, participation and cultural 
citizenship, by state projects and local practice to engage people in public 
affairs and cultural events. Thirdly, this research has theoretical implications 
for cultural policy and CPE. In the field of cultural policy, this research, which 
adopts the theoretical perspective of CPE with three discourses of cultural 
policy, uncovers the dialectic between discourse formation and structuration; 
furthermore, it provides an empirical approach with the supplement of three 
discourses of cultural policy for applying CPE in cultural policy studies to 
investigate the evolution of hegemonic discourse and structuration. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background and Research Purposes 
Over the last two decades, the main concerns and core values of cultural 
policy around the world have changed dramatically. The importance of 
cultural/creative industries is recognised widely by cultural policy-makers 
(Cunningham, 2001; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005; Pratt, 2005). 
Considering the cultural/creative industries as a type of knowledge-based 
economy, the economics of cultural policy has not only been emphasised in 
the economic field but also been involved in the government policy agenda 
(UNESCO, 2006; Pratt, 2007; Taylor, 2009; Throsby, 2010). These changes 
have extended the traditional values of cultural policy from national or 
cultural development to the wider benefits of economic and social purposes 
(Hartley, 2004; Garnham, 2005; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007; 
Hesmondhalgh, 2007). In Taiwan, there has been a similar trend since the 
1990s, but with locally specific developments. In particular, the emerging of 
‘cultural industries’ in 1995 and the launch of state initiative ‘cultural and 
creative industries’ in 2002 with relevant discourses being highlighted in 
cultural policy, which have brought salient debates and challenges to cultural 
policy over the last twenty years.   
As a matter of fact, ‘cultural industries’ and ‘cultural and creative industries’, 
despite the similar terminology, are two different development concepts in 
respective contexts of cultural projects in Taiwan (Wang, 2005; Liu, 2006). 
Since 1995, the Council for Cultural Affairs1 (hereafter CCA), which is the 
highest national office that makes policy and oversees Taiwan’s cultural 
affairs, launched a project for cultural industries with a specific strategic 
discourse – ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ (文化產
業華，產業文化化). This discourse serves as one of the strategies of the 
CCA to promote the Community Empowerment Project (社區總體營造計劃, 
hereafter CEP), which focuses on residents’ participation and community’s 
localisation (CCA, 1998; CCA, 2004a). Seven years later, in 2002, the state 
assigned the Ministry of Economic Affairs to develope a cross-sector project 
                                            
1 The Council for Cultural Affairs was established in 1981 and upgraded to the Ministry of 
Culture as part of a larger governmental reorganisation in 2012. Further discussions on the 
implications of the reorganisation are analysed in Chapter 6. 
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for ‘Cultural and Creative Industries’ (文化創意產業, hereafter CCIs), which 
mainly adopted the concept of ‘creative industries’ from the British 
experience, but collaborated with the CCA and shared the same discourse of 
industrialisation of cultural industries. With this state promotion, the term 
‘Wen-Chuang’ (文創), which is the abbreviated form of ‘Cultural and Creative 
Industries’ in Mandarin, has become very popular in Taiwanese society. 
Specifically, the term ‘Wen-Chuang’ has not only gradually replaced ‘Wen 
Hua Chan Ye’ (文化產業), which means ‘Cultural Industries’ in Mandarin, but 
has also been widely used to refer to many designer shops, complex 
restaurants and cafés which combine their business with arts and cultural 
symbols or activities. On the other hand, the phrase ‘Industrialisation of 
Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ has been used for the principle of both 
projects and become the hegemonic discourse in cultural policy since 1995 
(CCA, 1998; CCA, 2004a). Against this background, this research is 
concerned with the trajectory of industrialisation and the meaning-making of 
the relevant discourses in cultural policy, which is mainly led by projects in 
the ‘cultural industries’ and the ‘cultural and creative industries’, as well as 
the related critical issues and debates in Taiwan over the last two decades. 
The original motivation for tracing the emergence and transformation of 
industry-related projects in the field of cultural policy came firstly from my 
personal work experience and observation. I worked at the cultural 
development department of the Cultural Affairs Bureau in New Taipei City 
from 2007 to 2009. During this period, I encountered numerous difficulties in 
coordinating policy-planning and practice around ‘cultural industries’ and 
‘cultural and creative industries’ with cultural workers, organisations, citizens, 
foundations, entrepreneurs and central government. For instance, the ‘Local 
Cultural Museum’ project, which I was in charge of in New Taipei City, was a 
sub-project of cultural industries but the content was mixed with the 
concepts of cultural and creative industries, such as the emphasis on 
creativity and economic profit, which caused confusions in implementation. 
Some cultural workers at the museums I worked with told me they were 
confused by the discourse of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of 
Industries’ and did not know how to industrialise the museums to promote 
community empowerment (社區營造) and the economic benefits of CCIs at 
the same time. These confusions and frustrations of the working experience 
led to the initial inspiration for this research. The research inquires into the 
meaning-making of the discourse around ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’ and the evolution of industrialisation projects 
embedded within the structural environment. Through answering these 
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questions, the research wishes to identify the transformation of cultural 
policy led by industrialisation and clarify the changing meaning of the 
hegemonic discourse of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of 
Industries’ for the future planning and implementation of cultural policy.  
The second reason that drove me to explore this topic, is the controversial 
issue of the musical drama ‘Dreamers’ (夢想家). As part of the national 
centennial celebrations in 2011, ‘Dreamers’ was funded by the CCA and 
presented on the National Day for two nights, the 10th and 11th of October. 
Because of the surprisingly high cost of 215 million NT dollars (£4.54 
million), it soon drew strong public criticism of the biased allocation and 
extended to other problematic issues of cultural policy. Actually, the issue of 
‘Dreamers’ was just the straw that broke the camel’s back. It not only caused 
a series of debates about the role of cultural policy for cultural and economic 
value, it also led to the resignation of the chairman of the CCA within one 
month. The greatest dissatisfaction came from the cultural groups, who 
organised the ‘Preparation Office of Cultural Age Foundation’ (文化元年基金
會 籌 備 處), to call for a sweeping reform to the overemphasis on 
industrialisation in recent cultural policy. Their campaigns resulted in 
unprecedented reflections over cultural policy in the presidential election. It 
was the first time that cultural policy was a main issue in the election, and 
the three main presidential candidates were asked to account for their 
cultural policy and answer questions which the Foundation collected from 
the civil society (Huang, 2011; Chao, 2011). They questioned whether 
cultural policy was biased towards economic development and whether the 
cultural and creative industries project has overlooked cultural value (Wang, 
2012). In the relevant debates, the discursive strategies used by the 
Foundation seemed to prevail over the main cultural policy-maker (the CCA) 
to dominate the agenda for the reform of cultural policy. For example, the 
CCA promised to review the cultural policy, adjust the current overemphasis 
on economic value, and “step up a dialogue with artists in preparation for the 
drafting of a white paper focusing on cultural development in the future” 
(Cheng and Wu, 2011). The relevant issues of ‘Dreamers’ stimulated 
questions for this research; for instance: Why would a musical drama like 
‘Dreamers’ cause a fierce reaction from cultural groups? What lies behind 
the arguments between the state and the cultural workers? What kind of 
discursive strategies used by the cultural groups affected the CCA, making 
them willing to adjust cultural policy? What kind of perspectives and 
ideologies of industrialisation have struggled in the above process?  
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The third reason resulted from the fact that industrialisation has been 
officially listed as one of the four strategies2 of cultural policy since the 
Ministry of Culture was established in 2012. The Ministry of Culture not only 
reorganised the departments from the CCA but also integrated with the 
former Government Information Office, which included the departments of 
cultural exchange, the publishing industry, the film industry, the broadcast 
and television industry, and the popular music industry. These media 
industries used to be seen as propaganda apparatuses under the 
authoritarian government from the 1960s to the 1980s. Despite the lifting of 
marital law in 1987, the media industries continued to be excluded from the 
scope of cultural policy until 2012. With the international trend of creative 
industries, the media, with market-mediated and profit-oriented features, are 
viewed as profitable categories3 among the cultural and creative industries. 
When the Ministry of Culture integrated with the Government Information 
Office and the CCA, it was inevitable that some differences and conflicts 
among the media industries and artist-centred cultural fields would become 
increasingly visible in the thinking, and policy-making, of cultural policy. 
These recent changes have influenced the definition and objectives of 
cultural policy and the meaning of industrialisation. For instance, according 
to the first blueprint drafted by the Minister of Culture, the government would 
focus on small-scale cultural industries in villages to encourage cultural 
participation as well as the leading cultural and creative industries, such as 
media industries, to facilitate the development of the cultural economy 
(Taiwan Today, 2012). These shifts, and the relevant issues, are not pre-
given but depend on a hidden system of meanings that frame their 
significance, and the controversy, which requires in-depth discussion for a 
better understanding of the evolution of industrialisation and the implications 
for cultural policy. 
In this context, this research aims to identify significant discursive and 
structural factors that have shaped and underpinned the transformation of 
industrialisation of cultural policy. Understanding the evolution of 
industrialisation in cultural policy can uncover the complex relationship 
between the discourse of industrialisation and structuration and lay a basis 
                                            
2  The other three goals are internationalisation, soilisation (grassroots) and cloudisation 
(digitalisation). Futher analysis is presented in section 6.3.4. 
3 According to a media interview with the director of the Bureau of Audiovisual and Music 
Industry the export of broadcast television, film and pop music accounts for 54 percent of 
Taiwan's cultural and creative industries, which can be regarded as the most profitable of 
the cultural and creative industries (Zheng, 2012). 
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for future researchers, policy makers and participants to devise better 
strategies of public intervention in the field of cultural policy.  
 
1.2 The Development of Taiwanese Cultural Policy Studies 
The last few decades have seen a growing importance placed on cultural 
policy research in Taiwan. Before the lifting of martial law in 1987, cultural 
policy had been called ‘cultural construction’ and served as an instrument of 
political propaganda by the authoritarian ruling party, Chinese Nationalist 
Party (also called ‘Chinese Kuomingtang’, hereafter KMT), to control and 
shape people’s thoughts (Wang, 2002). With the development of 
democratisation, there has been a dramatic proliferation with diverse 
perspectives in Taiwanese cultural policy studies since the 1990s. In 
particular, there is an increasing trend in the number of studies regarding 
cultural industries and CCIs. Generally speaking, the previous studies of 
cultural policy can be divided as follows. 
Firstly, some studies take the historical structural approach to focus on the 
development of a specific cultural policy, such as community empowerment 
policy, dance policy, visual arts policy, museum policy or heritage policy. For 
example, Yu (2002) traces the formation of Community Empowerment Policy 
and points out that the policy was a response to the trend of globalisation 
and a way to build local cultural identity. Wang (2004) explores the 
contradictions and challenges in the development of multiculturalism in 
cultural policy in Taiwan. She concludes that cultural policy should be 
considered in terms of both cultural rights and multicultural citizenship and 
based on the principles of social justice, the recognition of difference and 
common culture rather than narrowly as ‘art policy’. Su (2011) focuses on the 
‘Local Cultural Museum Project’ (2002-2011) in history, art, industry, ecology, 
ethnicity and religion, and analyses museum governance in cultural policy. 
The majority of this literature demonstrates the diverse faces of cultural 
policy. Their theoretical and historical perspectives illustrate contextual 
factors that shape policy as well as the difficulties and challenges of 
implementing policy. Nevertheless, most of these studies view their target 
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policy as an existing reality and do not discuss the dynamic interplay of 
structure and agency or associated influences in policy-making.  
Secondly, there are a great deal of Taiwan-based investigations adopting a 
case study approach to analysing the development or marketing strategies 
of cultural policy, such as specific local cultural museums and specific 
creative and cultural parks (Chang, 2004; Chen, 2008; Tu, 2008; Liao, 2008; 
Huang, 2010). This kind of research provides a number of empirical cases 
and practical experiences to illustrate a specific subject. Most of them 
represent the successful models of implementing a cultural policy and 
recommend feasible methods and concepts for other relevant cases. They 
reveal the detailed and dynamic relations between stakeholders through 
interviews and fieldwork. It should be noted, however, that there have been 
few attempts to analyse the relationship between the initiative of actors and 
the structural conditions. Additionally, despite the case studies providing 
thick description and deep analysis for readers to understand the specific 
event or phenomenon, it is hard to show longitudinal viewpoints, or the 
whole picture of cultural policy, and its comprehensive implications.  
Thirdly, there has been a considerable proliferation of research concerned 
with cultural industries and CCIs especially since CCIs became one of the 
national essential policies in 2002. The diversity of these studies shows that 
it is a popular but complicated topic. Some of these studies are highly 
related to this research, for instance, some researchers investigate the 
development of cultural industries from being a marginal concern in policy to 
being highly visible and explicitly linked to the local economy (Liao et al., 
2000; Ku and Liao, 2004; Sin et al., 2005). These studies discuss the current 
debates around the complex interaction of local economy and cultural 
industries. They also point out the unstable features and high risks in the 
economics of cultural industry policy from the perspective of urban planning. 
However, their arguments are primarily based on Western experiences and 
most of them have not analysed the complex process of policy adoption from 
foreign countries or distinguished the discursive and contextual differences 
and relationships between cultural industries and CCIs in the Taiwanese 
context. As a result, their findings are limited and may be problematic in 
discussion of the transformation of Taiwan’s cultural policy.  
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It is worth noting that some researchers have noticed the differences when 
CCI policy transferred to Taiwan. They conduct a brief comparative analysis 
about why and how the government adopted a foreign policy. For example, 
the study of Liu (2006) takes a broad view of the evolution of Taiwan’s CCIs 
in recent years and finds that ‘cultural industries’ and ‘cultural and creative 
industries’, are actually of two different concepts and developmental 
contexts. The first was learned from the Japanese experience and is part of 
community empowerment policy aimed to revitalise communities; the latter 
was adopted mainly from Britain’s creative industries to pursue economic 
benefits. However, these two terms were usually mixed-used in the 2000s 
and the ‘Wen-Chuang’ (CCIs) has replaced ‘Wen Hua Chan Ye’ (cultural 
industries) in recent years. These misunderstandings could easily lead to 
confusion in the implementation process, thereby reducing the effectiveness 
of the promotion. Furthermore, Chu (2011a) re-examines the relationship 
between state and museums and considers the insight of the CCIs policy 
that the Taiwan government adopted from the UK under neo-liberalism. Chu 
(2011b) then finds that the creative industries of the UK reinforce cultural or 
creative activities already in existence, whilst the CCIs were introduced to 
Taiwan where most categories are new or emerging industries. On top of 
that, Taiwan’s economic development has long relied heavily on original 
equipment manufacturing; therefore Taiwan lacks a mature mechanism to 
incubate creativity, which is essential to CCIs. This contextual analysis 
explains the difficult position for the development of CCIs in Taiwan. In 
summary, these studies elaborate the contextual process of policy adoption 
and compare the content of the adopted policy, however, they do not explore 
the discursive and practical factors leading to why and how foreign policy 
would be accepted and adopted. 
In addition, there is some research which takes a discursive analysis 
approach to investigating cultural-industries policy. For instance, Chung 
(2012) examines the recent discourses and development of Taiwan’s CCI 
policy by reviewing its evolution. She finds that economic primacy has 
overshadowed issues of micro-level ecology of the CCIs and reveals that the 
result of policy widened rather than bridged the gaps between ‘localisation 
and globalisation’, ‘culture and creativity’ and ‘network systems’ of the CCIs. 
- 8 - 
Chung undertook an elaborate discursive analysis of four official documents 
but did not discuss the structural factors or the production of hegemony, 
which are significant to the formation of the discourse.  
Equally important to note, Wang, Li-Jung adopted Jim McGuigan’s (2011) 
framework to indicate that Taiwan’s CCIs Policy shows an important 
turnaround from ‘state discourse’ to ‘citizenship discourse’ and then to 
‘economic discourse’. In addition, the concept of culture is moving from ‘elite 
culture’ to ‘cultural economy’ (Wang, 2005). Wang holds the viewpoint that 
Taiwan’s government has hungered for cultural and creative industries since 
it encountered the pressure and impact of cultural homogeneity and 
economic reform from globalisation. However, she does not explain why 
policy-makers chose a cultural approach rather than other approaches. 
Furthermore, she does not discuss the struggle of the discursive formation 
or the structural factors leading to the change.  
The previous literature is very concerned with the historical transformation of 
cultural policy and planning. However, little research has been done 
exploring the transformation of industrialisation in cultural policy. The focus 
of cultural policy has inclined towards industrialisation under specific 
political, economic and social structures and the implications. It was this gap 
that led this research to take a historical and contextual perspective to 
investigating the discursive formation and structuration of cultural 
industrialisation. Having a holistic and historical analysis can shed light on 
the transformation of cultural policy and thereby correct the inclination to find 
a clear direction in the future.  
 
1.3 The Significance of the Case of Taiwan 
There are some especially significant aspects of the development of cultural 
industrialisation in Taiwan. Firstly, the cultural industries in Taiwan emerged 
under the framework of the Community Empowerment Project, which 
emphasised empowering community residents to participate in local cultural 
activities or traditional industries. Originally, community cultural industries 
mainly referred to the traditional cultural industries such as agricultural arts, 
craft, folk music and drama. In order to foster these kinds of cultural 
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industries, Chen, Chi-Nan (陳其南), who was the deputy head of the CCA, 
proposed the term ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ 
in 1995 (Chen, 1995). According to Chen’s explanation, ‘Industrialisation of 
Culture’ and ‘Culturalisation of Industries’ are corresponding and 
complementary concepts, whose initial aim was to empower residents to 
participate in community affairs by developing cultural industries. From then 
on, the term has gained wider currency, not only highlighting the discursive 
guidelines in related projects and official statements such as white papers 
(CCA, 1998; CCA, 2004a), but also the essential strategies in practice 
(Chen, 1998).  
In addition, there was an important shift in Taiwan’s cultural policy in 2002 
because the CCA launched the Cultural and Creative Industries Project, 
following the experience of Britain and UNESCO. In the same year, this 
policy was recognised by central government as an essential national policy, 
in the ‘Challenge 2008: Six Year National Development Plan’ (CEPD, 2005), 
with the aim of restructuring Taiwan’s economy and enhancing 
competitiveness in the international market. Accordingly, the course of 
cultural industrialisation in relation to the projects of ‘cultural industries’ and 
‘cultural and creative industries’ has involved specific issues of community 
empowerment, rural revitalisation, cultural development and economic 
reconstruction within various spatial-temporal frameworks. In particular, this 
research investigates the evolution of industrialisation in cultural policy, with 
a special focus on the discursive formation, the production of hegemonic 
industrialisation and the embedded structuration, which is expected to 
benefit the discussion of cultural/creative industries and cultural policy 
studies.  
Secondly, Taiwan’s case shows a rise in industrialisation of cultural policy, 
which paralleled the emergence of political democratisation and economic 
liberalisation in Taiwan. While industrialisation highlighted, and followed, the 
Community Empowerment Policy of the 1990s, Taiwan experienced a 
dramatic political democratisation and the rise of civil society. After the end of 
martial law in 1987, and following diverse social movements and reforms in 
the 1990s, the first direct presidential election was held in 1996 and there 
was the first change of political parties, from the KMT who had ruled Taiwan 
for over fifty years, to the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in 
2000. In 2002, Taiwan was involved in the World Trade Organisation and 
faced a global financial crisis. Embedded in this changing environment, 
cultural policy has inevitably been transformed by the state in response to 
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the structural changes. As the study conducted by Chung, Hsiao-Ling 
indicates, “by the end of the 1990s, cultural policy in Taiwan largely 
responded to the voice of Taiwanese consciousness, the needs of political 
integration, and more significantly, economic transformation” (Chung, 2012, 
p.342). The structural context and the discursive formation of 
industrialisation in cultural policy are the main concerns of this research. By 
exploring the correlation between the industrialisation of cultural policy and 
political democratisation, as well as the economic development of Taiwan, 
this research is expected to provide meaningful perspectives and 
comparative reference to other East-Asian countries with similar 
backgrounds.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
The above questions will be discussed within a structure including an 
introduction, literature review, theoretical perspective, analysis and 
discussion in three phases, and a conclusion. The thesis consists of seven 
chapters.  
First, the Introduction provides an overview of, and the motivation for, this 
study. It illustrates the research background and purposes, analyses the 
development of Taiwanese cultural policy studies, explains the significances 
and contributions of the Taiwanese case, and describes the thesis structure.  
Chapter 2 comprises literature reviews and the theoretical perspective of this 
research. It firstly discusses the relevant literature about the development of 
cultural industries and CCIs in cultural policy studies. Based on the literature 
review, it introduces the theorisation of Cultural Political Economy that 
underpins the research. The theoretical perspective of Cultural Political 
Economy will help examine the discursive formation of industrialisation and 
dialectic structuration in cultural policy, and to construct an appropriate 
theoretical framework.  
Chapter 3 is the methodology. It presents the methodology of the thesis in 
terms of critical semiotic analysis and elaborates on methodical strategies by 
critical discourse analysis, case studies and interviews. 
Within the theoretical framework of Cultural Political Economy and 
methodological analysis, the thesis is divided into three phases to 
investigate the trajectory of industrialisation in the following three chapters. 
Despite the structural analysis at every phase, the research analyses the 
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specific policy discourses which are highly related to industrialisation of 
cultural policy. It emphasises the co-construction of policy discourse and 
local practice. Consequently, four cases are selected and analysed in these 
chapters.  
Chapter 4 focuses on the Community Empowerment Project (1994-2002) in 
order to explore the emergence of industrialisation and political 
democratisation in cultural policy. It discusses the industrialisation model and 
its relation with policy discourse, using the case of the Baimi Clogs Village.  
Chapter 5 analyses the first stages of the Cultural and Creative Industries 
Project (2002-2008) and the New Hometown Community Empowerment 
Project (2002-2007) in order to study the transformation of industrialisation 
and neo-liberalisation in cultural policy. It takes the case of Taomi Eco Village 
to explore the transformation of local practice.   
Chapter 6 investigates the second stages of the Cultural and Creative 
Industries Project (2009-2012) and New Hometown Community 
Empowerment Project (2008-2013) through the recent debates about 
industrialisation between the government, civic society and the business 
sector. Two cases, Dragonfly Beads Art Centre and Teihua Music Village, are 
selected to elaborate on the diverse development and convergent evolution 
of local practice.  
Chapter 7 is the conclusion. It summarises the research findings and 
implications, explains the limitations and proposes suggestions for future 
research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review and Theoretical Perspective 
This chapter consists of four sections to lay the theoretical perspective for 
the research project. Firstly, it reviews the previous research, in order to 
discuss the essential concepts and development of industrialisation in 
cultural policy, and analyses their theoretical and empirical perspectives. On 
the basis of the literature review, it secondly proposes the theoretical 
perspective of Cultural Political Economy and elaborates on the disciplinary 
background. It accounts for the ontological inspiration of ‘cultural turn’ in the 
Cultural Political Economy, the epistemology of critical realism and the 
methodology of strategic-relational approach. The main concepts of the 
Cultural Political Economy will be outlined in the third section, which 
specifically focuses on the theorisation of ‘economic imaginaries’ and the 
production of hegemony, in order to lay out the analytical basis for policy 
analysis from which to explore the emerging context and meaning-making 
process of industrialisation. With the theoretical framework of Cultural 
Political Economy, it finally formulates the research questions for the 
investigation of the industrialisation trajectory in Taiwanese cultural policy.   
 
2.1 Cultural Industries, Creative Industries and Cultural 
Policy 
It is widely accepted that the concept of cultural industry was originally 
developed by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in their research A 
Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception. Adorno and Horkheimer 
(1997/1947) coined the term ‘cultural industry’ to distinguish between the 
traditional high arts and industrial production of mass culture such as film 
and broadcasting. In this sense, they criticise the commercialisation, 
standardisation and industrialisation of mass culture under the industrial 
style of capitalism in the 1940s. They argue that ‘cultural industry’ creates 
predetermined ideologies and messages to manipulate people to obey the 
established social structure and maintain a capitalist economy rather than 
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enlighten people.  In this sense, the term ‘cultural industry’ refers to their 
criticism of the commodification and industrialisation of culture, and the 
traditional arts, which were specifically not included in the category of 
cultural industries (Galloway and Dunlop, 2007). Therefore, cultural industry 
was excluded from cultural policy at that time.   
However, with technological advancement and a variety of research into 
mass communication, cultural studies and audience surveys, the meaning of 
cultural industry and its relation to cultural policy has been revolutionised. 
John Hartley (2004, p.13) observes that due to the democratic and 
egalitarian movements in the 1970s and 1980s, media industries served as 
a kind of ‘culture’. This acknowledgement resulted in commercial media 
industries such as TV, film, and music being viewed as ‘cultural industries’ 
and then subsumed into the field of cultural policy. This transformation 
reveals the co-constitutive formation of cultural policy between rhetoric and 
wider structures such as social democracy and media movements. 
The symbolic power of the cultural industries has been increasingly 
emphasised since the 1980s. For example, Nicholas Garnham (1987)  
adopts the political economic perspective to descriptively define ‘cultural 
industries’ as:  
those industries in our society which employ the characteristic modes of 
production and organisation of industrial corporations to produce and to 
disseminate symbols in the form of cultural goods and services - usually 
as commodities (p.25).  
This is an important change in the definition of cultural industries, in which 
cultural industries not only are acknowledged neutrally as commodities but 
also characterise their distinctive symbols of cultural production. Moreover, 
Garnham’s research argues that the popularity of cultural industries has 
extended accessibility of culture to people and thus needs to be stressed in 
cultural policy-making. 
During the same period, some important international organisations noticed 
the economic advantages of cultural industries. For instance, UNESCO 
recognised an economic dimension to culture and its impact on regional 
development that could bridge the gap of unequal cultural resources 
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between North and South (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005). In this context, 
cultural industries not only have political significance but also comprise an 
economical field. As David Hesmondhalgh (2002) suggests the word 
‘industries’ fitted a political strategy to imbue certain cultural activities with an 
industrial and egalitarian dimension that would convey a non-elitist approach 
to public funding of the arts. These significant developments have gradually 
diluted the earlier negative connotations of cultural industries. However, 
Garnham also urges policymakers to notice the dominance of the market in 
contemporary society and its implications, as the market decides most 
people’s cultural products.  
While this tradition [of public cultural policy] has been rejecting the 
market most people’s cultural needs and aspirations are being, for better 
or worse, supplied by the market as goods and services. If one turns 
one’s back on an analysis of that dominant cultural process, one cannot 
understand the culture of our time or the challenges and opportunities 
which that dominant culture offers to public policy-makers (Garnham, 
1990, p.155).  
In addition, some research concerned the economic benefits of cultural 
industries in regional regeneration as cultural industries gradually became 
an appealing strategy for city or regional policy-makers to promote their 
economies and revitalise or regenerate places with new images in Western 
Europe during the 1980s (Bianchini and Parkinson, 1993). As Griffiths et al. 
(2003, p.154) pointed out: 
The arts and culture have come to be seen as a key resource for urban 
regeneration, capable of addressing the most pressing urban problems – 
economic development and job creation, social exclusion and 
community building, and the renewal of the urban landscape.  
Furthermore, Hesmondhalgh and Pratt (2005) argue that ‘cultural industries’ 
were utilised by some local councils as a strategy of local investment or local 
regeneration to replace the declining manufacturing industries. They also 
took the example of Sheffield’s cultural-industries and argued that, “these 
were not specifically cultural industries policies, they were part of a local 
economic strategy” (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005, p.4). They further 
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indicate that this model became increasingly popular and has been adopted 
in the making of cultural policies in Western Europe, which are centred on 
museums and cultural heritage. 
The Australian government introduced the idea of the ‘Creative Nation’ in 
1994, which not only advocated the ideas of creative industries, but also 
extended the impact beyond the city or region to the national scope and 
emphasised that creative industries can advance the national image and 
economic development. In Britain, the government under the Labour Party 
had promoted similar concepts of creative industries since 1997 to rebuild 
the national image and transform the economic structure. Successful 
experiences and examples from the UK served as endorsements for the 
introduction of the government’s creative industries policy to other countries. 
According to analysis by John Hartley (2004, pp.18-19), there are several 
reasons that the ideas of creative industries are attractive to many countries. 
Firstly, they might bring economic benefits to promote jobs and GDP. 
Secondly, creative industries might help to revitalise cities and regions in 
difficult situations, such as Taiwan and Singapore, who were over-exposed 
to declining IT industries and eager to seek new ways, such as creative 
industries, to reboot their economic advantages. Thirdly, they provide new 
perspectives and possibilities to think beyond the distinctions between elite 
and mass, art and entertainment, sponsored and commercial, high and 
popular arts in public policy. 
When cultural industries and creative industries were involved in the field of 
cultural policy, there was debate between cultural value and economic value. 
For example, Jim McGuigan (2004) argues the fundamental rationales of 
cultural policy as below: 
In the past, cultural policy has been rationalised in various ways 
including the amelioration of ‘market failure’ for practices deemed to 
have a cultural value, that is not reducible to economic value. While this 
rationalisation persists residually, it has very largely been superseded by 
an exclusively economic rationale. In this sense, cultural practices are 
deemed worthy of public support because they are of economic value. 
Cultural policy has been rethought in such a way that it no longer 
- 16 - 
requires specifically cultural rationale (McGuigan, 2004, p.1, italics in 
original). 
This statement reflects the shift of a core value in cultural policy from cultural 
value to economic value. In addition, David Throsby (2010) observes the 
same trend. He reviewed a series of UNESCO reports about cultural policy 
and found there were few statements referring to the economics of culture in 
the 1970s, while the references to economics are everywhere in the new 
millennium. He argues the emergence of economic value has transformed 
the ways in which cultural policy is interpreted and practised (Throsby, 2010, 
p.2).  In other words, this crucial change not only affects the way people 
think of cultural policy but also makes an impact on the structures that shape 
and direct cultural policy. 
Furthermore, Throsby (2010, p.2) indicates two main causes: cultural and 
economic. The former refers to the widening scope of the term ‘culture’ in 
cultural policy. The content of cultural policy has extended from the arts and 
heritage to include policy towards the media industries, the wider cultural 
industries, tourism, urban and regional regeneration, diplomacy, and more.  
The other major factor is globalisation with three phenomena: flexible 
resource movement, the global marketplace and the free transmission of 
cultural symbols around the world. Among them, neo-liberal economic 
principles are the basis for policy-making. Neo-liberalism, in short, means 
the “revival of doctrines of the free market” (Gamble, 2001, p.127) over the 
past thirty years. Neo-liberalism was a critique of Keynesian economics, 
viewing state intervention and regulation of markets as having suppressed 
the function of market forces causing damage to the economy (McGuigan, 
2004). Neo-liberalists thereby call for cutbacks in public spending and 
promote partial forms of privatisation like outsourcing, private finance 
initiatives, public-private partnerships and a pervasive managerial discourse. 
As a result, due to tight budgetary constraints and faced with radically 
changed economic circumstances, governments have had to become much 
more enterprising than they were during the ‘bureaucratic-industrial’ era 
(McGuigan, 2005, p.236).   
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The discourse related to neo-liberalism plays an important role in pushing 
the close connection between culture and the market, with both advantages 
and disadvantages. Javier Stanziola (2002) takes Chile as an example for 
analysis of the impact of neo-liberalism on cultural policy. He points out that 
the reforms caused by privatisation and decentralisation of service provision 
not only de-emphasise the role of the central government, but are also 
aimed at empowering non-profit organisations financially as well as 
politically. He further noted that the central government now works closely 
with non-profit corporations, artists, intellectuals and all other citizens in 
creating public-private partnerships to produce cultural activities (p.29).  
On the contrary, Eleonora Belfiore (2004, pp.196-198) argues that the new 
public management arising from neo-liberalism leads to ‘instrumental cultural 
policy’ and problematic implications. The major problems include the quality 
of evaluation by unreliable statistics and overstress on ‘effectiveness’, 
‘performance measurement’ and ‘value for money’ in the field of cultural 
policy. In addition, Pierre Bourdieu (1998, p.102) criticizes that neo-
liberalism results in “the progressive disappearance of the autonomous 
world of cultural production”.  
Given such opposing views, Gamble (2001, p.134) advises that, rather than 
exaggerating the ideological hegemony of neo-liberalism across the globe as 
manifesting itself everywhere and in everything, the better way is “to 
deconstruct neo-liberalism into the different doctrines and ideas which 
compose it, and relate them to particular practices and political projects”.   
In addition, there have been a number of studies that have investigated how 
cultural industries shift to creative industries (Cunningham, 2001; Hartley, 
2004; Garnham, 2005; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007; Kong and O'Connor, 
2009; Flew and Cunningham, 2010). The background of these studies 
provides some of the inspiration for this research.  
First, it is crucial to stress that the political and economic context sets the 
specific conditions for cultural policy-making. As Garnham (2005, p.16) 
mentions, the shift to creative industries in the UK was motivated by a 
historically specific political context. That is, both the Thatcher governments 
and the subsequent Labour administration wished to enforce the shift from 
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state to market across the whole range of public provision, which resulted in 
this reinforcement of ‘economic’ and ‘managerial’ language and patterns of 
thought within cultural policy. This reminds researchers to pay attention to 
the intention and ideology of the political group in power, the economic 
structure and how they shape and are influenced by cultural policy. Hence, in 
this research, it is necessary to investigate the formation of cultural 
industries policy and CCIs policy within the context of political and economic 
structures. Particularly important is the implication of conflicts among state, 
civic society and the business sector on cultural policy.  
Second, it is essential to explore the transformation of discourses in cultural 
policy and their factors. As Flew and Cunningham (2010) put it:  
the creative industries went beyond the traditional discourses of 
subsidised arts, and gave a central role to creativity in the generation of 
economic wealth, and moved into larger discourses such as those of 
trade policy, copyright and intellectual property, urban development, and 
educational futures (p.113). 
 Furthermore, “creative industries were explicitly linked to discourses 
surrounding technological convergence, the information society and the ‘new 
economy’” (p.114). In addition, van Heur (2010) argues that the discourse of 
creative industries should be treated as a narrative that articulates a wide 
variety of compatible discourses which have been constituted by the decline 
of the Fordist industrial and Keyesian welfare-oriented state rather than an 
isolated phenomenon. van Heur, as an urban geographer, advocates the 
discourse of the emergence of new forms of capitalist accumulation and 
state regulation that necessitate rethinking the role of creative space, 
creative industry polices and the creative networks. His works remind this 
research to consider the relationship between the discourse of 
industrialisation and state technologies and capitalist restructuring. It can be 
noted that these dialectic transformations from negative cultural industry to 
relatively positive creative industries, from subsidised cultural policy to 
investment-linked creative industry policy, are related to different, selected 
and strategic discourses with specific political economic structures.  
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In a Taiwanese context, there are key discourses surrounding 
‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ from 1994 to the 
present which need analysing for the discursive formation and competitive 
process of evolution, especially putting equal emphasis on the structuration 
of democratisation and economic transformation in the context of Taiwan. 
Therefore, this research will adopt the theoretical perspective of Cultural 
Political Economy, which emphasises co-constitutive contextuality as well as 
dialectic historicity to explore the industrialisation in the field of cultural 
policy.  
 
2.2 Theoretical Perspective: Cultural Political Economy 
The section discusses the theoretical perspective of the research project. As 
the preceding discussion of the literature on the development of cultural-
industries has shown, industrialisation of cultural policy in a Taiwanese 
context has been a set of hegemonic discourses in terms of ‘Industrialisation 
of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ since the mid-1990s, whilst little 
research has discussed the transformation of meaning-making or the 
discursive-material factors that have underpinned its evolution during the 
past twenty years. Since the set of discourses has covered the dramatic 
democratisation and the alternation of the ruling party in various periods, the 
meaning of industrialisation has significantly changed within the distinct 
imagined goals and policy strategies. This research will analyse the 
discursive formation of industrialisation discourse and its evolutionary 
mechanisms within the specific political-economic context of Taiwan. For the 
objectives to be achieved, this research takes the perspective of ‘Cultural 
Political Economy’ as the main theoretical and analytical foundation, 
because the perspective emphasises co-constitution of the semiosis and 
structuration as well as the production of hegemony, which provides a helpful 
theoretical framework to investigate the semiotic and structural aspects of 
industrialisation in cultural policy and the hegemonic struggle for meaning 
and practice in the transformation.  
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Cultural Political Economy (hereafter CPE), as its name implies, is putting 
culture in its place in the political economy. The perspective of CPE has 
mainly been developed by Bob Jessop and Ngai Ling Sum with their 
colleagues based at Lancaster University. There are three essential 
components: the cultural turn, critical realism and the strategic-relational 
approach to the state, upon which Jessop and Sum build the ontology, 
epistemology and methodology of CPE.  
 
2.2.1 Cultural Turn 
The first disciplinary background to CPE is reflection on ‘cultural turn’, which 
inspires CPE to focus on the semiotic dimensions of political economy.  
’Cultural turn’, is a paradigm shift which places the specific efficacy of culture 
at the centre of discussions and debates in the humanities and social 
sciences (Ray and Sayer, 1999). This conceptual revolution, according to 
Stuart Hall, refers to a contemporary social analysis that gives culture a 
constitutive role in conditioning the existence of social life through the 
making of meaning (Hall, 1997, p.220). It is different from other types of 
Marxist explanation which make culture a purely dependent variable or hold 
with the view of ‘cultural supremacy’. Instead, ‘cultural turn’ describes a 
mutually constitutive perspective, from which to articulate culture with a 
political and economic structure (Hall, 1997, p.226). In this vein, ‘cultural 
turn’ has three main aspects. Thematically, the cultural dimension, which has 
been a marginalised research topic, neglected for a long time, is becoming 
increasingly emphasised in the discussion of social science mainly because 
of growing critical interest as well as the growth of cultural studies in 
reconnecting the humanities and social sciences (Sum and Jessop, 2003). 
Methodologically, the cultural content of social and economic activities has 
started to be viewed as a new standpoint for social analysis. Ontologically, 
culture has become a necessary foundation of the social world.  
In response to the above transformation of ‘cultural turn’, Sum and Jessop 
(2003) developed CPE and introduced ‘semiosis’ into critical political 
economy. They use ‘semiosis’ to refer to “the intersubjective production of 
meaning that can be seen as an umbrella concept for language, rhetoric, 
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discourses, narratives and identities” (Jessop, 2004, p.161). Jessop and 
Sum (2013) adopt Thwaites et al. (1994, p.1) definition of culture as “the 
ensemble of social processes by which meanings are produced, circulated 
and exchanged” to indicate the overlap between culture and semiosis and 
put culture in its place in political economy. In other words, this ontological 
turn gives semiosis a fundamental role in the overall constitution of social 
subjects and social relations. In this context, language (or discourse) is a key 
feature of social life and should be given priority in the analysis of the CPE 
approach rather than simply putting ‘culture’ into economic and political 
analysis or applying ‘cultural theory’ to policy analysis (Jessop, 2010, p.337; 
Sum, 2005). Therefore, the study of CPE especially stresses an ontological 
cultural turn in political economy and concerns the process of meaning-
making, especially how culture ‘construes’ the world (Jessop, 2010). 
In addition to focusing on the semiotic essence of meaning and meaning-
making in social relations, CPE highlights the complex relations between 
meaning and practice. In this relationship, CPE especially explores the 
operations of power that are “significantly shaped by the discursive 
constitution of identities, modes of calculation, strategies, and tactics”, as 
well as “the primary institutional mechanism in and through which power is 
exercised” (Sum and Jessop, 2003, no pagination). The theoretical reflexivity 
not only broadens the traditional-structuralist agenda of political economy to 
stress the semiotic nature of all social relations, but also provides a critical 
viewpoint on the importance of the materiality of the political economy. 
Jessop (2008, p.238) claims that CPE is not only concerned with “how texts 
produce meaning and thereby help to generate social structure” but also 
“how such production is constrained by emergent, non-semiotic features of 
social structure as well as by inherently semiotic factors”. In this vein, CPE 
critiques the way orthodox political economy tends to naturalise the process 
of modification and institutionalisation of capital accumulation; in contrast, it 
confirms the constructive position of critical political economy where 
technical and economic objects are always socially constructed, historically 
specific, more or less socially embedded or disembedded in the on-going 
social formation, and further concern the integration with semiosis (Sum and 
Jessop, 2003). 
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In summary, Sum and Jessop (2003, no pagination) list the five significances 
of the cultural turn to the CPE research, as follows: 
(a) It takes the argumentative, narrative, rhetorical, and linguistic 
turns seriously in the analysis of political economy, either as the 
principal method of analysis or as adjuncts to other methods of 
inquiry;  
(b) It examines the role of discourse in the making and re-making 
of social relations and its contribution to their emergent extra-
discursive properties; 
(c) It investigates discourses and discursive configurations as a 
system of meanings and practices that has semiotic structuring 
effects that differ from those of emergent political and economic 
structures and, a fortiori, study how these different principles or 
logics interact and with what effects; 
(d) It focuses on the (in)stability and the interplay of objects-
subjects in the remaking of social relations – and hence the 
importance of remaking subjectivities as part of the structural 
transformation and actualisation of objects; 
(e) It examines the relationship between the politics of 
identity/difference and political economy – especially the 
complex articulations between class and nonclass identities 
over different times and spaces. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
In other words, ‘cultural turn’ makes the CPE research not only stress the 
contribution of semiosis and semiotic practices to the constitution of social 
relations, but also acknowledges extra-semiotic features of social relations 
and their constraints and mobility. These five features inspire this research to 
take a synthetic perspective on the co-constitutive process between 
discourse and practice around the ‘industrialisation’ of culture policy and the 
relevant structural factors.   
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2.2.2 Critical Realism 
The real world is so complex that actors cannot grasp it all; reduction is 
necessary for sense-making and meaning-making and therefore a strategic 
condition for actors to engage with and ‘go on’ in the world (Jessop, 2005). 
This leads to the second component of CPE, which is, based on critical 
realism and its integration with semiosis, to explain complexity reduction of 
the social world by semiosis and structuration.  
According to Sayer (2000, p.2), critical realists believe “there is a world 
existing independently from our knowledge of it” and “independence of 
objects from knowledge immediately undermines any complacent 
assumptions about the relation between them”. This introduces complex 
inter-relationships to social reality. In addition, Roy Bhaskar’s (1978) 
proposes the world is structured, differentiated, stratified and changing, and 
social relations can be analysed, at three levels - the real, the actual and the 
empirical - with mechanisms (Archer et al., 1998; Dean et al., 2005; 
Danermark, 2002). Based on Bhaskar (1978, p.56) multi-level ‘ontological 
map’, Danermark (2002, p.20, my italics)  describes the three levels as three 
ontological domains: 
The empirical domain consists of what we experience, directly or 
indirectly. It is separated from the actual domain where events happen 
whether we experience them or not. What happens in the world is not 
the same as that which is observed. But this domain is in its turn 
separated from the real domain. In this domain there is also that which 
can produce events in the world, that which metaphorically can be called 
mechanisms. 
In this vein, Danermark (2002, p.21) indicates that the rather common 
expression ‘the empirical world’ is thus fundamentally misleading because it 
simplifies the three domains to a single one and reduces what is, to what we 
can know about it. He argues that the function of scientific work is therefore 
aimed at investigating and identifying the relationships and non-relationships 
of the three ontological domains, respectively, between what we experience, 
what actually happens, and the real, with the underlying mechanisms that 
produce the events in the world. In other words, the three levels with 
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different mechanisms and powers constitute the social reality and shape the 
social world we experience. Kathryn Dean, Jonathan Joseph and Alan Norrie 
(2005, p.8, my italics)  further illustrate the configuration: 
The real is the foundational level and is composed of multiplicity of 
power, which may or may not be actualised as empirically-accessible 
events; the actual is the level, where some of those real powers are 
actualised as events; the empirical is the level in which these events are 
experienced.   
Rooted in this worldview, Jessop distinguishes three levels and 
emphasises the distinctive relation as represented below (Jessop, 2005, 
p.41). 
Real: generative structures or causal mechanisms 
Actual: events resulting from various real tendencies and counter-
tendencies in specific initial conditions. 
Empirical: observations or measurements of actual events and, in some 
circumstances, underlying structures or mechanisms. 
On this basis of critical realism, the analysis of CPE is different from 
positivism, in that it does not discuss the structure and mechanisms behind 
social phenomena. In contrast, critical realist explanations of CPE 
distinguish these three levels including the multiple causal mechanisms at 
the real, their contingent necessary interaction at the level of the actual, and 
the ways in which empirical evidence about these processes can be made 
available (Jessop, 2005).  
Furthermore, Norman Fairclough, Bob Jessop and Andrew Sayer (2002)  
argue that critical realism must integrate semiosis into its account of social 
relations and social structuration because language and other semiotic 
structures are dependent instruments for actors to explore reality. In this 
vein, they are concerned with the mutual implications of critical realism and 
semiosis, which illustrate the dialectic of structure and agency. For instance, 
Fairclough et al. (2002, p.10) indicate that the dialectic is featured as “the 
operation of the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection, and 
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retention that shape the relationships between semiosis and social 
structuration”. In other words, the three mechanisms play essential roles in 
facilitating construal of the world to make sense and meaning of social facts. 
By doing so, the unstructured complexity becomes meaningful and 
structured complexity for actors to go on in the world (Sum and Jessop, 
2013). In this context, Jessop and Oosterlynck (2008) extend the 
revolutionary mechanisms to include material as well as semiotic factors. It 
is worth citing the list of mechanisms, to give a thorough picture: 
(1) Continuing variation in discourses and practices, whether due to their 
incomplete mastery, their skilful adaptation in specific circumstances, 
new challenges or crises, or other semiotic or material causes. 
(2) Selection of particular discourses (the privileging of just some 
available, including emergent, discourses) for interpreting events, 
legitimising actions, and (perhaps self-reflexively) representing social 
phenomena. Semiotic factors act here by influencing the resonance of 
discourses in personal, organisational and institutional, and broader 
meta-narrative terms and by limiting possible combinations of semiosis 
and semiotic practices in a given semiotic order. Material factors also 
operate here through conjunctural or entrenched power relations, path-
dependency and structural selectivities.  
(3) Retention of some resonant discourses (e.g. inclusion in an actor’s 
habits, hexis and personal identity, enactment in organisational routines, 
integration into institutional rules, objectification in the built environment, 
material and intellectual technologies, and articulation into widely 
accepted accumulation strategies, state projects or hegemonic visions). 
The greater the range of sites (horizontally and vertically) in which 
resonant discourses are retained, the greater the potential for effective 
institutionalisation and integration into patterns of structured coherence 
and durable compromise.  
(4) Reinforcement insofar as certain procedural devices exist that 
privilege these discourses and their associated practices and also filter 
out contrary discourses and practices. This can involve both discursive 
selectivity (e.g. genre chains, styles, identities) and material selectivity 
(e.g. the privileging of certain dominant sites of discourse through 
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structural biases in specific organisational and institutional orders). Such 
mechanisms recursively strengthen appropriate genres, styles, and 
strategies and selectively eliminate inappropriate alternatives and are 
most powerful where they operate across many different sites to 
promote complementary discourses within the wider social ensemble. 
(5) Selective recruitment, inculcation and retention by relevant social 
groups, organisations, institutions and so on, of social agents whose 
predispositions fit maximally with the preceding requirements. 
(Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, p.1159, italics in original) 
The above operations of mechanisms shape the co-evolutionary relations 
between semiosis and structuration and secure the social reproduction in 
discursive and material ways. With these features of mechanisms, CPE not 
only explains why certain kinds of things happen but also provides the 
direction to explore how things happen.  
In addition to the introduction of mechanisms, it is also important to discuss 
the other implications of critical realism and semiosis that facilitate CPE to 
explain complexity reduction of the social world by two modes of semiosis 
and structuration. Within the on-going process of complexity reduction, CPE 
employs the concepts of semiosis and structuration to interpret actual events 
and process as well as to contribute to the explanation of their emergent 
effects (Jessop, 2010). According to Jessop (2010), semiosis is a dynamic 
source of sense and meaning whereby complexity is reduced. Here, sense-
making refers to the role of semiosis in the apprehension of the natural and 
social world and highlights the referential value of semiosis. It reduces 
complexity for actors by steering attention and action to some aspects of the 
world. Meaning-making refers, in turn, to processes of signification and 
meaningful communication and is closely related to the production of 
linguistic meaning but also includes non-linguistic modes of signification and 
communication. The sense- and meaning-making of semiosis not only 
reduce complexity for actors but also give meaning to the world.  
Specifically, Fairclough et al. (2002, pp.8-10) identify the three main 
characteristics of semiosis as a medium of social practice. First, semiosis is 
influenced by the habitus that actors with different capacities have different 
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degrees of dealing with new discourses or language. Second, semiosis has 
a dual presence in the production and identification of social events, which 
illuminates semiotic causal powers, their mechanisms and semiotic 
interpretation. Third, semiosis is multi-functional, in as much as it is 
simultaneously referential, social-relational and expressive in social actions, 
which helps actors to identify constructions involving the two moments of 
‘construal’ and the material process of ‘construction’. These features explain 
that semiosis always pre-exists and interplays with social structures and 
illustrates such reductions by semiosis as rely on working with the other 
mode of complexity reduction – structuration.  
The other mode of complexity reduction, structuration, concerns the 
emergent pattern of social interactions, which refers to a complex, 
contingent, tendential process that is mediated through actions (Jessop, 
2010). Fairclough et al. (2002, p.11) highlight three interrelated semiotic 
aspects of social structuration: 
First, semiotic conditions affect the differential reproduction and 
transformation of social groups, organisations, institutions, and other 
social phenomena. Second, these mechanisms are reflexive in the 
sense that semiotic conditions affect the variation, selection and 
retention of the semiotic features of social phenomena. Third, semiotic 
innovation and emergence is itself a source of variation that feeds into 
the process of social transformation.  
In respect of the function of structuration, Jessop indicated three 
mechanisms, variation, selection and retention, which have played 
foundational roles in taking the real world from complexity to sedimented 
meaning and structured complexity (see Figure 3. 1).  In other words, the 
mechanisms working through semiosis and structuration transform the world 
to become meaningful to actors, and social interactions undergo 
structuration. In this way, CPE is characterised by the integration of the three 
evolutionary mechanisms into semiotic analysis. Jessop explains the 
functions of the mechanism and states that the analysis of CPE involves “the 
role of extra-semiotic (material) as well as semiotic factors in the contingent 
emergence (variation), subsequent privileging (selection), and on-going 
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realisation (retention) of specific discursive and material practices” (Jessop, 
2010, p.340). 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Figure 3. 1 Complexity reduction through enforced selection  
            (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p.151) 
 
In short, the inspiration from critical realism for CPE is not only to distinguish 
between real mechanisms, actual events and empirical observation, but to 
study the mechanisms in semiosis and emerging social relations. For this 
research, it is important to explore the operational mechanisms of semiosis 
and structuration that shape the specific semiotic order (such as 
‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ in this study) and its 
transformation, as well as investigate the dialectic of social relations 
between structure and agency. The latter is related to the strategic-relational 
approach that will be discussed in the following section. 
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2.2.3 Strategic-Relational Approach 
In order to develop CPE to understand the meaning of reality and practice 
and the struggle between agency and structure, Jessop firstly examined 
Anthony Giddens’ structuration theory, Roy Bhaskar’s transformational 
model of social activity and Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach, and 
finally developed the ‘Strategic-Relational Approach’ (hereafter SRA) to 
describe this complexity relation (Jessop, 2005).  
Rooted in the philosophical base of critical realism, Jessop argues that 
Giddens’ structuration theory introduces rich descriptions of structure and 
agency and their mutual constitution, but this dualism treats both at the 
actual level rather than analysing their mechanisms, emergent properties, 
tendencies and material (Jessop, 2005). In this context, he recognises 
Bhaskar and Archer’s critical realist analysis of structure and agency, and 
focuses on the contingent mediation through specific practices that are 
enabled, and limited, by the structural position which agents occupy and 
have the capacity to act within. However, Jessop criticises their analyses’ 
lack of the complex spatio-temporalities of structures, strategic contexts, and 
social practice and their contingent articulation (Jessop, 2005, pp.47-48).  
In order to go beyond the above three positions and further interpret the 
dialectic interplay of structure and agency, Jessop develops a Strategic-
Relational Approach. The Strategic-Relational Approach, as its name 
implies, takes a relational and strategic viewpoint to examine structure in 
relation to action, and action in relation to structure (Jessop, 2005). The 
approach is rooted in critical realism, and views social practice as socially-
structured as well as socially-structuring in terms of strategy and selectivity. 
In this vein, Jessop (2005) indicates that structures are strategically-
selective in their form, content and operation; and actions are structurally-
constrained, context-sensitive and structuring. Within this basis framework, 
the SRA is concerned with two relational-dimensions: first, how a given 
structure can privilege some actors, some identities, some strategies and 
some actions over others; and second, how actors take account of this 
differential privileging through ‘strategic-context’ analysis when undertaking a 
course of action (Jessop, 2005). Therefore, the SRA deals with “the relations 
between structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities and (differentially 
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reflexive) structurally-oriented strategic calculation” (Jessop, 2005, p.48). It 
is worth citing a paragraph to give a clear explanation of the two concepts of 
‘structurally-inscribed strategic selectivities’ and ‘structurally-oriented 
strategic calculation’: 
 The concept of structural selectivity highlights the tendency for specific 
structures and structural configurations to selectively reinforce specific 
forms of action, tactics or strategies and to discourage others. Likewise 
the concept of structurally-oriented strategic calculation highlights the 
possibility of reflection on the part of individual and collective actors 
about the strategic selectivities inscribed within structures so that they 
come to orient their strategies and tactics in terms of their understanding 
of the current conjuncture and their ‘feel for the game’ (Jessop, 2005, 
p.48).   
This paragraph indicates the reflexive reorganisation of structural 
configurations with path-dependent and path-shaping aspects, as well as the 
recursive selection of strategies and tactics dependent on agents’ identities, 
interests and calculations. The critical realist analysis of structure and agency 
goes beyond pure dualism and gives more attention to the emergent spatio-
temporal features and structured coherence of structures and agency 
(Jessop, 2005). In this context, SRA not only focuses on selected strategy 
and tactics within the dialectics of path-dependency and path-shaping, but 
also acknowledges the pre-condition and structuring of social relations 
(Jessop, 2005, p.52).  
The SRA inspires this research to think of a prior development of structure 
which has shaped current trajectories of industrialisation and future 
possibilities, and, at the same time, concerns the social force’s intervention 
in current conjunctures and the agents’ reflexivity and strategic practice that 
may create possible conditions for new trajectories.  
 
2.3 Cultural Political Economy and Policy Analysis 
CPE is concerned with the role of the general evolutionary mechanisms 
of variation, selection and retention in the strategic-relational dialectic of 
path-shaping in the context of path-dependency as well as the crucial 
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role of semiosis in simplifying meaning in the face of complexity and, 
indeed, in contributing to the social construction as well as the social 
construal of the social world (Jessop, 2008, p.236). 
The last section and the above paragraph have stated the focus of CPE 
based on three components: cultural turn, critical realism, and the Strategic-
Relational Approach. In short, the aim of CPE is to investigate the co-
constitution of semiosis and structuration in complex social relations. 
Building on this basis, CPE advocates the concept of ‘imaginaries’ and the 
production of hegemony to apply to policy analysis (Jessop, 2010; Sum, 
2009). This section discusses how they serve as analytical instruments for 
this research.  
 
2.3.1 Imaginaries and Economic Imaginaries 
In the analysis of CPE, one of the essential originalities is the ‘imaginary’. 
Jessop and Sum deploy this concept as useful in analysing why some 
construals play more fundamental roles in sense- and meaning-making as 
well as constructing the interaction of social relations.  
As mentioned, the real world is very complex and unstratified, so that 
complexity reduction by the concepts of semiosis and structuration is 
necessary for actors to be aware of the world, make meaning and take 
action. Within the articulation of semiosis and structuration, not all semiotic 
systems have the same effectiveness. Some specific semiotic systems have 
more powerful effects, influences on meaning-making and further frame 
social relations. In this sense, Jessop adopts the French usage of ‘imaginary’ 
to designate an imaginary relation for lived experience and interpret the way 
it contributes to social structuration (Sum and Jessop, 2013; Sum and 
Jessop, 2003). More importantly, they identify the imaginary relation as a 
kind of “semiotic system that frames individual subjects’ lived experience of 
an inordinately complex world and/or informs collective calculation about that 
world” (Jessop, 2010, p.344). With the concept of imaginary in mind, 
individual and organisational actors can connect to the world and go on in 
the world, make decisions or engage in strategic actions.   
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Based on this definition, Sum and Jessop (2013) identify how an ‘imaginary’ 
can be considered as a ‘master’ set of signs that are closely related to 
semiosis, but are not identical. They pay more attention to the material 
dimension of this imaginary relation and its implication for lived experience 
as they state the differences: 
semiosis is a generic term for the social production of intersubjective 
meaning and can be studied productively with the tools of semiotic 
analysis, the 'imaginary' not only refers to semiosis but also to its 
material supports, and this requires a broader toolkit. (Sum and Jessop, 
2013, p.165, italics in original).  
Furthermore, Fairclough (2003) explains that imaginaries comprise a 
dialectic arrangement of genres (that serve to regularise, such as public 
documents), discourses (that represent social practices, such as the 
discussion of ‘liberalism’), and styles (that are ways of being, such as 
managerial style) that specifically refer to a semiotic moment of a network of 
social practices in a given social field or wider social formation.  
In this regard, Sum and Jessop elaborate, thus:  
An imaginary provides one entry-point (among many others) into a 
supercomplex reality and can be associated with different standpoints, 
which frame and contain debates, policy discussions and conflicts over 
particular ideal and material interests (Sum and Jessop, 2013, p.165 
italics and bold in original).  
Building on the above explanation, there are three features of imaginary 
making the CPE approach a distinctive analytical perspective for policy 
studies. Firstly, the formation of imaginary is a struggling process conducted 
by specific agents, which typically involves the asymmetrical manipulation of 
power and knowledge and is liable to contestation and resistance (Sum and 
Jessop, 2003). Jessop (2010, pp.345-6) indicates that this struggle involves 
the participation and negotiation of political parties, think tanks, international 
bodies, interest organisations, social movements, and some intermediary 
instruments such as the mass media to mobilise elite and/or popular support 
behind competing imaginaries. All these social forces seek to establish or 
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consolidate a specific imaginary as the hegemonic ‘frame’ to dominate a 
particular context through the semiotic mechanisms of variation, selection 
and retention. At the same moment, other counter-hegemonic imaginaries 
may be initiated to resist and attempt to replace the hegemonic imaginaries. 
The struggle of imaginaries provides a specific lens for policy researchers to 
analyse the power relation of various interests and how they shape a 
specific lived experience.  
Secondly, the concept of ‘imaginaries’ provides a distinctive analytical 
concept through which to explore the configuration of the lived experience. 
For instance, the perspective of CPE recognises economy as having two 
types of meanings. One is the ‘actually existing economy’ which can be seen 
as the chaotic sum of all substantive economic activities (Sum and Jessop, 
2003). The other term is ‘economic imaginaries’ which is a semiotic system, 
coherent with these activities, that gives meaning and shape to the 
‘economic’ field within spatio-temporal frameworks (Jessop, 2010, pp.344-5). 
This distinctive term reveals a specific imaginatively constitutive role that can 
be effectively calculated, managed or governed by the relationship of these 
economic activities. In other words, the concept of imaginaries distinguishes 
the concrete or visible phenomenon/activities from the connective and 
strategic relationships between agency and structure within specific spatial-
temporal frameworks. In this sense CPE is helpful as its three essential 
components (the cultural turn, critical realism and SRA) and focus on 
formation of imaginary and power relations, have provided a critical 
perspective for researchers to look beyond the surface of policy text and 
analyse the immanent constitution and naturalisation of social relations. 
Thirdly, there are many kinds of imaginaries that link with each other within 
the broad field of semiotic practices (Sum and Jessop, 2013). Among them, 
Jessop and his colleagues especially emphasise the implications of 
economic imaginaries in a capitalist world (Jessop, 2004; Sum and Jessop, 
2003; Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008). They argue that economic 
imaginaries (re)articulate various genres, discourses, and styles around a 
particular conception of the economy and its extra-economic conditions of 
existence (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, p.1158). Jessop particularly 
highlights that the constitutive role of economic imaginaries can not only 
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“identify, privilege and stabilise some specific economic relations” but also 
“transform them into objects of observation, calculation and governance” 
(Jessop, 2010, p.345). In this vein, he explains why ‘knowledge-based 
economy’ has become a powerful economic imaginary in the last 20 years 
and indicates that its power works as a master economic narrative that 
articulates many accumulation strategies from local to global, state projects, 
and affects diverse institutional orders and the life world, which has been 
influential in shaping policy paradigms, strategies and policies in and across 
many different fields of social practice (Jessop, 2004). In addition, economic 
imaginaries are discursively constituted and materially reproduced on many 
sites and scales, with different spatio-temporal contexts and horizons 
(Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008, p.1158). These features of economic 
imaginaries are important elements with which to examine the semiotic 
practice of policy and its structuration.  
Apart from the features of imaginaries, CPE further concerns the formation 
of hegemonic imaginaries where social forces compete to establish a 
specific imaginary with the effectiveness of a dominant frame in social 
formation. This will be discussed in the following section.  
 
2.3.2 The Production of Hegemony  
As the previous sections show, only some specific imaginaries can become 
of primary semiotic order, and affect the (re)making and reproducing of 
capitalist social relations. During the struggles of imaginaries, it is necessary 
to analyse the production of hegemony. Ngai-Ling Sum is one of the 
important researchers in this area, who introduces Gramscian and 
Foucauldian perspectives into the analysis of the making of hegemony, and 
significantly supplements the CPE research.  
In the development of CPE’s theoretical framework, Ngai-Ling Sum is 
specifically concerned with the discursive-structural selectivity of social 
forces in the production of hegemony as well as the struggles between 
hegemonic imaginary and counter-hegemonic imaginary (Sum, 2005). In 
order to unpack the production of hegemony, Sum (2009) integrates 
Foucauldian insights into discourse, discipline and governmentality and 
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Gramscian inspiration of language, domination and hegemony into CPE. 
She calls this integration “Gramsianize Foucault”, and it involves three 
aspects. Firstly, it adopts the Gramscian perspective for exploring the 
formation and reproduction of hegemony. Secondly, it takes the Foucauldian 
viewpoint to investigate the discursive aspects of subject formation and 
techniques of subjectivation. Finally, it synthesises these Foucauldian 
insights into a broadly Gramscian approach to analysing the discursive 
moments of social relations; specifically, exploring how these discourses are 
mutually implicated with structural features in the production of hegemony 
(Sum, 2009, p.186).   
Sum’s studies reveal how new social relations can be interconstructed by the 
production of hegemony, which involves both discursive selectivity and 
material selectivity to privilege specific discourses and their practice; at the 
same time, filtering out contrary discourses and practices (Sum, 2005, p.8). 
In order to analyse the selectivity in the competition of hegemony, Sum 
(2005, p.10) derives three mediating arenas as material-discursive sites that 
serve to condense social relations and to normalise and negotiate 
hegemony: (1) international organizations/institutions, such as the WTO or 
World Bank; (2) super and sub-states, such as the EU, ministries, and local 
governments; and (3) (trans-)national civil society, such as NGOs, social 
movements forums and popular culture. Among them, the first two are 
crucial intermediaries in (re)structuring capitalist hegemony and 
consolidating the new common sense within elites and among the masses, 
by deploying the knowledge technologies of hegemony, while the feedback 
or opinions of civil society sometimes inspire or counter the hegemony from 
the first two arenas. It is worth noting the suspected and contested nature of 
civil society that sometimes follows the hegemonic imaginary but sometimes 
generates discourses and actions of counter-hegemony that would 
challenge or deconstruct these technologies (Sum, 2005, p.10-12).  
In addition, within these hegemonic processes, some actors play a more 
powerful role as intermediaries in articulating, reinforcing and filtering out the 
discourses, such as international organisations or governmental policy-
makers (Sum, 2005, p.12). They may select, privilege or recontextualise 
certain economic imaginaries and their corresponding objects of 
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governance, and mobilise networks to support their promotion and 
institutionalisation, whereby public choices and public opinion may be 
constrained or weakened. Moreover, such hegemonic discourses and 
formations also marginalise some groups while they provoke resistance from 
social movements and civil society (Sum, 2009). 
Thus, Sum’s analysis of hegemony contributes a constant, dynamic struggle 
of semiosis and structuration to the CPE research. It highlights the 
interaction among policy discourses, governmentalities and structures which 
emerge between the actual events and underlying mechanisms to critically 
explain the production of hegemonic policy discourses and practices. When 
analysing the production of hegemonic policy discourses, Sum (2009, 
pp.198-199, italics in original) suggests a series of questions for the study of 
policy-making: 
1. What kind of policy ideas and economic imaginaries are selected 
and how they develop?; 
2. Who gets involved in the discursive networks that cut across 
diverse institutional orders and civil society (e.g., business schools, 
strategy firms, think tanks, international organisations, private 
authorities, regional organisations, aid agencies, the business 
press, etc. )?;  
3. How policy ideas are being turned into transnational knowledge 
brands4?; 
4. How the brands are being recontextualiszed at every sites and 
scales?; 
5. How and through what mechanisms (e.g., knowledge apparatuses 
and technologies) are they (re-) produced as part of the hegemonic 
logics?; 
6. How they (re-) organise the spaces, policies and populations?; 
                                            
4 Sum uses ‘knowledge brand’ to refer to a set of hegemonic discourse. For example, 
Florida’s ‘creative class’ can be seen as a ‘knowledge brand’ in the discourses of urban 
regeneration (Sum, 2009). 
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7. How this hegemonic constellation of policy discourses and practices 
come to be challenged and (re-) negotiated in specific 
conjunctures?; 
8. How these mediate the rebuilding of social relations? 
These questions provide essential starting points for the inquires of this 
research to investigate ‘industrialisation’ as a hegemonic imaginary; what 
kind of policy discursive conditions and constructions there are; who the key 
actors are; and how and by what mechanisms the hegemonic imaginary has 
been constructed and transformed.  
 
2.4 Research Questions 
In view of the research background and theoretical perspective of CPE, 
three major research questions are addressed: 
(1) What is the trajectory of industrialisation in Taiwan’s cultural policy? 
This focuses on an investigation into the selection and evolution of 
industrialisation discourse in terms of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industrialisation’; and what discursive context and 
structural factors have co-constituted the meaning of industrialisation 
discourse from 1994 to 2012. 
(2) On this trajectory, how has industrialisation become a critical issue 
and seized hegemony in Taiwan’s cultural policy? This explores the 
evolution mechanisms, the actors’ visions and the struggle over 
hegemony in the discursive, material evolution of industrialisation.  
(3) What are the implications of the trajectory for the network of cultural 
policy including cultural production and distribution? This evaluates 
the continuity and changes of industrialisation in the three temporal-
spatial phases and discusses the contradictions and challenges of 
cultural policy in Taiwan.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
This chapter elaborates on the methodological approach based on CPE for 
analysing the trajectory of industrialisation in Taiwan’s cultural policy. It 
consists of three sections. The first section analyses the application of the 
CPE theory by the essential studies, which include New Zealand’s fashion 
industries, creative economy, South West England’s creative industries, and 
creative network. These relevant studies indicate the complexity and 
difficulty of applying the CPE approach to cultural policy. In order to 
supplement CPE, the second section introduces Jim McGuigan (2004) three 
discourses of cultural policy, including state discourse, market discourse and 
civil discourse, as the analytical tools to investigate the semiotic practice 
between the state and local practice. These analyses lay the foundation for 
the methodological approach – critical semiotic analysis, which employs 
critical discourse analysis with case studies, and interviews, in the third 
section.   
 
3.1 Applying the CPE Approach to this Research 
CPE analysis aims to explore the co-constitution of semiosis and 
structuration by the evolutionary mechanisms of variation, selection and 
retention, and investigate the production of hegemonic imaginary that 
constitutes the role of specific forms of agency and technologies in this 
context. Among the applications of the CPE approach, some research 
discusses the cultural/creative industries and cultural/creative economy, 
which provides significant inspiration for this research.  
One piece of research is a collective work about the designer fashion 
industry conducted by Nick Lewis, Wendy Larner, and Richard Le Heron 
(2008). They use similar concepts to the CPE perspective to examine the co-
constitution of political projects in the case of the New Zealand designer 
fashion industry. Through discursive analysis of the relevant documents and 
interviews, as well as practical participation in the related events, they found 
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the designer fashion industry was entangled in, and supportive of, multiple 
political projects with diverse expectations. In other words, the designer 
fashion industry is imagined as an export earner, a set of representations for 
branding New Zealand, able to facilitate the clothing industry and products, 
and a frame for promoting economic nationalism, the new economy and 
social development (Lewis et al., 2008). In terms of ‘after-neoliberal’ 
imaginaries which work similarly to economic imaginaries, they argue that 
the creative economy is mobilised by the state as a part of political projects 
to articulate strategies and practices of ‘globalisation’, ‘knowledge economy’, 
‘creative city’ and ‘social development’.  
Similarly, Calvin Taylor (2013) emphasises the link between economic 
imaginaries and state projects. He argues that a ‘creative economy’ can be 
seen as a strategically selected assemblage or a strategic fix to reconcile the 
contradictions in the regional economy. In his analysis, he views creative 
economy as the specific economic imaginary which has emerged at a 
distinctive conjuncture in the regional economy as well as a ‘strategic fix’ in 
facing the contradictory tensions of a post-neo-liberal era of economic 
governance (p.2). Taylor (2013) research provides significant inspiration for 
this research. In Taiwan’s context, ‘industrialisation of culture’ has been an 
essential theme of the state’s project, and has extended to frame 
programmes with various focuses. This thinking leads this research to 
examine the emergence of ‘industrialisation of culture’ as economic 
imaginaries as well as what and how the state attempts to ‘fix’; in particular 
by the selection of ‘extra-economic strategies’. Here, extra-economic 
strategies refer to “a central concern of the new emphasis on political 
economy in governance and the institutional arrangements through which 
‘fixes’ can be selected, constructed, implemented and managed” (Taylor, 
2013, p.7).  
Julie Channer (2013) holds a similar position, that creative industries and the 
creative economy signify a state’s political strategy and economic 
imaginaries.  Her study examines state governance of the creative industries 
in South West England under the Labour government from 1997 to 2010. In 
addition to the interpretation of state power and the SRA framework, the 
significance of her research for this research is the multiple articulations and 
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the role of imaginaries. In Channer (2013, p.46) analysis, imaginaries have 
different scales and serve as conceptual tools to observe the multi-scalar 
governance and the contestations of power relations. In Taiwan’s case, the 
imaginaries of industrialisation seem to be different at the level of the state, 
local government and local communities. Although the state’s imposed 
imaginaries may be more powerful in the consolidation of power relations, 
other imaginaries constructed at other levels, or even at the micro level of 
social forces, may maintain and shape new power relations. In other words, 
it is a constant and dialectic process that imaginaries are constructing, and 
being constructed by, structure and agency.  
Bass van Heur (2010) takes the CPE approach to investigating the role of 
networks of aesthetic production in mediating and transforming imperatives 
of capitalist accumulation and regulation. He argues that network dynamics 
are related to accumulation and regulation, and these relations are highly 
partial and uneven. His research not only inspires this research to notice 
alternative forms of regulation that may not directly relate to the state, but 
also pays equal attention to interpreting the actual interactions as well as 
imagined political economies (van Heur, 2010b, pp.195-196). This is 
reflected in the critique of the CPE approach. In the debate with Jessop and 
Sum (van Heur, 2010a; van Heur, 2010c; Jessop and Sum, 2010), van Heur 
points out that the CPE approach is so complex that it lacks an empirical 
research strategy. In order to develop empirical tools based on the CPE 
perspective, this research borrows Jim McGuigan (2004) discursive analysis 
of cultural policy to propose research strategies, and this will be elaborated 
in the next section.  
Regarding van Heur’s other criticism, that the current version of CPE does 
not notice the emergence of progressive practices beyond regulation, he 
reminds researchers to be concerned with the political relevance of CPE 
(van Heur, 2010c). In Taiwan’s experience, alternative forms of political 
intervention such as social movements and diverse protests from civil 
groups play an essential role in the emergence of industrialisation discourse. 
This research will investigate the dialectic between the state’s regulation and 
local practice in every phase (Chapters 4, 5 and 6). 
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Synthesising the above analysis, the relevant research, with the CPE 
approach, provides very useful thoughts and critical perspectives for 
studying the emergence and transformation of the ‘Industrialisation of 
culture’ in Taiwan. There are several features that can be summarised here.  
First, the CPE approach takes a co-constitutive view to analyse the 
formation of policy with the focus on discourse and structure. It provides an 
integral and dialectical perspective from which to analyse the evolution of a 
cultural policy. This suggests that the researcher should be concerned with 
the role of semiotic practices. In this sense, this research will investigate the 
interaction among policy discourses, governmentalities, local practice and 
structure. In particular, it should involve the investigation of questions of how 
mechanisms operate to select, retain and reinforce specific imaginaries and 
thereby shape the concrete, contextualised and contingent dynamics of a 
particular economy in its specific social and cultural settings as these 
change over time. 
Second, the important concepts of the CPE approach such as semiotic 
practice, economic imaginaries and governmental technologies provide very 
useful analytical tools in cultural policy studies to better understand how the 
formation and implication of cultural industrialisation have been mobilised by 
state regulation and co-shaped through local practice. In this vein, this 
research will investigate the emergence of industrialisation discourse and its 
embedded imaginaries within a political, economic and social context.  
Third, the roles of state power and governmental technologies are 
indispensable in CPE’s analyses. State power is the discursively- and 
institutionally-mediated condensation of a changing balance of forces. This is 
because it refers to the mechanisms involved in the governance of conduct 
and in the production of hegemony, domination and capital accumulation. 
The research conducted by Sum (2009) provides a significant contribution 
which illustrates how governmental techniques strategically produce 
hegemony and consolidate the state’s domination. Moreover, Sum (2009; 
2010) explores technologies of economic competitiveness and clusters in 
neo-liberalism, such as knowledge apparatuses (e.g. numbers, stands, 
programmes, guidelines) and knowledge brands as well as common 
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discursive stratagems (e.g. naturalisation, inevitabilisation, otherisation, 
nominalisation). Therefore, the CPE perspective offers an approach to 
looking “beyond agenda setting, policy discourses and policy formulation to 
examine how policies actually get implemented and with what effects, 
whether intended or not” (Jessop, 2010, p.339). These mechanisms and 
technologies remind researchers to notice the struggles of meaning-making 
and domination from policies, policy decision techniques, policy instruments 
and policy evaluation. 
Last, but possibly the most distinctive point of this research, is to explore the 
semiotic and structural condition of the democratisation from post-
authoritarian to increasingly democratic society. Since the lifting of martial 
law in 1987, Taiwan has experienced dramatic change in every aspect. The 
extensive democratic reforms in political institutions, general elections, 
economic liberalisation, social security and the emerging of civil society, all 
set the emerging conditions of the social relations between structure and 
agency. In particular, a variety of crises occurred during the transformation to 
democratisation, which led to a relatively unstable situation in the production 
and reproduction of discourse and structuration. In addition to focusing on 
the multi-level economic imaginaries, this research will explore the emerging 
and constitutive role of political imaginary which was mainly mobilised by the 
political party in power in the semiotic practice of industrialisation.  
Building on the theoretical CPE perspective provided above, this research is 
not only concerned with how industrialisation of culture produces meaning 
and thereby helps generate social structure, but also pays attention to how 
such production of meaning and structuration is constrained by emergent 
social structure, as well as by inherently semiotic factors within the specific 
spatio-temporal era.  
Although CPE provides a very insightful theoretical perspective and useful 
concepts such as the ‘Strategic-Relation Approach’ and ‘economic 
imaginary’, there are two main challenges when applying a critical realist 
perspective of CPE in this empirical study. One of the challenges is the lack 
of clear research procedure and methods to distinguish the three levels (the 
empirical level, the actual level and the real level) and explain the 
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naturalisation of hegemonic discourse and the constitution. The dominant 
discourse is often represented in the policy narrative and practice principles, 
in which some influential semiotic systems can be recognised as economic 
imaginaries, which might cause confusion about how to look beyond the 
surface of policy text and empirical practice in order to deduce the meaning-
making of the economic imaginaries and the immanent constitution of social 
relations. Facing this challenge, this research develops the research 
procedure. It starts to conduct historical and contextual analysis to clarify the 
political-economic structure and the hegemonic discourse of cultural policy in 
every phase, which had confined the frame of the tendency and the counter-
tendency of the actual level. Then, by cross-checking with the empirical data 
and the CPE’s critical semiotic analysis (section 3.3), it identifies the specific 
spatial-temporal condition with causal mechanisms in the real level and the 
production of hegemonic/counter-hegemonic discourse (tendency/counter-
tendency).        
The other challenge is to operationalise the analytical concepts of CPE. As 
the theoretic framework of CPE is rather complex, it is difficult to 
operationalise the essential concepts, such as economic imaginaries and 
semiotic practice. In order to overcome this insufficiently explanatory 
perspective, this research supplements it with Jim McGuigan (2004) three 
discourses of cultural policy in the research framework. The three discourses 
provide distinguishing instruments of phenomena or events related to 
industrialisation for the analysis of semiotic practice.  
 
3.2 Three Discourses of Cultural Policy  
This research aims to investigate why and how the discourse of 
industrialisation has seized the hegemony in Taiwan’s cultural policy in the 
past twenty years. Based on the theoretical perspective of CPE, the 
evolution of hegemonic industrialisation has been mobilised, and struggled, 
at multi-levels of social forces such as the state’s policy regulation, business 
promotion, communities’ practice and cultural movements’ resistance. In 
order to analyse the dialectic and dynamic production of hegemonic 
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industrialisation, this research introduces three discourses of cultural policy 
which are borrowed from Jim McGuigan’s study (2004).  
In the policy analysis of cultural policy, McGuigan (2004) develops three 
discourses – state discourse, market discourse and civil discourse – to 
explore the discursive framing of cultural policy. These distinguishing 
discourses supplement CPE in this research in the three aspects. First, they 
remind the researcher to analyse the difference in ideologies hidden in three 
main areas – the state, the market and civil society – and their semiotic 
practice. In particular, it pays attention to the recent development of the rise 
of market reasoning within the public cultural sector under the neoliberal 
hegemony, as well as exploring the grounds of cultural resistance. Second, it 
adopts Foucault’s account of discourse to look at “the operations of power in 
the regulation of discourse, procedures of exclusion, reason and truth, 
internal policing and conditions of application” (McGuigan, 2004, p.36). 
Third, it argues that these discourses “all function in some sense to define 
‘the real world’ of culture and to position agents and subjects, producers, 
consumers, citizens and mediators, within the discursive space of the 
cultural field” (McGuigan, 2004, p.36). These characteristics are highly 
similar to the semiotic mechanisms of the CPE approach but focus more 
specifically on the field of cultural policy. In this sense, this research borrows 
the three discourses as an analytical lens through which to understand the 
variation, selection and retention of discourses about industrialisation and its 
associated practices of ordering, reproducing and transforming cultural 
policy formation.  
These three discourses can be summarised as follows (McGuigan, 2004, 
pp.36-60): 
(1) State discourse, such as ‘extension’, ‘access’ and ‘inclusion’. 
McGuigan traces back the emergence of these discourses in the 
British context and indicates that the background of these 
discourses assumed that the state was the principal actor in the 
cultural field. During the 1960s and 1970s, governments controlled 
general allocation of resources, where the principle was meant to 
secure political ‘neutrality’ and ‘impartiality’ between interested 
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parties in the specific field of operation. For example, ‘access’ was 
enacted in public fields such as education and cultural fields, such 
that it referred to opportunities and pleasures that were previously 
denied to most people. With the opposition movements, the 
meaning of ‘access’ was changed by redirecting resources and 
control to ‘the people’ (pp.39-40).  
(2) Market discourse, such as ‘de-regulation’ and ‘privatisation’. 
McGuigan argues that the 1980s was the turning point of cultural 
policy, and that the market discourse has become increasingly 
powerful. The market discourse refers to the language of money, 
that all value would be reduced to exchange value. Moreover, this 
discourse shows the positive public-private partnership between 
public-sector culture with an investment in cultural industries and 
festivals. McGuigan illustrates a number of examples that criticise 
the way the public sector is colonised by market discourse with a 
pervasive neo-liberal ideology, meaning that many public-sector 
cultural organisations are asked to achieve greater managerial 
efficiency, public-private partnerships, relative autonomy from the 
state and so on (pp.42-46). For instance, ‘market niche’ and 
‘corporate image’ are often used in governmental cultural 
arguments, and some public art museums are named after a 
sponsoring company.  
(3) Civil discourse. This emphasises the role of cultural policy in public 
citizenship, based on the theory of the public sphere of Jurgen 
Bourdieu.	McGuigan argues that civil discourse is often produced 
when something is wrong with ‘the culture’ that needs rectifying. In 
this sense, the discourses of culture jamming and civil movements 
are examples of civilising discourses which seek to counter 
governmental abrogation of responsibility and unrestrained 
cultural capitalism. He adopts Umberto Eco’s term ‘semiological 
guerrilla warfare’ to describe the function and organisation of civil 
discourse.   
In McGuigan (2004, p.36) thinking, the three discourses not only have a 
number of variants and may be internally unified, but also function in some 
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sense to define 'the real world' of culture and to position agents and 
subjects, producers, consumers, citizens and mediators, within the 
discursive space of the cultural field. When applying these discourses as an 
analytical lens in this research, it is worth noting the changing roles of the 
state in shaping its political imaginaries and economic imaginaries by 
mobilising the state discourse and market discourse in cultural policy. In 
addition, it is necessary to analyse the form and practice of civil discourse 
from civil society, local communities, social movements and cultural events, 
and how they have played an influential, constitutional role in the discursive-
formation of industrialisation during the period that Taiwanese society shifted 
from a post-authoritarian society to a young democracy in the past twenty 
years. 
 
3.3 Methodological Approach: Critical Semiotic Analysis 
The previous discussions have shown that CPE highlights the role of 
semiosis and examines the co-constitution between semiosis and 
structuration through evolutionary mechanisms. Methodologically, CPE 
employs the approach of ‘critical semiotic analysis’ to investigate the 
operation of evolutionary mechanisms, the formation of economic 
imaginaries and the production of hegemony in the structuration. On the 
theoretical basis of CPE, with the supplement of three discourses of cultural 
policy, this research takes critical semiotic analysis as a methodical 
approach to investigating the complex discursive-structural constitution of 
industrialisation in Taiwan’s cultural policy.  
Critical semiotic analysis, as Jessop (2004) emphasises, focuses on 
investigating the continuing variation in discourses and practices, the 
privileged discourse within the selective co-evolution of semiotic and 
material processes, and the institutionalisation of resonant discourses.  In 
this sense, it is consistent with critical discourse analysis but pays equal 
attention to discursive selectivity as well as material selectivity. In other 
words, critical semiotic analysis not only explores the variation and selection 
of specific discourse but also analyses the material context framing the 
semiotic selection as well as the structuration. More importantly, based on 
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the SRA, which initially focused on structural and agential selectivity (see 
section 3.1.3), the engagement of critical semiotic analysis has extended 
CPE to more fully explore the articulation and co-evolution of the discursive 
and extra-discursive (material) moments of social structuration and practice 
(Sum and Jessop, 2013). In this vein, Sum and Jessop (2013, pp.97-98) 
distinguish three concepts of critical semiotic analysis: semantics, social 
practices and discourse, which serve as analytical levels. Semantics 
concerns analysis of the historically specific macro-discursive vocabularies 
that frame social practices across a specific period. Social practices means 
analysing the meaningful practices and focusing on the substantive material 
aspects. Discourse refers to practices of sense- and meaning-making at the 
linguistic level, as well as semantic meaning. With the three analytical levels 
in mind, this research starts, from a historical and structural analysis of 
Taiwan, to investigate the contexts (semantics) which frame the emergence 
and transformation of the hegemonic discourse – ‘Industrialisation of 
Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’. It then focuses on the discursive 
formation and social practice surrounding the hegemonic discourse in the 
state’s policy practice as well as the local practice.  
Regarding the analytical strategies of critical semiotic analysis, this research 
takes critical discourse analysis with case studies, and interviews as the 
analytical tools to examine the discursive-material co-evolution between 
policy discourses and local practice in the production of hegemonic 
industrialisation.  
 
3.3.1 Critical Discourse Analysis with Case Study Research 
Discourse, as Teun A. van Dijk (1985, p.7) points out, plays a crucial role in 
ideological formulation, in the communicative reproduction of the social and 
political decision procedure, and in the institutional management and 
representation of such issues. Reiner Keller (2005) indicates that discourses 
are considered as ‘structured and structuring structures’ which shape social 
practices of enunciation. In her view, discourse analysis recognises the 
importance of socially constituted actors in the social production and 
circulation of knowledge to address sociological interests, the analyses of 
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social relations and the politics of knowledge as well as the discursive 
construction of reality as an empirical process. 
This research adopt Keller’s ‘sociology of knowledge approach to discourse’ 
to explore and discuss cultural policy in Taiwan. The main reason is because 
the sociology of knowledge approach to discourse emphasises the process 
of structuration with regard to the struggle in the relationship between 
discourses and structure, which not only responds to the concerns in this 
research but also fits the purpose of the CPE approach. Significantly, as 
Keller (2005, no pagination) notes, “it is not discourse itself which performs 
actions or social practices, but rather social actors involved in different social 
fields and symbolic struggles”. In practice, Keller assumes that discourse 
research always has to be considered a process of data construction and 
interpretation. 
Consequently, this research will firstly conduct a historical-context analysis of 
the past and present policy discourses regarding cultural industrialisation 
from various sources, including the texts of policies, laws, regulations, official 
documents, the statements of politicians, debates and the texts of 
interviews, to identify the structural factors and influences of the 
industrialisation of cultural policies. From these various discourses, two main 
project topics, highly related to the transformation of industrialisation, are the 
basis of collecting and interpreting discourses. One is the Community 
Empowerment Project; the other is the Creative and Cultural Industries 
Project.  The discourses surrounding these two topics are the main analytical 
targets. Among them, this research particularly focuses on the following 
essential documents:   
(1) The Cultural Policy White Paper (CCA, 1998; CCA, 2004a). These two 
official reports, the 1998 version and 2004 version, formally define the 
goals, topics, meaning and strategies of cultural policy in Taiwan during 
the last twenty years. As white papers, they represent the viewpoint of 
the state actor, the CCA (the main cultural policy-maker), in discourse 
and in practice. 
(2) Scoping reports commissioned by CCA. For example, the  “Handbook of 
Community Empowerment in County and City” (Chen, 1998) and “The 
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Trajectory of Community Empowerment in Taiwan” (Su and Tsai, 1999) 
are crucial books about cultural industries and community development 
with theoretical perspectives and many examples from abroad and at 
home. They are designed as guidelines for many communities and 
cultural workers to follow, which can been seen as part of governmental 
technologies. 
(3) Challenge 2008 – National Development Plan (Executive Yuan, 2002). 
This is the first time that CCI were included in national essential plans in 
Taiwan. It is a six-year policy guideline that was made by the DPP 
government, Taiwan’s ruling party from 2000 to 2008, with the aim of 
increasing competitive advantages for Taiwan at a national level. In this 
grand project, the Community Empowerment Project was included and 
extended to the cross-sector project entitled the ‘New Hometown 
Community Empowerment Project’. Both projects generated specific 
discourses and practical strategies for the government to constitute the 
political and economic imaginaries of industrialisation.  
(4) Creative Taiwan (Executive Yuan, 2009a). In 2008, the KMT government 
took over power from the DPP and initiated a five-year plan (2009-2013) 
for the cultural and creative industries. It is an action plan with two major 
strategies, environmental readiness and flagship projects. The 
discourses and strategies of ‘Creative Taiwan’ were distinguished from 
the DPP version of the CCI project, which led to another shift of 
industrialisation.  
(5) ‘Bedrock Action’ (CCA, 2007b; CCA, 2007c). This encompasses two 
sub-projects: the ‘Local Cultural Museum Project II (2008-2013)’, and the 
‘New Hometown CEP II (2008-2013)’. Both served as the second stage 
of the ‘New Hometown Community Empowerment Project’ for the CCA 
to continue the relevant projects of community empowerment. Under the 
administration of the KMT government, the CCA had adjusted the 
focuses of both projects. 
(6) The Law for the Development of the Cultural and Creative Industries 
(CCA, 2010a). This was promulgated in 2010 and provides a legal 
foundation and framework for the CCI development. It not only legalises 
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the subsidy system of the CCI but also consolidates the KMT 
government’s political and economic imaginaries of industrialisation.  
In addition, based on the theoretical reflection of CPE and three discourses 
of cultural policy, this research views the discourse of ‘Industrialisation of 
Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ as the dominant imaginaries, as well as 
the strategic fix, within the specific temporal-spatial context. The production 
of meaning-making and social practice have interacted between the state’s 
policy regulation and the local practice. The state plays a greater regulation 
role in the constitution of industrialisation imaginaries by mobilising the state 
discourse and market discourse in cultural policy, while the local 
communities or other civil forces might maintain, negotiate or create new 
civil discourses and strategies to shape their own industrialisation 
imaginaries to compete for the meaning-making of industrialisation. In order 
to investigate the actual interactions and co-constitution between the state’s 
policy and the local practice, this research chooses four cases of local 
community/tribal industries by conducting case study research to further 
analyse the semiotic practice of industrialisation discourse, especially 
focusing on the hegemonic struggle among the state discourse, market 
discourse and civil discourse.  
Case study research, as Yin (2013, p.16) defined, is an empirical inquiry that 
“investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the ‘case’) in depth and within 
its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context may not be clearly evident”. In addition, other researchers 
indicate that the case study approach is beneficial in examining causal 
complexes, the conjunctures and interactions of social changes (Ragin, 
1987; McQueen & Knussen, 2002). Consequently, there are two advantages 
of case study research. Firstly, it supplements critical discourse analysis with 
holistic contextuality in a real-world local practice. Case studies of these four 
local industries help this research to understand the real-live interactions 
between the policy discourse and local practice, especially as an effective 
method to address ‘why’ the hegemonic discourse emerges and ‘how’ the 
discursive formation and structuration is co-constituted and forms a new 
confined condition for the evolution mechanisms such as the variation, 
selection and retention of discourses. Secondly, case study research 
- 51 - 
comprises multi-method strategies, such as quantitative evidence as well as 
the qualitative approach of direct observation and interviews, to provide 
‘thick description’, acknowledging multiple realities having multiple meanings 
(Yin, 2013). In other words, the four cases serve as the analytical 
representatives of local practice, their discourses and semiotic practice 
being the essential resource to conduct critical discourse analysis. By doing 
so, the findings of critical discourse analysis, supplemented with case 
studies, lay the foundation for this research to explore the multiple causal 
mechanisms of the industrialisation discourse hidden in the empirical 
evidence and actual interaction. 
However, it is necessary to be aware of the limitations of, and concerns 
about, case study research. The greatest concern might be a lack of 
rigorous or systematic procedures in the process of data analysis (Yin, 2013). 
Another issue with case study data is that the analyses are often criticised 
as descriptive, as story-telling, and lack critical interpretation (Hsieh, 2004). 
Thus, when applying case studies to this research, it is necessary to raise 
cautious awareness and adopt the analytical technique of ‘cross-checking’ of 
all data derived from the multi-methods such as interviews, participation, 
observation and various documentations, to interpret the semiotic practice of 
local practices. 
In addition, the selection of the cases does not aim to represent all styles of 
local practice; instead they are selected based on significant discourses and 
practice, to provide the empirical foundation of each phase. The four cases 
are located in the rural areas respectively in northern Taiwan, western 
Taiwan, southern Taiwan and eastern Taiwan. Furthermore, all the cases 
have participated in the state’s cultural policy in terms of the Community 
Empowerment Project as well as the Cultural and Creative Industries 
Project, and have been selected by the state as models to promote 
industrialisation. More importantly, all of them have constituted imaginaries in 
the interactive process with the state, but have independently developed 
their specific discourses and strategic practice to develop their cultural 
industries or cultural and creative industries. These four cases not only 
signify the dialectic process of industrialisation between the policy 
discourses and local practice, but also provide the empirical foundation for 
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this research to analyse the multiple levels of imaginaries and the production 
of hegemonic discourse. A brief introduction to the four cases is presented 
below. 
Case 1 – Baimi Clog Village (白米木屐村). This is located in northern 
Taiwan and is a typical and well-known case of the Community 
Empowerment Project, since the CCA advocated the concept and the project 
of cultural industries in 1995. Through industrialisation, it has converted an 
area seriously polluted by the mining industry into a culture-oriented clog 
village by the endogenous and indigenous approach. The story of Baimi 
Clog Village has been promoted by the state and the press, and has 
attracted many communities to visit and learn the approach of 
industrialisation.   
Case 2 – Taomi Eco Village (桃米生態村). This is located in western 
Taiwan (or central Taiwan). It used to be an ordinary agricultural village, but 
was destroyed by an earthquake in 1999. With the support of state funding 
and the New Homeland Foundation, it has been reconstructed as an ecology 
village by the endogenous and tourism approach. The approach not only 
challenged the privileged discourse shaped by the DPP government but also 
had a significant influence on the evolution of industrialisation.  
Case 3 – Dragonfly Beads Art Studio (蜻蜓雅築). This was founded in 
1983 in an indigenous tribe in southern Taiwan, to promote Paiwanese 
culture and bead products. Since 2002 when the DPP government launched 
‘Challenge 2008’, it has been frequently chosen as an excellence model, to 
promote the concept of CCIs. In 2006, the founder of Dragonfly Beads Art 
Studio established the ‘Association of Timur Cultural Industries and Arts’ to 
revitalise tribal industries using endogenous and ecotourism strategies. 
Case 4 – Teihua Music Village (鐵花音樂聚落). This is located in eastern 
Taiwan. It is music ‘cultural and creative village’ built by the Lovely Taiwan 
Foundation in 2010. With the state’s financial support from 2010 to 2013, the 
Foundation worked with local artists and musicians to develop local 
indigenous music industries and local cultural industries. Since 2013, the 
Foundation has independently managed the Teihua Music Village and its 
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industrialisation has been acknowledged and adopted by the non-cultural 
governmental sectors.  
 
3.3.2 Interviews 
Interviewing is a common method for collecting data for social science 
studies. The text from interviewees (actors) is an essential discourse. The 
interviews supplement this research, in order to understand actors’ 
discursive and practical activities and the connections among the state 
actors and civil actors in semiotic practice. Thus, this research collects and 
analyses first-hand material via interviews in order to understand the 
processes and institutions involved in policy-making and the implementation 
of cultural industries’ policies.  
There are two categories of interviewees, each making a different 
contribution. One group consists of the insiders to cultural policy-making. 
They are the executives of cultural policy and most come from government 
institutions, such as officials of the CCA. The discourses from insiders help 
the research to understand the context, formation and various motivations 
behind cultural policy. There are three interviewees in the insider group, two 
are former chairpersons of the CCA and directly in charge of the policy-
making and implementation of the ‘Community Empowerment Project’ and 
‘Cultural and Creative Industries Project’. One is Chen, Chi-Nan, who was 
the main planner of Community Empowerment Project and proposed 
“Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries” as principles for 
developing cultural policy since 1994. He also promoted the idea of CCIs 
when he was the consultant of the Executive Yuan (Cabinet) from 2002 to 
2004 and then the chief of the CCA from 2004 to 2006. The other is Chen, 
Yu-Chiou Chen, who was the chief of the CCA from 2000 to 2004 and 
initiated a series of CCI projects. This research conducted initial interviews 
with two chairpersons of the CCA in March 2012. The preliminary analyses 
of their interviews were significant and laid the essential foundation for the 
data collecting as well as the snowball sampling of the sequential 
interviewees and the selection of case studies. Apart from the two 
chairpersons, there was another insider interviewee, the secretary of the 
Chen, Yu-Chiou, who introduced the latest development based on British 
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experience into the policy-planning of the cultural and creative industries 
projects in 2002.   
The other group consists of the outsiders to cultural policy-making. They are 
cultural workers and organisations, foundations, entrepreneurs, community 
residents and citizens. They participate in agenda-setting, policy-making and 
implementation as well as commenting on or debating the issues they are 
concerned with. They can affect the direction of policy-making through 
diverse approaches, such as press conferences, demonstrations, petitions 
and other movements. The discourses from outsiders help us to understand 
the related conflicts and tensions, to evaluate the co-constitution of 
industrialisation between the officials’ discourse and policy text, as well as 
the local practice.  
Based on the theoretical perspective of CPE, two types were taken in the 
selection of outsiders. The first type is composed of seven interviewees from 
the four case studies in order to examine the discursive-practice 
transformation of industrialisation in local practice. The other type is the core 
actors of the controversial issue of ‘Dreamers’ (one is a cultural worker and 
the other is an entrepreneur) in order to explore the economic imaginaries of 
industrialisation and the debates.  
Research fieldwork was undertaken in Taiwan in March and November 2012. 
The first fieldwork consisted of two interviews with insiders and secondary 
data collection to refine the research questions and identify the potential 
interviewees and cases. The second fieldwork involved ten interviews and 
visits to four cases to collect primary data.  The updating observation took 
place in August 2014, when the researcher visited two cases of the third 
phase (Dragonfly Beads Art Studio and Teihua Music Village) in order to 
understand the latest development. 
The empirical material is drawn from in-depth interviews with 12 
interviewees. Interviews were conducted using semi-structured questions 
and open conversations. All the interviews were conducted in Mandarin or 
Taiwanese and recorded electronically. These interviews were used to 
collect discursive data and compared with the policy text and secondary data 
including relevant literature and media coverage in order to conduct a critical 
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analysis of responses. The list of interviewees and the interview questions 
are presented in Appendix 1.   
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Chapter 4 Industrialisation of Cultural Policy I (1994-2002) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates the first period of the industrialisation of cultural 
policy led by the Community Empowerment Project and the relevant projects 
of cultural industries in Taiwan from 1994 to 2002. It focuses on the 
emergence of the discourse of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of 
Industries’ and its structuration in later periods. It aims to explore the 
selection of the discourse and the corresponding strategies, as well as the 
relevant practice and articulation.    
It is widely acknowledged that the emergence of cultural industries has been 
linked to the community movement since the mid-1990s when Taiwan 
experienced the institutional reform of democratisation (CCA, 1998; CCA, 
2010b). When the state launched the Community Empowerment Project  
(CEP) in response to the movement in 1994, it proposed a programme of 
cultural industries, as one of the four empirical sub-projects to support the 
CEP. In order to understand the correlation between the industrialisation of 
culture and political democratisation in this period, it is necessary first to 
trace the colonial history of Taiwan, which is also the underlying cause of the 
CEP encouraging communities to adopt cultural industries in the mid-1990s.  
The second section deals with the dramatic transition during the end of the 
1970s when Taiwanese consciousness started emerging, leading to a 
legalisation crisis for the ruling party and resulting in dramatic political 
democratisation, with martial law finally being terminated in 1987. The 
structural crisis created conditions for the CEP that can be seen as the 
state’s strategic fix to consolidate the KMT’s hegemony in the 1990s. In this 
context, the third section elaborates on the emergence of cultural industries 
and the strategy of industrialisation by the endogenous and indigenous 
approach to support the CEP. It focuses on exploring the dialectic process 
between semiosis of industrialisation and structuration. The fourth section 
examines the articulation between the semiosis of industrialisation and local 
practice using the case of the Baimi Clog Village, which is the typical model 
of cultural industrialisation moving gradually towards sustainable 
development. The final section concludes the co-constitution process of 
cultural industrialisation in this phase and the implications for the next phase.  
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4.1 Historical Background of the Community Empowerment 
Project  
This section explores the historical background and previous cultural policy 
which set the preconditions for the CEP. It includes a brief history of Taiwan, 
the formation of ethnic groups in Taiwan, the promotion of Chinese 
nationalism and the awareness of Taiwanese consciousness. These issues 
are the contextual basis for exploring the shift of cultural policy from 
centralisation and Chinese nationalisation to localisation and Taiwanese 
awareness in the 1990s.   
 
4.1.1 The Colonial Period and Ethnic Formation 
Taiwan is located in East Asia, a small island in the Pacific Ocean, and is 
surrounded geographically by Japan, Korea, China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines. In addition to Taiwanese Aborigines, there are another two main 
ethnic groups, Taiwanese Hakkas and Taiwanese Fulos, who inhabited 
Taiwan four hundred years ago, mainly from South-Eastern China. These 
ethnic groups make up the diverse culture of Taiwan, while the ethnic 
differences and discrimination in cultural policy have caused conflict.  
The ancient inhabitants of Taiwan are Taiwanese Aborigines, composed of at 
least 16 groups5 with their own languages, distinct culture, lifestyle and 
social systems. The Taiwanese aboriginal groups are linked to Austronesian 
ethnic groups in South East Asia, and they share close blood relationship 
and appearance. They had been living on Taiwan’s islands for approximately 
7,000 years before the influx of Han Chinese in the 17th century. Now the 
population of the sixteen aboriginal groups is about 2 per cent of the total 
population, or about 530,000 people. 
The Hakkas and the Fulos migrated to Taiwan from South-Eastern China, 
starting in the 17th century. In 1624, the Dutch Empire colonised Taiwan in 
order to extend trade, and they brought a great number of Han Chinese to 
                                            
5 As of September 2015, according to the demographics of the Council of Indigenous People, 
sixteen groups have gained official recognition: Ami, Atayal, Bunun, Kavalan, Paiwan, 
Puyuma, Rukai, Saisiyat, Tao, Thao, Tsou, Truku, Sakizaya, Sediq, Hla’alus and 
Kanakanavu. 
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Taiwan (Andrade, 2007).  In fact, beginning with the arrival of the Dutch, 
Taiwan experienced a series of colonisations. These foreign regimes 
included the Dutch (1624-1662), the Spanish (1626-42), the Zheng family of 
the Ming Empire (1662-1683), the Manchus of the Ching Empire (1683-
1895) and the Japanese (1895-1945). Apart from the Japanese regime, they 
all brought large numbers of Chinese people to Taiwan. These groups have 
been settled in Taiwan for more than four hundred years and have their own 
language and traditional culture. The Fulos are the largest ethnic group in 
Taiwan, constituting 67 per cent of the total population, followed by the 
Hakka which make up 14 per cent.  
In 1895, Taiwan was colonised by Japan as a result of the Treaty of 
Shimonoseki signed by the Ching Empire after they lost the first Sino-
Japanese War. Although the Taiwanese protested fiercely and claimed their 
independence and sovereignty, the protests were violently suppressed by 
the Japanese modern army. From then, the Japanese colonial government 
imposed a series of modernisations not only aimed at making Taiwan a 
model for other colonies under Japanese imperial rule, but also serving as 
part of its economic network in East Asia to supplement Japan’s industrial 
and economic development (Chu, 2011). Accordingly, they set up 
infrastructure, including the public transport, agricultural engineering, public 
health, modern education and policing systems, as well as investigating local 
historical resources and establishing museums. Ironically, this cultural and 
material infrastructure laid the foundation for the modernisation of Taiwan. 
This modern infrastructure improved Taiwan’s development during the fifty-
year colonial period and the following decades. There were a considerable 
number of students studying in Japan who brought back new technology and 
knowledge with which to construct a modern Taiwan. More specifically, with 
the trend of self-determination in the early decades of the nineteen century, 
some Taiwanese organised ‘Taiwan's Parliament Petition Movement’ for local 
autonomy. They proposed fifteen petitions from 1921 to 1934 and had a 
significant influence on raising Taiwanese awareness. In 1921, the 
‘Taiwanese Cultural Association’ was founded to serve cultural 
enlightenment as well as support the political movement (Tsuilien, 2011). 
The association had more than a thousand members composed of students, 
doctors, lawyers, businessmen, famers and workers. They held a variety of 
cultural talks and issued newsletters and magazines to introduce the modern 
disciplines of knowledge, such as history, law, health, literature and drama. 
To give access to this material to the majority of uneducated people, they 
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organised film tours, summer schools and reading societies to promote their 
campaign. The relevant discourses and activities of Taiwan’s Parliament 
Petition Movement shaped the cultural imaginaries of Taiwanese identity, to 
distinguish it from Japanese culture and identity.  
The Japanese colonial government imposed the ‘Japanisation Movement’ 
after the second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, and most Taiwanese 
were forced to adopt Japanese surnames and customs during the war 
period (Chu and Lin, 2001). This imposed movement aimed to transform the 
Taiwanese into loyal subjects of the Japanese Emperor (Tsai, 2011). As a 
result, their indigenous cultural identity was suppressed and some native 
languages and cultures were lost or mixed.  
The influence of colonial modernisation and the assimilation into Japan led 
to a certain cultural affinity of policy-making in Taiwan after World War II. It is 
especially evident in the craft industries that the Taiwan Craft Research 
Institute constantly refers to the Japanese experience, such as the project of 
‘one village, one product’, aiming to promote traditional craft industries in 
local areas in the early 1990s (Huang, 2003a, Huang, 2003b, Yu, 2002). In 
this context, the CCA continued to consult Japanese experts and launched 
the idea of cultural industries (Huang, 2003b). This will be further elaborated 
in section 4.3 
At the end of WWII, Taiwan claimed its independence and sovereignty when 
Japan admitted defeat. However, according to the agreement made by the 
Alliance at the Cairo Conference in 1945, the ruling power of Taiwan was 
transferred to the Republic of China (ROC), founded in 1912 in China by the 
KMT after taking over the Ching Empire. Since then, Taiwan has become a 
province of the ROC and was consequently ruled by the KMT government. 
In order to reduce the Japanese influence and build a Chinese national 
identity, the KMT regime ruled Taiwan very harshly with bloody suppression 
of social protests in the early years (Ho and Broadbent, 2011). The 228 
Incident of 1947 was one of the most notorious massacres6, leading to long-
term ethnic conflicts which have still not been thoroughly resolved.  
                                            
6 The incident began with the accidental seizing of a vendor selling illegal cigarettes, but 
soon caused island-wide demonstrations demanding a greater degree of autonomy. The 
protest was brutally suppressed by the KMT military from mainland China on 28 February 
1947. More than 10,000 people were killed or injured. Before the 1990s, it was a taboo to 
openly criticize the 228 Massacre and it was absent from Taiwan history for several 
decades. 
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In 1949, the KMT-led government retreated to Taiwan after its army’s failure 
in the civil war with the Communist Party of China. Soon, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) was established in Mainland China. There was 
hostility and radical tension between the ROC and PRC until the 1990s.  
After the KMT came to Taiwan and claimed the legality of the ROC 
government, they imposed repressive rules on the Taiwanese people. The 
KMT regime declared a state of emergency and implemented Martial Law to 
suspend citizens’ rights of assembly, association, and the right to form 
political parties, which used to be secured according to the Constitution of 
the ROC.  
During the period from 1945 to 1949, around two million people from all over 
Mainland China immigrated to Taiwan. They included administrators of the 
KMT party, government officers, the military and their families. They are 
‘Mainlanders’ and used to be called ‘Wai-Sheng people’ (外省人), which 
meant that they were external to Taiwan (Wang, 2002). On the other hand, 
the Fulos and the Hakkas called themselves ‘Ben-Sheng people’ (本省人) 
which meant that they were internal or native to Taiwan (Wang, 2002). The 
Mainlanders usually speak Mandarin and now make up 17 per cent of the 
whole population of Taiwan.  
One of the greatest distinctions between the Mainlanders and the other 
groups are their different life experiences (Ash et al., 2011). The Taiwanese 
Aborigines, Taiwanese Fulos and Taiwanese Hakkas, have lived in Taiwan 
for hundreds of years and experienced multiple foreign invasions and 
colonisation, wars, plagues, resistances and revolutions, and natural 
disasters. These common living experiences give them a shared sense of 
community, despite the fact that the most aborigines suffer from 
discrimination. By contrast, the Mainlanders experienced the overthrow of 
the Ching Empire, an eight-year Sino-Japanese War, and were defeated in a 
civil war by the communists in China, and then they were forced to leave 
their home to settle in a small island. Another difference is the identity 
experience (Wang, 2002). On the one hand, for most Taiwanese including 
Aborigines, under Japan’s colonial and modernising rule, the strictly 
disciplined but relatively stable life made them familiar with Japanese habits 
but led to a confused identity among Chinese, Taiwanese and Japanese. On 
the other hand, most Mainlanders who fought against Japan during WWII 
relatively hate the Japanese for invading China resulting in the enhancement 
of their collective Chinese national identity. 
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In addition, the language barrier brought misunderstandings and 
exacerbated conflicts among ethnic groups. In particular, despite the 
Mainlanders being in the minority, they controlled the KMT government and 
enjoyed the privileged right to dominate political, cultural, economic and 
social resources in Taiwan from 1949 to the 1990s. As a result, Mandarin is 
the national language, while Taiwanese and the aboriginal languages were 
forbidden in the public field during this period. In short, there was a huge 
perceptual gap in identity between ‘Mainlanders’ and ‘Taiwanese’ (mainly 
referring to the Hakkas and the Fulos), which caused a number of ethnic 
conflicts before the 1990s.  
In this context, the CEP was proposed in 1994 as a strategic fix, in order to 
reconcile such tensions through reassigning meaning in the community. 
There will more analysis of this in section 4.3.   
   
4.1.2 White Terror and Imagined Chinese Nationalism 
Since the KMT government implemented martial law in 1949, Taiwan 
experienced a one-party authoritarian regime for thirty-eight years. Under 
the limitations of martial law, citizens’ freedoms and political participation 
were severely restricted, organised political contests were forbidden, the 
mass media were state-controlled, and coercive force was deployed to 
repress political dissidence (Tien, 1975). On the other hand, Chinese 
nationalism was instilled into the education system and cultural fields to 
consolidate the KMT’s cultural hegemony in Taiwan.  
In the 1950s and 1960s the KMT regime brutally suppressed dissidents in a 
purge known as the ‘White Terror’, in which tens of thousands of suspected 
spies and communists were imprisoned, tortured or executed without legal 
trial. The White Terror caused a chilling effect in the whole society and 
facilitated “political forces in absolute command” (Hsiao, 1990, p.164). In 
other words, all aspects of public life were placed completely under the 
control of the KMT’s ‘party-government-military’ system. This not only 
destroyed the legal system and public sphere which was built in the 
Japanese colonial period but also made people afraid to participate in public 
affairs and deterred the Taiwanese from discovering their own local culture 
and history.  
Moreover, in order to consolidate the KMT’s legitimacy, the regime attempted 
to build a strong belief that the people of Taiwan were Chinese, by a rigorous 
programme of thought censorship and imposing Chinese nationalism on 
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Taiwanese national identity (Su, 2001; Liao, 2002; Winckler, 1994). At the 
same time, the KMT regime systematically discriminated against the native 
Taiwanese and depreciated Taiwanese culture and history. In contrast, 
Chinese history and culture was promoted. The specific purpose of cultural 
policy was to reinforce the KMT’s cultural hegemony through discourse and 
materialised projects embedded in a specific political imaginary.   
Firstly, the KMT regime promoted ‘anti-communist literature and arts’ in the 
1950s. ‘Anti-communist’ was the privileged discourse and dominated cultural 
policy in the period. This is because the KMT regime under the rule of 
Chiang, Kai-Shek (蔣介石) firmly believed they would fight back in Mainland 
China and retake control one day. Until then, they had to maintain a belief in 
anti-communism (Chang, 2004; Su, 2001). As a result, ‘Counterattack 
Mainland China’ and ‘Rescue the Mainland Compatriots’ were the main 
discourses with a variety of projects, such as the KMT’s political imaginary to 
strengthen the abstract meaning of ‘anti-communist’ in the 1950s. Slogans 
were posted in public areas such as schools, councils, stations and almost 
every official publication. In addition, the Ministry of Defence conducted the 
specific discourse of ‘army literature’ with the public. This kind of literature 
illustrated stories about the magnificent landscape of the Chinese homeland, 
the brutal behaviour of the Chinese Communist Party and the soldiers’ 
sadness at losing their homes (Chang, 2004). This kind of art and literature 
attempted to shape the imaginary of ‘Grand China’ and stimulate anger at 
the communists.    
Secondly, the KMT regime established the Cultural Affairs Bureau, the first 
governmental cultural department in Taiwan, under the administration of the 
Ministry of Education in 1967. The bureau included the traditionally defined 
sub-departments of cultural policy, such as literature, arts, theatre, dance 
and music, and also involved communication media such as broadcasting, 
television and the film industry. Although the establishment of the Cultural 
Affairs Bureau could be seen as enhancing the professionalism of cultural 
areas in administration (Chang, 2004), its main goal – revival of Chinese 
national culture – was still aimed at consolidating the KMT’s favoured 
ideology of Chinese nationalism through a series of discourses and 
systematic official projects. Apart from the continued promotion of anti-
communism, the Cultural Affairs Bureau regulated arts and the media to 
meet the principles of KMT authoritarian regimes through issuing licences, 
pre-reviewing and cutting content under martial law. As a result, strict 
censorship, with the depreciation of local dialects and Taiwanese folk arts, 
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was imposed on the film, broadcasting and television industries (Lu, 1998; 
Chang, 2004; Lin, 2006). In 1973, the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the Ministry 
of Education was dismantled quietly due to an overlapping function with the 
later ‘Chinese Cultural Renaissance Commission’ which was led by the KMT 
party (Liu and Fang, 2012). Only the media industries of publishing, film, 
broadcasting and television were incorporated into the former Government 
Information Office, which was a cabinet-level agency of the Executive Yuan 
as a propaganda mechanism to privilege Chinese content and regulate 
newspapers, films, broadcasting and television.  
Thirdly, the KMT regime set up the Chinese Cultural Renaissance 
Commission, whose function and responsibility overrode the Executive Yuan 
Commission and Cultural Affairs Bureau, to promote the ‘Chinese Cultural 
Renaissance Movement’ (hereafter CCRM) against the ‘Cultural Revolution’ 
deployed by the PRC in Mainland China in 1967. The movement was one of 
the anti-communist strategies, as President Chiang, Kai-Shek said, “the 
Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement was an important weapon of 
ideological and cultural war against communists led by Mao Zedong” (CCA, 
1998). Thus, all of the concepts of the CCRM developed under the 
hegemonic imaginaries of anti-communism. Its implementation included 
research and publications, guidelines for people’s lives, counselling for new 
arts and literature, reform of the educational system, the cultural renaissance 
movement and the cultural battle against communists (Liu and Fang, 2012). 
In addition, the CCRM played a critical role in the construction of a 
hegemony of Chinese ‘national culture’ (Wang, 2002, p.83). For example, 
the state called the Chinese ‘Beijing Opera’ (京劇) a ‘national drama’ and set 
several troupes and theatre schools to replace its popularity with Taiwanese 
‘Kua-a hì’ (歌仔戲), which is the indigenous kind of drama with songs in 
Taiwan. These state projects had a specific bias against indigenous culture. 
Chang (2004, p.3) points out that “all things Chinese were associated with 
sophistication, beauty and grandeur, while all things Taiwanese were 
regarded as vulgar, stupid and coarse”. 
As a result, the privileged art forms and artists, those of the traditional 
Chinese culture, were created, reproduced and linked with daily life in 
Taiwan by the selection of regulation and the funding of programmes of 
cultural policy. They were presented as a hegemonic form of ‘semeiotic 
tradition’ such as the historical tradition, the cultural tradition, and the 
language tradition, to constitute a closely imagined relationship and link to 
China (ROC) in Taiwan. In summary, the semiotic and material co-
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constitution was firmly constructed as the ‘imagined Chinese nationalism’ 
and served as a political imaginary by the KMT regime to perceptibly and 
imperceptibly affect the people in Taiwan at all levels, form the 1950s to the 
1970s.  
 
4.2 The Changing Relationship Between the State and the 
Society  (1970s –1990s) 
4.2.1 Crisis of Legitimacy and the Establishment of the Council 
for Cultural Affairs  
The above political projects of Chinese-centre national-building and cultural 
building were shaken from the 1970s. International relations and domestic 
political movements lost the dense control of the KMT party-state institution. 
This crisis prompted alternative semiotic and strategic innovations rooted in 
old and new semiotic systems and orders (Jessop and Oosterlynck, 2008). 
The alternative opinions and diverse discourse gradually emerged in local 
society.  
In the field of international relations, a series of diplomatic setbacks hit the 
KMT regime and caused a crisis for the KMT and ROC’s legitimacy. In 1971, 
Taiwan was forced to withdraw from the United Nations because the 
People’s Republic of China became the legal representative of China at the 
United Nations. Since then, Taiwan has not only lost its official membership 
of many international organisations but broken off diplomatic relations with 
many countries such as America, Britain and Japan. With this international 
isolation, the hegemonic narratives of ‘retake the Mainland’ were losing their 
convincing power over the public and seemed increasingly impracticable. In 
response to the crisis, the KMT regime adopted a more localised and open 
approach to the political sphere. When Chiang, Kai-Shek died in 1975, his 
son, Chiang, Ching-Kao, assumed power and triggered a series of important 
reforms that meant that Taiwan shifted from ‘hard authoritarianism’ to ‘soft 
authoritarianism’ (Winckler, 1984). President Chiang, Ching-Kao recruited 
more Taiwanese professionals and entrepreneurs into the KMT party and 
governmental institutions. Specifically, a series of major construction projects 
under the model of developmentalism served as state projects as well as 
strategic fixes to improve economic development and reconcile international 
and domestic tensions. Accordingly, ‘Ten Major Construction Projects’, the 
first national infrastructure projects with a focus on heavy industries, was 
launched in 1974, followed by ‘Twelve Major Construction Projects’, 
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including agricultural and cultural construction in the 1980s. Noticeably, the 
Industrial Technology Research Institute and Hsinchu Science Park were 
established in 1973 and 1979, which laid the foundation for export-oriented 
economic development, and a shift from low-value manufacturing industries 
to higher-value electronic industries.  
In particular, the ‘Science Park’ model attracted foreign investors and 
domestic entrepreneurs to start businesses and create high economic 
growth in the 1980s and 1990s. The industrialisation of the ‘Science Park’ 
aimed to establish a supportive environment for the Information Technology 
industries, which include the state providing specific industrial areas with 
generous tax incentives for research and development activities, and directly 
subsidising certain target fields (Booth, 2011). The successful experience of 
this model has become a significant approach of economic imaginaries for 
the state to promote emerging industries. For instance, when the state 
launched the Cultural and Creative Industries Project in 2002, one of the 
strategies was the Cultural and Creative Park based on the model (see 
Chapter 5).  
In the area of internal affairs, some political dissidents organised ‘Dang Wai’ 
(黨外), which means ‘outside the KMT party’, to constantly challenge KMT’s 
authoritarian rule. Owing to the limitations on forming a political party, they 
edited many political magazines to introduce the concepts of democracy and 
criticise the problems of current policies, such as the depressed farming 
villages, uneven distribution of wealth and labour issues. Despite these 
magazines being banned for their criticism of the government, others sprang 
up. As a result of the enlightenment of these political magazines, the 
strategic practice co-constituted the political imaginaries of ‘democracy’ in 
Taiwan’s society, and led to further challenges to the KMT’s authoritarian 
rule. For instance, a group of ‘Dang Wai’ held a political demonstration on 
International Human Rights Day in 1979 in Kaohsiung, a major city in 
southern Taiwan, resulting in the arrests of a large number of opposition 
leaders and local activists. This incident increased the radicalisation of the 
democracy movement in the first half of the 1980s (Hsiau, 2000).  
On top of the international frustrations and the democracy activists, a trend 
for ‘searching for cultural roots’ emerged in society (Chang, 2009). Due to 
the ROC being excluded from international organisations, many people 
started to think about who they were. With the new soft authoritarianism, the 
state adjusted the previous bias of regulation, such that local knowledge 
started to emerge in the 1970s, and meanwhile Taiwan Studies had become 
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a topic that many people were concerned about (Lee, 2004). Accordingly, 
many university teachers and students started to focus on local society and 
conduct a variety of social investigations in the rural areas. Furthermore, 
some workers at magazines drew attention to the local society and edited 
special issues about folklore, ritual and local history, such as the arts 
magazine entitled ‘Lion Arts’, which issued a series of cultural reports and 
criticisms based on local society.  Another case was the establishment of the 
Cloud Gate Dance Theatre in 1973, which was the first Taiwanese dance 
group to produce choreographed dance based on local culture. With more 
and more local culture presented and discussed publicly, alternative political 
imaginaries of Taiwanese consciousness were gradually constituted and 
started to compete with Chinese nationalism. As a result, the debates about 
native literature, modern poetry, folk music movements and ‘New Taiwan 
Film’ started to emerge.  
In 1981, in response to the dramatic changes in international relations and to 
reconcile the internal demand for political democratisation and cultural 
awareness, the Council for Cultural Affairs was set up (Chang, 2004). 
Although the principle was still clearly defined to promote Chinese culture, 
the main works of the CCA in the initial stage focused on the preservation of 
cultural heritage from around Taiwan, and established subsidy mechanisms 
for arts and culture (CCA, 1998). The CCA covered literature, visual arts, 
performance and cultural heritage, which were conceived of within the 
traditional scope of cultural policy. By the mid-1990s, the goal of the CCA 
was mostly served by cultural development and cultural exchange. 
Economic benefits were not the main concern or issue in the field of cultural 
policy (Chang, 2004). It was not until the mid-1990s when the CCA initiated 
the CEP with cultural industries, that economic value was emphasised in 
cultural policy.  
In short, the semiotic practices of ‘democracy’ and ‘localisation’ were the 
main themes in Taiwan during the 1970s and 1980s, which led to KMT’s 
legitimacy crises. Facing constant criticism and conflict, the KMT regime 
finally lifted martial law in 1987. This created another condition, a remarkable 
proliferation of alternative discourses and strategic practices started to 
surface.  
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4.2.2 The End of Martial Law and the Co-constitution of 
“Taiwanisation Policy”  
Under the pressure of democracy movements and cultural enlightenment 
from magazines and groups on democracy and local culture, the legitimacy 
of martial law was challenged and eventually ended in 1987. A large number 
of new social movements emerged to challenge the KMT regime on a range 
of political and social issues. These social and political forces laid the 
foundation for the CCA to shift the focus of cultural policy toward people’s 
cultural life and contemporary Taiwan.  
Following the lifting of martial law in 1987 and the death of President Chiang, 
Ching-Kuo a year later, the pace of democratisation accelerated rapidly. In 
1988, Lee, Teng-Hui (李登輝) was appointed as president. He was the first 
Taiwan-born president and received a Japanese colonial education and an 
American doctoral education. During his term from 1988 to 2000, President 
Lee implemented a series of projects around democratisation and 
localisation, which brought significant transitions in politics, the economy and 
society in the 1990s. For example, the ban on new newspapers was 
repealed in 1988; the ‘Civil Associations Act for the Period of Communist 
Rebellion’ was passed in January 1989 and soon amended to the ‘Civil 
Association Act’ in 1992, which led to a strong wave of public participation 
and movements in many areas. According to Michael Hsiao (1990), at least 
eighteen social movements had emerged to make claims on the state by the 
end of the 1980s. These included consumer movements, local anti-pollution 
protest movements, conservationist movements, women's movements, 
aborigine human rights movements, student movements, New Testament 
Church protests, labour movements, farmers' movements, teachers' welfare 
protests, disability and disadvantaged welfare group protests, veterans' 
welfare protests, human rights movements, Mainlanders' home-visiting 
movements, Taiwanese home-visiting movements, anti-nuclear power 
movements, Hakka rights movements and the non-homeowners' shell-less 
snail movement. 
Among these movements, the student movement known as the Wild Lily 
Movement brought significant political changes in March 1990. Students sat-
in at Chiang, Kai-Shek Memorial for six days and proposed four demands: 
(1) re-elect the National Assembly; (2) abolish the old constitution; (3) 
present a schedule for political reform, and (4) convene a National Affairs 
Conference to discuss reform projects (Fell, 2012). These demands gained 
widespread support from the general public. In response to the political 
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crisis, President Lee held a National Affairs Conference to discuss political 
reform. In the next five years, a series of political reforms called 
‘Taiwanisation policy’ were undertaken to strengthen the legitimacy of the 
KMT’s rule in Taiwan (Fell, 2012). As a result, all the senior parliamentarians 
had to retire in 1991. For the first time in 1992, a new parliament, the 
National Assembly and Legislative Yuan, were wholly elected by the people 
of Taiwan. Since 1994, local people have been able to participate regularly in 
direct elections for all mayors and presidential elections.  
In summary, these social movements and the liberalisation of the media 
served as evolutionary mechanisms that not only accelerated political 
democratisation, but also stimulated the proliferation of civil discourse and 
debate on the relationships between state and society. Through the political 
reforms and social mobilisations, the KMT regime’s privileged imaginaries of 
‘Chinese nationalism’ were eroded and some civil discourse, such as 
‘Taiwanese consciousness’ and ‘localisation’, seized the hegemony. 
Embedded in the context, the CEP was a strategic fix in cultural policy 
launched by the CCA in response to the change of cultural hegemony, which 
led to widespread implications for state discourses, away from focusing on 
Chinese traditional culture and arts towards Taiwanese local cultural activity. 
 
4.3 Community Empowerment and Cultural Industries  
The background given above has revealed significant political 
democratisation, economic development and flourishing civil movements. In 
the local society, people have started to discuss and be concerned with their 
local environment, their family history and identity (Hsiau, 2000). These 
structural changes and the semiotic practice related to the ‘local’ have 
shaped a new policy relation between government and people. The bottom-
up perspective emerged whereby government policy was asked to adjust 
from centralisation to local-oriented thinking and focus on listening to 
people’s demands and a local perspective.  This shift had set the conditions 
for the cultural policy and laid the groundwork for the constitution of the 
imaginary for the CEP and cultural industrialisation. 
 
4.3.1 The Development and Challenges of the CEP 
In the 1990s, the KMT government under the administration of Lee, Teng-Hui 
adopted a series of semiotic strategies to constitute a Taiwan-centric cultural 
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identity. During his reign, he recruited Taiwanese elites with Taiwanese 
consciousness into the government institutions, and started to emphasise 
the distinctive characteristics of Taiwanese history, geography and culture 
from China. Specifically, in order to reconcile ethnic conflicts and ease 
tensions, President Lee raised a couple of cultural slogans and held them up 
as the guidelines of state policy (Huang and Hsu, 2011; Chang, 2009). One 
of the hegemonic discourses was ‘community of shared fate’ (生命共同體). 
According to Lee’s interpretation, the term means the four ethnic groups 
should be organised as a community, sharing the same destiny. He 
explained the meaning in one speech, as below: 
There are twenty-one million people in Taiwan. Apart from the 
aborigines, the ancestors of most people in Taiwan were migrants from 
the Mainland, either fifty years ago, or hundreds of years ago. Every one 
of us has stuck together, and has created a civilised and prosperous 
society here. For our future prosperity, we rely on one another. We are 
both Chinese and Taiwanese. There is no ethnic difference... We should 
be able to have an equal footing and equal opportunity... This is what 
'Community of Shared Fate' is all about (Speech to the First Nation-
building Research Group,1992, cited in Chang, 2009, p.40).  
In this vein, cultural policy was a primary instrument in the repetition and 
reinforcement of this new discourse (Chang, 2009). Therefore, the CCA 
started to promote the concept of community and launched the Community 
Empowerment Project in 1994. The goal of this project was to implement an 
integrated programme for local communities to build their local 
consciousness and empower residents to participate in public affairs (CCA, 
1998).  
In the discursive formation of community empowerment, Chen, Chi-Nan 
played an essential role in creating and elaborating the meaning and 
spreading the concept of the CEP around Taiwan. Chen, an anthropologist 
who graduated from Yale University and taught in Hong Kong, was known 
for the theory of the ‘indigenisation’ of Taiwanese immigrants from China. In 
fact, before Chen worked for the CCA and proposed the CEP, he had 
developed ideas for community empowerment (Yu, 2002).  He advocated a 
series of discourses on civil consciousness and proposed the concept of a 
‘Civil Country’ in his book (Chen, 1992). He argued that people could not 
depend on political and economic power to improve society and their lives. 
People have to take the responsibility of participating in public affairs and 
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dominate the direction of the state (pp.211-212). These perspectives gained 
the attention by the former President Lee, Teng-Hui and thus Chen was 
appointed as a consultant of the CCA in 1993, and became the Deputy Chair 
of the CCA one year later (Lu, 2002). For Chen, the main concern of 
advocating the CEP was Taiwan’s democratisation (interview with Chen, Chi-
Nan, 2012). He believed that the practice and learning of democracy should 
come from the community. Through such democratic procedures citizens 
can have the autonomy and opportunity to achieve a common view as the 
basis for discussing their public affairs. In other words, the CEP is the 
scheme he designed for cultivating the spirit of democracy through 
participating in cultural events. As Chen (1999, p.19) puts it: 
Community empowerment represents a transformation in the mode of 
thinking which starts from making a new person to making a new society 
and a new country; it is a quiet revolution. Community empowerment 
emphasises the spirit of participation in promoting democratisation and 
public discussion from bottom to top. 
This discourse resonated with the long-term appeal of people's sovereignty 
and localisation in local society since the 1970s. However, despite the term 
‘community’ based on a bottom to top perspective soon caught the attention 
of the grassroots associations, the CCA encountered many difficulties in 
implementing the CEP in the early stages. One of the main reasons was that 
grassroots activities had been stunted by political control and the ‘White 
Terror’ for many decades. Most people were still worried about being 
involved in public affairs and had no ideas of ‘empowerment’ or strategies of 
participation in the community.  
In addition, there is a gap between the CCA’s (or Chen, Chi-Nan, the main 
policy actor, to be precise) policy discourses and local practice. For instance, 
the term ‘community empowerment’ (社區營造) was the fresh noun for the 
people in the mid-1990s, when the political reform had just started, media 
control just lifted and most people were not aware of the concept of 
empowerment. When the CCA entrusted some scholars to explain the 
meaning of the CEP in the local villages and towns, most people could not 
understand ‘empowerment’ and thought it related to construction of houses 
literally (Tseng, 2007). 
Likely, most of the cultural administrators, especially in local government, did 
not really understand how to encourage or motivate people to participate in 
community affairs. The initial projects were still rooted in the previous top-
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down pattern and focused on buildings, facilities and the improvement of 
infrastructure. For example, the project ‘Put Arts into the Countryside’ 
referred to setting up a holiday square for cultural activities in villages and 
towns. Other projects such as ‘Reinforce the Facilities of Exhibitions and 
Performance in Towns and Villages’, ‘Enhance the Local Traditional Cultural 
Space and Architecture’ which aimed to balance the cultural development of 
urban and rural areas, focused on infrastructure. In the early stages of the 
CEP in 1993 and 1994, these strategies mostly considered the community 
as merely the venues of cultural activities rather than trying to empower the 
residents. Even though Chen, Chi-Nan and the CCA, along with other 
scholars, produced diverse policy discourses in the research and workshops 
to elaborate on the concept of CEP, only a few communities which had 
previous experience of social movements and fighting for their rights, could 
develop their own empowerment projects (Yu, 2002). This reveals the 
discourse of ‘community empowerment’ had still been affected by the path 
dependency of previous top-down policy and struggled for the path shaping 
of the CEP.   
Facing conceptual and practical difficulties, Chen, Chi-Nan and the CCA 
proposed the project of cultural industries with the strategic discourse 
‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ to construct 
economic imaginaries of community empowerment and facilitate the CEP’s 
implementation. It was a dynamic and dialectic process in which diverse 
actors including policy makers, academic researchers and local communities 
engaged in semiotic practice, which will be elaborated in the following 
section.  
 
4.3.2 The Emergence of Cultural Industries and Semiotic Practice	
The initial concept of ‘cultural industries’ was proposed by the CCA in the 
‘Cultural‧Industries Symposium’ (文化・產業研討會) in 1995. Moreover, the 
concept was disseminated by a series of relevant projects and thematic 
discourse that the CEP gradually gained support from many communities 
and developed so far. 
From the title, that separates culture and industries by an interval mark (‧), 
it can been seen that ‘cultural industries’ had not become an official term in 
cultural policy in 1995. At this symposium, nearly six hundred participants 
attended and exchanged ideals about the cultural industries (Yu, 2002). 
They were Japanese scholars, central and local government officials, 
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cultural and historical workers and members of industries, who exchanged 
experiences and discussed the topics of culture, industry and community 
empowerment.  
In fact, the initial idea of cultural industries was borrowed from Japanese 
experience and collaborated with the local communities to constitute 
meaning. In the early stages of the CEP, Chen, Chi-Nan visited Japan and 
learned of their local mobilisation called the ‘Machizukuri’ (community-
building) movement (造町運動), which was launched following the critical 
anti-pollution movement of the 1960s. According to Chen, Chi-Nan and 
Chen, Rui-Hua (1998, p.29), the content of the ‘Machizukuri’ included the 
promotion of local or community history and culture, the protection of local 
customs and practices, the protection of the natural environment, the 
nurturing of local talent, the establishment of local or communal 
organisations, the creation of communal systems, increasing local works, 
and the improvement of communal living conditions. On this basis, Chen, 
Chi-Nan found that cultural industries could be the starting point for 
community empowerment, and proposed the dual-core concept of 
‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ for cultural 
industries to serve as a strategy of the CEP (Interview with Chen, Chi-Nan, 
2012). This is evident from the CCA’s statement in the Cultural Policy White 
Paper:  
Culture constitutes the insight of history and life subjectivity; industries 
provide the continual material foundation for insight. As a result, the CCA 
proposed the ideas – ‘Industrialisation of Culture’ and ‘Culturalisation of 
Industries’ in the ‘Cultural‧Industries Symposium’ in 1995. After that, 
the concept of ‘cultural industries’ has become the core of the 
Community Empowerment Project (CCA, 2004a, p.194). 
It can been seen that the ‘Cultural‧Industries Symposium’ was a milestone 
in cultural policy and served as one of the governmental technologies that 
constituted the importance of cultural industries in cultural policy.  After this 
conference, ‘cultural industries’ soon became a buzzword, and many 
communities were enthusiastic in developing their projects. In this 
conference, Chen (1995, p.6) proposed the two strategies. First, 
‘industrialisation of culture’ which means developing economic use of local 
culture in indirect ways. Second, ‘culturalisation of industries’ refers to 
attaching cultural features to local industries making them part of culture, to 
increase attractiveness and value. Furthermore, he explained that cultural 
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industries aim to create specific cultural value for a community through 
researching, recovering and innovating crafts or cultural activities based on 
life experiences and public discussion. In this vein, the close connection 
between cultural industries and local communities were officially involved in 
the relevant CEP. More importantly, the promotion of cultural industries not 
only constituted the substantive meaning of ‘community’ which means 
‘settlement with the sense of community’ rather than merely a spatial 
meaning (Tseng, 2007, p.13), but highlights residents having a sense of 
shared living experience and common expectations by engaging in local 
cultural industries.  
Later in the same year, Chen emphasised the distinctiveness of cultural 
industries in another conference entitled ‘Local Culture and Regional 
Development’. He addressed the features of cultural industries within the 
CEP (Chen, 1995, cited in Yu, 2002, pp.74-75): 
1. Cultural industries of the CEP do no refer to the mass and standard 
production of cultural industry. Cultural industries highlight the 
creativity and life characteristics which originate from the local 
tradition and the innovation of craft people. Therefore, the 
industrialisation of cultural industries is small-scale and hand-made.  
2. The output value of cultural industries usually depends on tourism, 
but its derivate economic activities cannot be limited to tourism. The 
small quantity of cultural industries must link with diverse activities 
to raise the economic efficiency in the community. Therefore, they 
rely on community cooperation to create the value of place. 
3. Cultural industries stress endogenous development and their 
subjectivity is based on local features, environmental conditions and 
community residents.  
4. When developing the cultural industries, the community must 
protect the environmental landscape and life tradition for 
sustainable operation. 
Chen’s address identified the features of cultural industries as hand-made or 
small-scale, highlighting indigenous features including the value of ‘place’, 
residents’ subjectivity, as well as focusing on the endogenous development 
through community cooperation and participation. The endogenous 
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approach also means an approach distinguished from the mass-production 
and market-mediated cultural industry. In other words, the cultural industries 
in the beginning stage served the strategy of participatory incentives to 
empower residents.  
In addition, it is noted that there were three thematic semiotic practices 
interweaving the meaning-making of community empowerment and 
facilitating the discursive formation of cultural industries.   
The first thematic discourse is ‘decentralisation’. With the breaking of the 
authoritarian regime, decentralisation was one of the claims of local society. 
In cultural aspects, most of the important cultural facilities and cultural 
events were focused in Taipei, the capital city and the location of the central 
government, which had gained widespread criticism since the 1980s. More 
and more people and groups asked the state to decentralise resources and 
take local perspectives into account in the policy-planning (Yu, 2002). In 
response to the civil demand, the CCA devolved responsibility to County and 
City Governments and provided funds to subsidise local cultural events, and 
build local culture spaces for performances and exhibitions.  
From 1994 to 2001, decentralisation discourse related to cultural industries 
was mainly represented in two aspects of the CEP. Firstly, a series of cultural 
events and arts exhibitions were displayed in the countryside. For example, 
the 'National Festival of Culture and Arts', which was the biggest cultural 
event in Taiwan launched in 1983, was planned by the CCA and travelled 
around the island providing cultural activities to the people. Since 1994, local 
governments took it in turns to take charge of the festival. After that, every 
local cultural centre had the chance to introduce and promote their cultural 
activities based on their own local culture, history and industry to the whole 
country. Secondly, the CCA encouraged local cultural centres to serve as 
‘local CCAs’ that had to develop their own policy and subsidy schemes for 
local groups and cultural projects. Through decentralised planning of the 
CEP, the local cultural centres started to search for their cultural 
characteristics. Most of them got assistance from local cultural-historical 
workshops which have collected local culture and conducted historical 
research since the 1980s in order to develop their specific cultural policies 
and make incentive plans for their communities. One of the active local 
governments is Yilan County (Lu, 2002). Since 1994, Yilan County has 
encouraged its local communities to participate in the CEP and advocated 
the concept of empowerment. In 1996, the County held the ‘International 
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Children's Folklore & Folkgame Festival’, which was part of the devolved 
project of ‘'National Festival of Culture and Arts'’. The festival not only 
brought about the revival of local cultural industries but also reshaped the 
County’s image by empowering community residents and developing local 
festivals. Consequently, ‘the Yilan experience’ became ‘the exemplar for 
cultural construction by local government’ (Lu, 2002, p.83) such that other 
local governments came to visit and learn the strategy of cultural industries.  
Through the semiotic practice of the decentralisation discourse and the 
coordinated bureaucracy of local festivals, the meaning of industrialisation is 
constituted.  
Parallel to decentralisation discourse, localisation discourse was the second 
thematic discourse representing frequently in cultural policy, especially in the 
CEP. With the political reforms of democratisation, the variation of 
localisation discourse was promoted by many local cultural workers, 
associations and historical studios to ask the state to plan cultural policy 
based on local history and culture (Lu, 2002). The CEP was one of the 
responses to localisation. For example, Chen, Chi-Nan (1995) asked 
whether the cultural administration should put local culture into their policy-
making, emphasising, “‘local place’ is the field where people conduct their 
real life; thus it ought to be the primary focus of cultural administration”. 
Another example that highlighted the value of local culture in the cultural 
industries was shown in the 2004 Cultural White Paper which stated, “the 
process of production is full of life based on local history and culture to make 
people in Taiwan rethink cultural value, rediscover the real meaning of their 
own culture” (CCA, 2004a, p.194).  
Furthermore, the discourse of localisation was enhanced by referring the 
Japanese experience for the state to confront the problems of the rapidly 
growing gap between the urban areas and rural areas. In the early 1990s, 
most townships and villages had faced declining economics because of 
dramatic urbanisation, and the rapid industrialisation of manufacturing 
sectors in the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the state joined the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1995, lifted limitations and 
pursued free trade. This made economic conditions in most townships and 
the rural areas relying on farming and traditional crafts worse, and they 
asked for reforms. In order to resolve the industrial crisis in rural areas, the 
Handcraft Research Institute referred to the Japanese experience which had 
a similar background in the early 1950s and had come up with some 
regenerative strategies for rural areas to preserve their traditional crafts and 
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revive local industries (Yu, 2002). Therefore, similar projects funded by the 
Ministry of Economics encouraged discovering specific local resources and 
introducing operation skills to revitalise traditional crafts for the local 
economy. These projects were soon integrated into the CEP to develop 
community industries and, as mentioned earlier, drew Chen’s attention to 
transfer Japan’s project of ‘Machizukuri’ into Taiwan. The highlight of 
localisation discourse in cultural industries showed the existing civil claim 
and the state’s past projects had co-constituted the meaning of 
industrialisation. 
The third thematic discourse is ‘participation’, which was initially advocated 
by professionals and foundations such as scholars of architecture and 
regional planning, activists and cultural workers. As mentioned, the early 
stages of the CEP focused on the construction and improvement of cultural 
infrastructure, which attracted many architects and scholars, with their teams 
joining the projects. Most particularly, Hsia, Chu-Joe and Chen, Liang-Chun 
with the students of the Graduate Institute of Building and Planning at 
National Taiwan University; and Tseng, Shu-Cheng with his team from the 
Department of Architecture at Tamkang University proposed the concepts of 
‘participatory design’ and ‘community architects’ in the consultant meeting of 
the CEP project (Tseng, 2007). These ideas met the core values of the CEP, 
and soon became a philosophy of empowering people in the community (Yu, 
2002; Ho, 2012b). This transformed the focus of previous projects of the 
CEP from infrastructure to the practical strategy of empowerment. For 
example, the CCA repeatedly emphasised that the subject of community is 
residents. The community can only be improved with the residents’ 
participation (CCA, 1998).  
In addition, many professionals, associations and cultural groups played an 
intermediate role in developing participation discourse into practice. As 
analysed earlier in this chapter, most Taiwanese lacked the interest to 
engage in public affairs due to the chilling effect of White Terror. In order to 
encourage communities to understand the meaning of ‘community 
empowerment’, these professional groups organised and 
mobilised community residents to participate in community public affairs by 
providing them with civil education and training. For example, community 
universities were set up around Taiwan and provided workshops and classes 
to advance people's ability to discuss public affairs in order to increase their 
citizenship consciousness (CCA, 2010c). The movement of 'We Write the 
History of Our Village' shows how ordinary people can use their community 
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histories as a basis for establishing grassroots democracy and discovering 
the potential industries for local communities (CCA, 1998). Moreover, a 
number of groups organised the ‘Association of Community Empowerment’ 
in 1997 with the purpose of developing and encouraging research for 
community empowerment and providing policy suggestions, based on the 
local perspective, to the government. At the same time, it also tried to 
construct a public sphere through which community workers could discuss, 
communicate, enter into dialogue, and develop the participation discourse. 
Within these hegemonic processes, some actors play a more powerful role 
as intermediaries in articulating, reinforcing and filtering out the discourses, 
such as international organisations or governmental policy-makers (Sum, 
2005, p.12). They may select, privilege or recontextualise certain economic 
imaginaries and their corresponding objects of governance, and mobilise 
networks to support their promotion and institutionalisation, whereby public 
choices and public opinion may be constrained or weakened. Moreover, 
such hegemonic discourses and formations also marginalise some groups 
while they provoke resistance from social movements and civil society (Sum, 
2009). 
These discourses were frequently represented in the policy text of the CEP 
and became the practical principle of cultural industries. They can be seen 
as ‘state discourses’ of cultural policy formed in the context of 
democratisation during the 1990s. More importantly, the three state 
discourses of decentralisation, localisation and participation laid a semiotic 
order for the introduction of industrialisation by cultural industries into the 
framework of the CEP. As a result,  ‘community empowerment’ is a familiar 
term in people’s lives and often acknowledged as an on-going process of 
building the sense of community by engaging in cultural industries since the 
end of the 1990s.  
In 1998, the CCA launched a new project – ‘Revitalising Local Cultural 
Industries’. Here, the CCA formally defined ‘cultural industries’ as, “based on 
creativity and uniqueness with its roots in local tradition and characteristics 
or the originality of local craftsmanship” (CCA, 1998). The definition clearly 
emphasised the living cultures and values of the locality. Based on the 
definition and the endogenous approach, Chen, Chi-Nan and CCA  
advocated the strategy of cultural industries by the ‘endogenous and 
indigenous approach’ (地 場 化), which emphasised locally-oriented 
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production and consumption (Chen and Chen, 1998). As Chen (1999) 
argues, the endogenous and indigenous approach of community industries 
aims to replace the introduction of external capital to promote local 
development as well as prevent the negative impacts of homogenisation and 
exploitation in the community.  
However, CCA’s policy discourses of cultural industries and semiotic practice 
of industrialisation were not widely accepted among the communities in the 
early years. Only a few communities adopted the endogenous and 
indigenous approach and worked with the CCA to develop the strategies of 
industrialisation. It was not until the post-earthquake reconstruction of 1999 
that a great deal of damaged communities started to think of the possibilities 
of cultural industries. On 21 September 1999, central Taiwan was hit by an 
earthquake. Nearly 3,000 people died and many communities were seriously 
damaged. Large numbers of non-governmental organisations and volunteers 
immediately came to participate in the reconstruction. The CCA soon 
incorporated the reconstruction work as one major dimension of the CEP 
with the Association of Community Empowerment and other professionals, 
such as architects, space planners, social workers and cultural workers. 
These professionals introduced new practices such as eco-tourism and 
organic farming to these damaged communities (Huang, 2000). The 
Association of Community Empowerment soon became a major partner, 
working closely with the CCA in terms of training government staff and 
community organisers. The relevant practices of the reconstruction with 
cultural intermediaries have enhanced the endogenous and indigenous 
approach to cultural industries in communities. Furthermore, Huang and Hsu 
(2011) point out that the unexpected earthquake set off a series of economic 
mechanisms, and changed the focus of communities to economic outputs 
generated by community cultures. In other words, the priority of cultural 
industries had shifted from empowering people to participate in public affairs 
to empowering people to develop local industries for community 
reconstruction and regeneration. In this vein, an endogenous and indigenous 
approach was emphasised and adopted by communities.  
In addition to the promotion of these governmental technologies, the 
economic imaginaries were advanced by other researchers. For instance, 
Wong (2001) argues that local culture as the object of industrialisation must 
be based on the reflection of the existing industrial mode which focuses on 
intense labour and low costs of production in rural areas. Wong claims the 
endogenous and indigenous approach highlights the local identity and 
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cultural preservation can not only revive the local economy but also resist 
the dominant logic of capitalist reproduction. Huang, Shi-Huei continued to 
introduce the relevant Japanese experience to share and discuss with 
policy-makers and communities (Huang, 1998; Huang, 2003a; Huang, 
2003b; Huang, 2005). Their academic efforts consolidate the symbolic power 
of the economic imaginary (the endogenous and indigenous approach) for 
the cultural industries in the local communities.  
Apart from the CCA’s policy discourses and academic discourses, local 
practice had played an essential role in the co-constitution of 
industrialisation, in that the discourse of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’ and the economic imaginary have been making 
sense and making meaning. One of the most renowned cases is that of 
Baimi Clog Village. The discursive formation and co-constitution process of 
industrialisation are analysed in section 4.4.  
 
4.4 Local Practice – the Case of Baimi Clog Village 
The previous section has shown that the state discourses of 
‘decentralisation’, ‘localisation’ and ‘participation’ were constituted by the 
dynamic and dialectic process between the state and society. In this phase, 
the CCA launched the CEP and advocated the endogenous and indigenous 
approach as the economic imaginary of the cultural industries. Many local 
communities resonated with this economic imaginary of cultural 
industrialisation based on their contexts and demands. Their ongoing 
practice from the civil sector has participated in the semiotic practice with the 
state sector to co-constitute a semiotic frame for later development but also 
structure the relationships between state and civil society. Baimi Clog Village 
is one of the typical practices and has often been praised as the most active 
community since the CCA promoted the CEP in 1995 (Lu, 2002). 
Specifically, the case of Baimi Clog Village had a significant impact on the 
discursive formation of industrialisation and facilitated the dominance of 
‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ in the late 1990s.  
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4.4.1 Community Empowerment in Baimi Clog Village 
Baimi village is a small village in the northern Taiwan. It is located in Yilan 
City and about 100 kilometres from Taipei. It was seriously polluted by 
mining factories and struggled to protect its environment until the early 
1990s when it changed to a sustainable village with community 
empowerment and a cultural clog industry. After developing clog craft 
industries for a decade, the general population of Baimi community became 
stable at around 2,150 from 2004 to 2010 according to the demographics of 
Yilan City. In 2012, the turnover of Biami Clog Museum and associated 
industrial activities was about 17 million NT dollars (about £341,777) with 
only 520 thousand NT dollars CCA funding for education projects, according 
to the interview with Lin, Ray-Mu (林 瑞 木), the director of the Baimi 
Community Development Association. During the past twenty years, the 
Baimi community has persisted with endogenous and indigenous 
approaches to revive local industries and improve the environment. The 
case was often promoted by the government to highlight the policy 
achievement and introduce the strategies of industrialisation, and also 
attracted other communities and associations to visit and follow the 
strategies.  
In fact, the Baimi community has undergone a tough process of 
transformation from a mining town to a clog village. Before Japanese 
colonial rule, Baimi was farmland, planting rice, peanuts and other 
agricultural products. The name ‘Baimi’ was said to relate to the sound of 
‘white rice’ in Chinese. In addition, Baimi has the most abundant limestone 
(over 80 per cent) in Taiwan. During the Japanese colonial period, the 
Japanese started to build cement factories in this area, and about seventy 
cement factories were built in its most prosperous period. After WWII, 
Taiwan’s economy shifted from agriculture to an industrial economy, which 
resulted in demand for these materials increasing considerably. Therefore, 
more and more cement plants and factories were established in Baimi, 
including the Taiwan Cement Company which is Taiwan’s biggest cement 
factory. Moreover, the state established a petrol storage plant in this small 
village in the early 1980s. Every day, there were about four hundred trucks 
running on the main road through Baimi village, which produced a great deal 
of industrial emissions and exhaust fumes (Lu, 2002). According to statistics, 
Baimi was the dustiest area in Taiwan by the mid-1990s (NCAF, 2004). This 
polluted and dangerous environment narrowed the public space for residents 
and made Baimi village fall into decline. More and more people emigrated to 
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other areas and most of the younger generation left Baimi village after 
graduating from secondary school.  
However, following the rise of environmental consciousness in the late 
1980s, residents organised a community organisation in 1992 to protest 
against the pollution. After several protests and boycotts, the Taiwan Cement 
Company promised to improve the environment and provide ‘environmental 
protection compensation’ every year to the Yilan County Government rather 
than directly to Baimi village. This angered the local activists; therefore they 
formed the Baimi Community Development Association (hereafter BCDA) in 
1993 and asked for the legal right to fully manage the monetary 
compensation. With the emerging decentralisation discourse, its meaning 
was so widely acknowledged by the public that the BCDA asked the 
government to devolve power to the people. The BCDA’s boycott strategy 
was legalised with the decentralisation discourse, and the Yilan Government 
granted the BCDA the compensation fund in 1994. This fund became the 
major financial source for the BCDA in the early years (Lu, 2002). They used 
the fund to improve their environmental protection and community welfare, 
such as by caring for seniors and securing the community. Soon, Baimi 
community was named as one of six outstanding communities of 
environment improvement by the Environmental Protection Administration of 
central government in 1994 as well as the ‘Premium Community’ by the Yilan 
Government in the environmental contest of 1995. This resistant and 
participatory experience improved their environment significantly and built a 
collective sense of belonging. Then the members of the BCDA started to 
think of the future of their community (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012).    
When the CCA launched the CEP in 1994, the BCDA was keen to 
understand the concept of ‘community empowerment’ (Tseng, 2007). At that 
time, ‘community empowerment’ was a new term with abstract ideas, and 
most residents of Baimi village viewed the CEP as merely a project of 
community architecture (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012).  
During the same period, Yilan County Government under the administration 
of Yu, Hsi-Kun (游錫堃) adopted a series of indigenous projects to build a 
‘new Yilan culture’ and local identity. Therefore, when the CCA promoted the 
CEP and encouraged the local cultural centres of county government to be 
local CCAs, Yilan County Government was most enthusiastic in responding 
to the CEP (Lu, 2002). In 1995, Mayor Yu announced that CEP would 
become the major direction integrating county governmental projects in the 
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following years. In this vein, Yilan County Government combined the existing 
local art festival with community empowerment projects to encourage local 
communities to make their proposals. Then, following the localisation 
discourse of the CEP, communities were encouraged to discover their 
distinguishing local features from their local history (Tseng, 2007). In 1996, 
Yilan County designed the ‘seed community’ project, which encouraged all 
twelve townships to nominate one community to participate in the festival of 
‘Happy Yilan New Year’. In this festival, each seed community would be 
granted funding and gain consulting assistance to develop and display their 
‘cultural specialty’. Although Baimi with its cultural specialty of being a ‘clog 
village’ was not Suao township’s scheduled seed community (Lu, 2002), the 
BCDA submitted their own proposal and was included in the project because 
it represented the autonomy of the community and met the bottom-up 
approach of the CEP. With the support of the local government, CEP’s 
semiotic practice and the residents’ participation, Baimi village started to 
develop clog cultural industries and ‘clog village’ has become the symbol of 
the Baimi community.   
The above development shows that the cultural industries were seen as a 
post-industrialisation remedy for the state and the Baimi community to 
counter the negative results of the long-term bias of economic 
industrialisation which favoured specific heavy industries but exploited the 
resources, traditional industries and culture of rural areas. Despite the fact 
that the CCA proposed economic imaginaries of industrialisation, Baimi 
village participated in the process of meaning-making of endogenous and 
indigenous approach with the state actor and reconstructed their own 
industrialisation with empirical experience and influenced other community 
industries. The following section discusses the complex dialectic process.  
 
4.4.2 The Semiotic Practice of Industrialisation in Baimi Clog 
Village  
As a matter of fact, clogs were not the initial option of cultural industries for 
the BCDA, as the controversial stone-mining industry, which was the primary 
natural resource and local industry, had once been considered their ‘cultural 
specialty’ (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). Although Baimi village had 
been famous for making wooden clogs since the Japanese colonial period, 
the wooden clog industry had vanished and been replaced by the mass 
production of plastic clogs and shoes in the early 1960s. However, some 
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senior residents still remembered their childhood with the old sayings related 
to wooden clogs. These sayings drove the BCDA to investigate the local 
history and community resource. They found many stories and invited two 
retired craftsmen to teach residents clog-making skills. A young artist, Hsien-
Chang Chiu (邱 憲 章), assisted in painting clogs and designing multi-
functional clogs for modern use such as key rings with clog shapes and 
diverse decorations. These collective efforts drew considerable attention in 
the festival and, more importantly, hundreds of the clog products were sold. 
The economic profit gave Baimi community confidence in presenting itself as 
a ‘clog village’ (Lu, 2002).  
When Yilan County Government held the ‘National Community 
Empowerment Fair’ in 1997, the BCDA designed Baimi’s version of 
‘Cinderella’ to connect their glorious past of clog-making and the 
revitalisation of the cultural industry, through residents’ participation. The 
event was very successful for sales, and brought big financial support for the 
Baimi community. The following media coverage enhanced the residents’ 
confidence in the cultural clog industry and made the Baimi community 
decide to take the clog industry as a strategy to empower their community 
(Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). 
However, they did not realise the meaning of the policy discourse 
‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ nor how to 
industrialise the clog culture in the beginning (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 
2012). During that period, Chen, Chi-Nan played an intermediary role to 
interpret the economic imaginary of cultural industries and discuss with the 
BCDA. After the discursive-practice interpretation, the Baimi community 
gradually developed practical strategies to put ‘industrialisation of culture, 
culturalisation of industry’ into their local context, as well as the CEP’s 
context.  
This was the culmination of several events. Firstly, BCDA consulted with 
Chen, Chi-Nan and clarified the relationship between community 
empowerment and cultural industries, which laid the foundation to employ an 
endogenous and indigenous approach to developing cultural clog industries. 
In 1998, Chen stepped down as the Deputy Director of the CCA and became 
the director of Yang Shan Cultural Foundation in Yilan. Due to the 
geographical affinity, the BCDA and Chen with the Yang Shan Cultural 
Foundation gradually formed a partnership to work on the CEP and cultural 
industries. As a founder of the CEP, Chen analysed the importance of 
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community empowerment and discussed the possible benefit of cultural 
industries by endogenous and indigenous approach with the BCDA. In order 
to find an operational method, they visited some cases in Japan and 
consulted with Miyazaki Kiyoshi who was the main consultant of the CCA’s 
CEP (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). After these consultations, and many 
discussions with the residents, the BCDA decided to take the endogenous 
and indigenous approach to developing the clog cultural industry for the 
community’s public interest. According to Lin, Ray-Mu, the approach means 
“producing locally and selling locally” (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). In 
another interview, Lin elaborated on the spirit and purpose of Baimi Clog 
Village.  
The products we sell in Baimi Clog Village emphasise the features of 
unique, small quantity, sentiment, hand-made, experience-based. The 
core value comes from community empowerment with the goal to rebuild 
the living value of Baimi community and keep the balance between local 
industries and environment. What we want to do for our hometown is to 
find out the sustainable direction (Lin, 2007, cited in Tseng, 2007, p.160). 
The consulting process and partnership may bring dilemmas such as 
overdependence on consultants’ assistance. However, in Baimi’s case, the 
BCDA takes a very cautious attitude to applying for government funding and 
asking for external professional assistance, according to Lu’s (2002) 
anthropological observation in 1998 and the interview with Lin, Ray-Mu in 
2012. In the case of Baimi Clog Village, Chen, Chi-Nan played a translation 
role to explain the meaning of community empowerment and then the Baimi 
community decided how to put the concepts of industrialisation into 
practice. Lin mentioned that Chen only asked questions such as: “why do 
you want to do that?” or “what is your aim in doing the clog industry?” which 
stimulated the BCDA to think about the value of cultural industries for their 
community and eventually develop their own ability and skills to manage 
cultural industries (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). Through the debates 
and practice, the Baimi Community reconfirmed the meaning of the CEP as 
Lin, Ray-Mu said, “from this process of industrialisation in the clog museum, 
we are gradually catching the main idea of CEP, which is the project of 
empowering people” (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). 
Secondly, the BCDA used several strategies of industrialisation. In the 
beginning, they participated in the CEP and applied for a government grant 
from the Ministry of Economics to develop the clog industry. With this 
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government funding and a loan from the bank, they renovated the clog 
workshop and exhibition hall, which used to be abandoned factories and 
dormitories, to display the local industrial history and a variety of clogs. The 
other fundamental strategy was the organisation of a co-operative in 1998, 
which has served as the base for community sustainability as most 
residents are stakeholders and share responsibility and interests. As Hsiao, 
Yu-Chu (蕭玉珠), the director of the tour of the Baimi Clog Museum, said:  
The core value of our clog museum is for public interest, our revenue 
doesn’t go back into the market mechanism… the clog industry was 
once disappearing, but we incubated it by the creativity based on our 
living story. This is what we called ‘industrialisation of culture’ (Interview 
with Hsiao, Yu-Ju, 2012). 
From 1998 to 2002, the turnover of the co-operative had increased 
considerably from 1 million NT dollars to 9 million NT dollars. Furthermore, 
the BCDA referred to the Dutch experience of operating clog industries for 
tourism (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). In 2007, they built the Clog 
Museum, which was partly subsidised by CCA’s project entitled ‘Local 
Cultural Museum’ (the follow-up project of the CEP during 2002-2007, see 
section 5.3.3 for further details). Then, they designed a visiting path in the 
Clog Museum by linking it with the production, craftsmen’s studio, display, 
workshop for DIY and shops. Now they provide a variety of experience tours 
to introduce visitors to their local history and clog culture. They also exploited 
various cultural commodities of clogs for fashion use including keyrings, 
wedding presents and healthy clogs. The Clog Museum currently provides 
four types of experience tours for visitors to promote clog industries and 
local culture. The tour-type of endogenous and tourism approach was the 
reflexivity of cultural translation in which they consulted and discussed with 
professionals and residents, then selected the practice (see section 5.4.2 for 
further details). The tours include the guided tour of the clog museum, DIY 
experience of clog craft and ecological interpretation, which have created 
stable and diverse employment for about thirty people in the local area 
(Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). From 2007 to 2012, there were about 
180 thousand visitors coming to Baimi Clog Museum every year, and the 
revenue of the co-operative sustains the development of Baimi Clog Village 
(Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). Despite the prosperity of clog cultural 
industries, the BCDA focuses on improving the surrounding environment, 
such as rebuilding the multifunctional community centre, establishing the art 
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square, the walking path around the community and the railway park. Their 
future goal is to develop an eco-museum. 
The social-cultural impact of Baimi clog industries transforms residents’ 
hometown imaginaries. Through these collaborative efforts by participation 
and empowerment, the residents’ cultural identity has been consolidated and 
they have more knowledge and skills to participate in public affairs (Interview 
with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). In the past, the Baimi residents were resigned to 
everything and rather passive on public issues. For example they used to 
accept government arrangements in the name of national development 
whereby they gave up their land for factories and oil storage. However, the 
experience of the Clog Museum has made the residents change their 
indifferent attitude and be willing to fight for their rights. For example, the 
BCDA participated in the public hearings of the Suhua Highway 
Improvement Project to make their appeals and ask government to have 
respect for local opinions concerning the environmental implications 
(Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). Their proposal to design different roads 
for community use was accepted by the administration.  
Rooted in the endogenous and indigenous approach, the profitability of the 
cultural industries was not the main concern during the first phase of 
industrialisation in cultural policy. Lin and Chen (2003) emphasise that the 
formation of Baimi Clog Village did not aim to make the maximum profit from 
the cultural clog industry; instead, it was the outcome of the residents’ 
attempt to improve their environment and find a sustainable strategy. Today, 
they still persist in this strategy as Lin and Hsiao said respectively: 
It is not saying that we can handle the cultural industries without the 
worries behind. We have to go back to think of the issues about our 
community environment and our life. For us, ‘community empowerment’ 
is composed of life, ecology and production… We make efforts to 
improve our environment, build better public spaces and make good use 
of the space to make our life better. The clog museum brought visitors’ 
encouragement to support us to have more motivation to keep going 
(Interview with Hsiao, Yu-Ju, 2012). 
It is important to maintain the clog cultural industries to sustain our 
community… Without cultural industries, we will lose our environment. 
And if we are not sensitive to our environment, the shared consensus 
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would fly away. Therefore, the importance of cultural industries is to 
generate this consensus (Interview with Lin, Ray-Mu, 2012). 
The above development shows the semiotic practice of industrialisation by 
the case of Baimi Clog Village. From the struggling process, it reveals that 
the economic imaginary was not only shaped by the policy discourse and 
governments’ strategies, but also underwent constant reflection, 
consultation, negotiation, and partnership implementation. The co-
constitution process of endogenous and indigenous approach consolidated 
the meaning of industrialisation in the first phase was empowerment and 
participation. This approach and the meaning dominated the 
industrialisation of cultural policy in the 1990s and early 2000s, which affect 
the most communities and organisational actors to engage in similar actions 
to develop their cultural industries and local areas.       
   
Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the emergence of cultural industries in Taiwan’s 
cultural policy and highlighted the co-constitution of industrialisation between 
the policy discourse and local practice from 1994 to 2002. After experiencing 
the colonised period, the KMT’s authoritarian ruling with privileged 
imaginaries of Chinese nationalism, the rising of social movements and 
Taiwanese awareness, Taiwan started toward the path of democratisation 
since martial law was lifted in 1987. Embedded in the specific context, the 
CEP was launched by the CCA in 1994 as a strategy to promote cultural 
democratisation. In order to facilitate the CEP, cultural industries were 
advocated by the CCA in 1995 with the economic imaginary of 
industrialisation by the endogenous and indigenous approach. 
Within the context that the focus of cultural policy had shifted from Chinese 
nationalism to democratisation, the case of Baimi Clog Village has shown 
the dialectic and co-constituted process of the meaning-making of 
industrialisation. On the one hand, the industrialisation emerged and was 
mobilised by the state as a political project to articulate with discourses and 
practices of democratisation, localisation and participation. On the other 
hand, Baimi village initially followed the CEP but gradually developed its 
industrialisation strategies and became one of the typical models of the CCA 
to introduce cultural industries into other communities. Though this process 
of industrialisation, the meaning of endogenous and indigenous approach in 
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terms of empowerment and participation were established. With the 
economic imaginary, it empowered communities themselves to build their 
own industrialisation and local identity. By their practice in the clog industry, 
the process they experienced and the difficulties they overcame, or failed to 
deal with, enriched the insight of cultural industries and defined the scope 
and meaning of cultural industries in Taiwan. Furthermore, with the 
government promotion and media coverage, the case of Baimi provided a 
referencing perspective for other communities.  
However, the meaning of industrialisation underwent another significant 
transformation after 2002. First, Taiwan became a member of the World 
Trade Organization in 2002 and faced tough competition and challenges, 
such that economic transformation became a pressing issue. Second, as the 
DPP government gained power in 2000, ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ was the main 
concept of policy-making. In this context, the CCA proposed the ‘New 
Hometown Community Empowerment Project’ in 2002 to continue and 
extend community empowerment and the cultural industries. Meanwhile, the 
CCA adopted the British scheme of ‘creative industries’ and proposed the 
‘Cultural and Creative Industries Project’. The new project of the CEP and 
the emerging of CCIs had formed the new discursive-material condition to 
industrialisation of cultural policy and caused confusion and debate. These 
dramatic developments and another semiotic practice of industrialisation will 
be analysed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 5 Industrialisation of Cultural Policy II (2002-2008) 
Introduction 
This chapter investigates the second period of industrialisation of cultural 
policy in Taiwan from 2002 to 2008. Since the millennium, Taiwan 
experienced another dramatic transition in politics, economics, society and 
culture, which created the conditions for the industrialisation of culture in 
cultural policy. It not only brought variations of discourse but these were 
accompanied by selected projects with the retention influence of previous 
projects to co-constitute the evolution of industrialisation. The economic 
imaginary of industrialisation had therefore been changed and diverged into 
various directions framing the cultural policy of central government and local 
communities.  
In order to elaborate on this development, the chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first section of the chapter explains the structural context 
following the first rotation of the ruling party and economic liberalisation after 
Taiwan joined the World Trade Organization in 2002. Throughout this period, 
indigenisation expressed in ‘Taiwanese awareness’ continued as a prevalent 
theme in social and cultural issues. Taiwanese indigenous identity gradually 
supplanted Chinese-centric identity after the Democratic Progressive Party 
(hereafter DPP) gained power in 2000. However, international trade and 
domestic political changes raised new controversies and conflicts over the 
cultural industries and communities. With the achievement of 
democratisation, the focus of community empowerment shifted to cultural 
industries and challenged the dominant position of participatory 
industrialisation in cultural policy. In particular, the state launched the 
‘Cultural and Creative Industries Project’ (hereafter CCIP) in 2002. As a 
result, these changes constituted a specific semiotic-material condition with 
new economic imaginaries of industrialisation in cultural policy. 
Following this contextual framing, the second section examines the rise of 
the imaginaries of cultural and creative industries within national policy as a 
‘strategic fix’ for the DPP government to confront this economic 
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transformation under neo-liberalism and the knowledge-based economy. It 
particularly examines how this strategic fix was played out through the 
evolution of the ‘Cultural and Creative Park’ (hereafter CC Park) approach as 
the specific form in which the CCIP economic imaginary was conceived by 
the CCA.  In this context, there was clear competition between an artist-
dominated sense of civil purpose and the state authorities’ advocacy of the 
neo-liberal approach to industrialisation. Space allocation thus became a key 
site in which the emergent hegemonic discourse of industrialisation was 
played out.  
The third section investigates the formation of the New Hometown 
Community Empowerment Project (hereafter New Hometown CEP) and its 
political and economic imaginaries. It focuses on the complementary role of 
New Hometown CEP between the previous CEP and CCIP. More 
specifically, the ‘Local Cultural Museum’, the sub-project of the New 
Hometown CEP, encompasses the semiotic practice of cultural citizenship, 
which has evolved into the meaning of industrialisation. 
Local practices by communities and organisations played an essential part in 
the semiotic-material evolution of cultural industrialisation during this phase. 
The communities inherited the previous imaginaries focusing on the 
empowerment and participatory approach and increasingly emphasised 
tourism-profit of cultural industries sponsored by the state. However, some 
cases developed self-governance in industrialisation. One of the important 
cases, Taomi Eco-Village, will be examined in the fourth section to describe 
the semiotic struggle among the various actors (the central government, 
local communities and non-governmental organisations). Finally, the 
concluding section summarises the co-constitution process of cultural 
industrialisation in the second phase and the challenges for the next phase.  
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5.1 The Transition of Political, Economic, Social and Cultural 
Structure 
5.1.1 Political Democratisation and ‘Taiwan’s Subjectivity’ 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Taiwan experienced several decades 
of authoritarian rule and democracy movements until democratised 
institutions and political mechanisms were gradually established in the 
1990s. Prior to 1991 the legislature had been largely unelected under the 
limitations of martial law since 1949. There were only ‘supplemental 
elections’ for a few seats representing Taiwan’s districts, while the delegates 
of the Chinese Mainland districts held the majority of seats without re-
election in both the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan. It wasn’t 
until the ‘Wild Lily Movement’ (野百合運動) of 1990, which was organised 
mainly by university students, triggered a series of political reforms and 
constitutional amendments including subjecting the Legislative Yuan to full 
re-election and instituting universal suffrage in the national and local 
elections, that direct election of local governments started in 1994, and the 
first presidential election was held in 1996. It can be said that after 1996, as 
Garver (2011, p.11) describes, “the people of Taiwan created a vibrant 
political system, complete with freedom of speech, association and 
assembly, rule of law, and competitive and fair multiparty elections that 
enabled the island's citizens to choose and change their rulers”. 
During the process of democratisation, investigating local history and 
rebuilding an affirmative knowledge of long-ignored indigenous culture 
became a common concern and was followed by the community 
empowerment movements. Meanwhile, political indigenisation with the 
promotion of Taiwan’s identity had continued to develop under the 
administration of Lee, Teng-Hui. These developments loosened the 
previously dominant China-centric identity, and created a new set of 
imagined values for the society. One of the significant discourses was the 
‘New Taiwanese’, which Lee, Teng-Hui originally promoted in order to defuse 
the ethnic conflicts and win the elections (Lee, 1999). 
Ethnic tensions and conflict were increasingly fierce due to the intense 
elections and lack of transitional justice after the end of martial law (Wu, 
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2006). Lee developed the discourse of the ‘New Taiwanese’ to fix ethnic 
conflicts between Taiwanese and Mainlanders (Huang and Hsu, 2011). In his 
terms, the ‘New Taiwanese’ was defined inclusively:  
No matter if you came 400 to 500 years ago, or 40 or 50 years ago from 
the Mainland, or if you are aboriginal, we are all Taiwanese, so long as 
we work hard for Taiwan, the Republic of China, then we are New 
Taiwanese (Lee, 1999, p.264).  
This discourse had significant implications. It not only facilitated Ma, Ying-
Jeou’s victory in the Taipei mayoral election of 19987, but it also promoted 
the ‘community of the shared fate’ with the relevant projects of the CEP 
since 1994 and thus strengthened Taiwanese indigenous identity and 
awareness. As a result, it can be said that ‘New Taiwanese’ became an 
important semiotic frame, having significant influence on localisation since 
then, and on the subsequent DPP government. This represented an 
important break with the previous KMT policy of subordinating the Taiwanese 
indigenes within the broader Chinese nation by various mechanisms of 
policy discourses and projects. In this vein, Lee redefined the relationships 
between Taiwan and Mainland China as a ‘special state-to-state relation’ in 
1999, which was interpreted and labelled as ‘Two States’ by the press later. 
At that time, the ‘special state-to-state relation’ was reflected by the reality 
and widely accepted by the majority of Taiwanese people according to 
official surveys8, although it did cause turbulence in cross-strait relations. 
After that, ‘New Taiwanese’ became a dominant discourse and was further 
used by the DPP to promote multiculturalism, replacing ‘Four Ethnic Groups’, 
to win the presidential election.  
In 2000, the DPP, the first opposition party, with a focus on Taiwanese 
awareness and Taiwanese identity, won the presidential election by a 
marginal majority (39.3 per cent) because of the division of the KMT. 
                                            
7 Ma Ying-Jeou was elected President in 2008 and remains so to date.  
8 The Mainland Affairs Council collected 16 surveys conducted by different organisations in 
1999 and all of the results showed the majority of respondents agree with Lee’s claim. 
[Online]. [Accessed 6 June 2015]. Avilable from:  
http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=55885&ctNode=6146&mp=1  
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However, since the KMT party still held a majority of seats in the Legislative 
Yuan, and in order to reduce China’s military threat and gain American 
support, the DPP government took a moderate attitude and followed 
progressive strategies on indigenisation policies of national identity in the 
first two years (Fell, 2012). For example, in President Chen, Shui-Bian’s 
inauguration, he pledged ‘Five Nos’: that he would not declare 
independence, change the national title, put the state-to-state theory into the 
Constitution, hold a referendum on independence or abolish the National 
Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines as long as China 
had no intention to use military force against Taiwan. Moreover, Chen 
appointed a KMT member as Prime Minister and organised the cross-party 
committee of economic development to plan trade between Taiwan and 
China. In addition, the DPP government promoted its own version of Lee’s 
‘New Taiwanese’ through the discourse of multi-cultural society, giving equal 
importance to every ethnic group (Fell, 2012). The discourse of 
multiculturalism was consolidated by the implementation of education 
systems and cultural projects as well as the establishment of new ethnic 
institutions (Wang, 2004). For example, mother tongue language education 
became a compulsory subject in primary schools in 2001, the Hakka Affairs 
Council was established in 2001, the Council of Indigenous Peoples was 
renamed in 20029 and the ‘Indigenous People’s Basic Law’ was discussed 
and finally promulgated in 2005 to secure the autonomy of every aboriginal 
group.   
However, Chen’s moderate strategies did not receive a positive response. 
According to the analysis of Dafydd Fell (2012, pp.215-216), the reasons 
include the DPP having limited seats in Parliament and encountering serious 
domestic setbacks such as the controversial issue of the ‘Fourth Nuclear 
Power Station Project’ 10 . Moreover, the DPP failed to deal with the 
                                            
9  The council was originally established on 1 December 1996 entitled the Council of 
Aboriginal Affairs. On 4 January 2002, the Legislative Yuan approved the amendments to 
the council and on 25 March in the same year, the council was renamed the Council of 
Indigenous Peoples. 
10 The Fourth Nuclear Power Station Project was planned in the 1980s but was suspended 
after residents’ protests. It was constructed in 1999 and scheduled to complete in 2004. 
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consequences of the dotcom recession, as Taiwan suffered negative growth 
in 2001 and record levels of unemployment. Externally, China continued to 
squeeze Taiwan's international space as the number of formal diplomatic 
relations declined11. Therefore, after 2002, the DPP adjusted its moderate 
strategies by intensifying the discourse of ‘Taiwan’s Subjectivity’ (台灣主體性) 
on several occasions to deal with the rise of China and dilute the economic 
crisis.  
‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’, as the term literally suggests, takes Taiwan as a 
subject in its own right rather than affiliating it with China. The term 
emphasises Taiwan as a unique nation with its own marine history and the 
substance of being multiracial, multilingual and multicultural but experiencing 
colonisation in various periods (Chuang and Lin, 2003). In this sense, Chen 
made an assertion that Taiwan should ‘go its own way’ in the DPP’s national 
conference of August 2002. One month later, Chen further proposed ‘one 
country on each side’ in the annual conference of the World Federation of 
Taiwanese Associations meeting in Tokyo. He stressed that Taiwan is an 
independent and sovereign state, “…with Taiwan and China on each side of 
the Taiwan Strait, each side is a country” (Yang, 2002). This concept is 
opposed to the ‘1992 Consensus’ of ‘One China, Respective Interpretations’, 
which came about when the representatives from Beijing and Taipei met in 
1992 and claimed to be two separate political entities within the same name 
of ‘China’, each having respective interpretations of what ‘China’ meant in its 
own way12 (Fell, 2012). However, the DPP government never claimed the 
                                                                                                                           
When Chen, Shui-Bain won the election, he halted the construction of the plant in the late 
2000s in response to his manifesto. However, the KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan later 
reversed the decision. So far it has not been completed because of a growing anti-nuclear 
public sentiment and the demand for a national referendum. 
11 According to the statistics of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the number of countries that 
have the diplomatic relations with Taiwan had reduced from 29 to 23 from 2000 to 2008.  
12 For Beijing, ‘China’ refers to the People’s of Republic of China (PRC) and they claim 
Taiwan is an integral part of China. For Taipei, ‘China’means the Republic of China (ROC) 
or an ethnic community comprising – as has been the case since 1949 – two different 
political entities, the PRC and the ROC, each ruling its own territory (Fell, 2012, p.25). 
Observers in the PRC and also some in Taiwan argue that the Republic of China ceased to 
exist after the establishment of the PRC or the ROC’s expulsion from the United Nations in 
1971. Within Taiwan there remains much disagreement about whether the national title 
should still be the Republic of China or Taiwan. Although the ROC’s Constitution was 
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legitimisation of the ‘1992 Consensus’. Moreover, when the DPP continued 
in power in 2004, Chen claimed that “Taiwan’s future should be decided by 
the Taiwan people” in his second presidential inauguration speech. Chen 
stated: 
If both sides are willing to create an environment engendered upon 
‘peaceful development and freedom of choice’ based on goodwill, then in 
the future, the Republic of China and the People’s Republic of China or 
Taiwan and China can seek to establish relations in any form 
whatsoever. We should not exclude any possibility, so long as there is 
the consent of the 23 million people of Taiwan. 
Such advocacy continued to strengthen the discourse of ‘Taiwan’s 
subjectivity’. Then, the DPP passed the resolution of ‘ethnic diversity, 
national integration’ (族群多元，國家一體)13 to incorporate all ethnic groups 
by linking the doctrine of multiculturalism and ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ in 2004. 
Pledge 8 of this resolution claimed that:  
Taiwan is not only the natal home to Aborigines, Hakka and Hoklo, but also 
a new home to Mainlanders and a new world for foreign new immigrants. 
The subjectivity of Taiwan is jointly constructed by all ethnic groups. Each 
ethnic group is the master of Taiwan; each ethnic group’s mother tongue is 
one of the languages of Taiwan. 
It contains assertions such as the establishment of Taiwan’s subjectivity, the 
national identity based on civil consciousness, the mutual toleration of 
Republic of China or Taiwan identities, an acceptance that all ethnic groups 
are the masters of Taiwan, and an acceptance of Taiwan as a diverse 
multicultural state. Accordingly, the four main ethnic groups’ heritages and 
religious practices and rituals were emphasised and selected, regenerated 
and promoted as tourist festivals as well as potential vehicles for Taiwanese 
national culture and identity (Shih, 2012). For example, the Hakka Affairs 
Council launched a series of projects to promote Hakka culture, ecology, 
                                                                                                                           
designed to govern all of China, it is basically intact and functioning in Taiwan today 
(Hickey, 2011; Fell, 2012, p.232).  
13 The full text can be seen on the DPP’s official website. [Online]. [Accessed 5 June 2015]. 
Available from: http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=1792 
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food and industries such as the Tung Blossom Festivals in 2002. In addition, 
the diverse aboriginal rituals and celebrations have been widely 
acknowledged by people across Taiwan. The Aboriginal identity, languages, 
education and autonomous regions were legitimised through the 
establishment of the Indigenous People’s Basic Law in 2005.  
The DPP government attempted to secure the discourse of ‘Taiwan’s 
subjectivity’ through national referenda14 but was unsuccessful because of 
the boycott by the KMT in 2004 and 2008. In response, China passed the 
‘Anti-Secession Law’ in 2005 and continued posing a military threat to 
Taiwan’s independence. As a result, Chen announced that the National 
Unification Committee would cease to function and the National Unification 
Guidelines would cease to apply, in 2006. 
It can be seen that since 2002, the DPP government consistently promoted 
‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ symbolically and in substance. This not only resonated 
with Lee, Teng-Hui’s inclusive ‘New Taiwanese’ discourse but further 
incorporated multicultural values into the content of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’. 
Furthermore, the DPP government exploited policy statements and the 
state’s resources to create a sovereign state with its own distinct culture, 
which is in contrast to the previous KMT government’s representation of 
Taiwan as the last bastion of Chinese cultural renaissance. In other words, 
‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ stands as the political imaginaries for the DPP 
government and connects with its nation-building project. Although this 
perspective gave rise to criticism and debate from the pan-KMT camps, it 
                                            
14  There were two national referendums held in 2004. (1) The DPP called on the 
Government to acquire more advanced anti-missile weapons to strengthen Taiwan's self-
defense capabilities; (2) The DPP called on the Government to establish a framework for 
cross-strait interactions. In 2008, there were four national referendums: In January 2008, 
(1) the DPP called on the recovering KMT assets; (2) the former KMT minister called on the 
legislation to investigate the responsibility of leaders of the nation and their subordinates, 
when there is grave damage to the nation; (3) in March 2008, the DPP called on the 
government to apply for new membership of the United Nations under the name Taiwan; 
(4) the KMT called on the government to apply for restoration of the nation’s UN 
membership under the name the Republic of China or another appropriate name. However, 
due to the political competition between the DDP and KMT, these six proposals were 
boycotted by each side. As a result, all proposals failed to reach the required 50 per cent 
turnover (Fell, 2012).  
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seized a hegemonic frame and affected other economic, social and cultural 
policies under DPP rule. 
 
5.1.2 Economic Neo-liberalisation and ‘Challenge 2008’ 
After the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998, Taiwan’s export-oriented economy 
and industries encountered severe challenges in that the economic growth 
slowed in the post-2000 period. During the 1990s, the annual average 
economic growth-rate was 6.42 per cent compared to 4.08 per cent from 
2000 to 2007 according to the data from the Directorate General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics15. In particular, Taiwan’s economy went through a 
recession during 2001 and 2002 with the first-ever negative growth of -2.18 
per cent in 2001 and the highest unemployment, at 5.17 per cent, in 2002.  
In addition to the slow growth, there were several significant economic 
developments under the DPP administration. First, the DPP government 
advocated a ‘knowledge-based economy’, to deal with the industrial 
transformation and impacts of trade liberalisation in 2000. On the one hand, 
the large-scaled manufacturing industries, which Taiwan had depended upon 
for subsistence since the 1970s, were losing their competitive advantages 
when facing cheaper labour and lower production costs of China and 
Southeast Asian industrialising countries. On the other hand, the high-tech 
industries, which the Taiwan government had promoted since the 1980s and 
which contributed considerably to the national economy, had encountered 
developmental bottlenecks and needed to be upgraded as they mostly relied 
on original equipment manufacture. Therefore, the DPP government urgently 
adopted the knowledge-based economy model into its policy-making in 
response to the finical crisis (Chen, 2004). The Council for Economic 
Planning and Development (CEPD) started the ‘Project of Knowledge-based 
Economy’ in 2000 to facilitate economic transformation and as a strategy to 
elevate Taiwan’s international competitive advantages (CEPD, 2000). 
Moreover, President Chen, Shui-Bian not only invited leading entrepreneurs 
to organise a committee but also formulated the year 2001 as the ‘first year 
                                            
15  [Online]. [Accessed 5 June 2015 ]. Available from: 
http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=14616&CtNode=3566&mp=1  
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of the social promotion of the knowledge-based economy’. However, the 
project received dramatic criticism. Morris Chang (張忠謀), who was the 
President’s policy advisor, pointed out the myths of the knowledge-based 
economy, including its overwhelming emphasis on economic impacts, 
exclusively applying to technology industries as the only way for Taiwan’s 
economy (Chen, 2001). In addition, Wang (2001, p.202) criticised the 
government for “copying the catchword, formulating plans and policies 
without profound examination and criticism”. 
The second important development in the economy was that Taiwan had 
become increasingly dependent on the Chinese market. Since the late 
1980s, Taiwanese citizens had been allowed to visit relatives in China and 
bilateral trade between Taiwan and China had increased rapidly (Yu, 2004; 
Chu and San, 2011). Annual investment from Taiwan to China in 1996 was 
US$1229.2 million, which was second only to America with US$1443 million 
(Chu and San, 2011). In order to avoid an ‘industrial hollowing-out’ effect and 
for national security, Teng-Hui Lee proposed the discourse of ‘Slow Down 
and be Patient’ (戒急用忍) in 1996 to regulate the investment in hi-tech 
industries, with project funding of more than US$50 million and infrastructure 
by rigid scrutiny (Chu and San, 2011). Six years later, when the DPP took a 
moderate strategy on cross-strait relations, they shifted to the discourse of 
‘proactively liberalise, effectively manage’ (積極開放，有效管理) as the 
conclusion of the Economic Development Advisory Committee in 2001. The 
DPP government loosened regulation in response to intense pressure from 
the business sector and WTO accession. This led to stronger ties across the 
Taiwan Strait (Chu and San, 2011). In 2002, China had already surpassed 
the United States and became the largest market for Taiwan’s outward 
investment with US$6723.1 million, which was about triple that of the 
previous year according to statistics from the Ministry of Economic Affairs. 
The Chinese export drive was also backed by Taiwan’s technological support 
and supply of intermediate goods and materials (Chu and San, 2011).  
However, with the increasing stress on ‘Taiwan subjectivity’ and the 
overwhelming dependence on the Chinese market, the DPP government 
adjusted the discourse to ‘proactively manage, effectively liberalise’ (積極管
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理 ， 有 效 開 放) in 2006. The strategy emphasised the management 
responsibility of the government to reduce the risk of liberalisation and to 
attempt to build a negotiation mechanism for the cross-straits economy16. 
Nevertheless, it did not reduce the increasing dependence on the Chinese 
market in Taiwan’s economy and industries (Chu and San, 2011).  
The third development was that Taiwan eventually became a member of the 
WTO in 2002 after sixteen years of negotiations (Chiang, 2004). In view of 
the WTO regulations on non-discrimination, the DPP government continued 
to follow the neo-liberal policies left over by the old KMT administration. As a 
matter of fact, some analyses point out that the dominant process of neo-
liberalism was accompanied by democratisation. In the past, the old KMT 
authoritarian regime carried out protection-oriented developmentalism as a 
patron-client strategy to gain support from the business sector (Chu, 2011a). 
During the democratic movements, Chu (2011a) argues that the market-
dominated neo-liberalism as the economic discourse was acted out by 
certain reformers in concert with the localisation discourse to oppose the 
authoritarian party-state. For example, some economists published reports 
and books about ‘disintegrating the KMT-state capitalism’ and promoting 
privatisation in place of the ‘state enterprise’, owned and controlled by the 
KMT (Shen et al., 1991; Cheng, 1993). The discourse of ‘disintegrating the 
KMT-state capitalism’ had significant impact on the privatisation and 
liberalisation strategy of economic policy since the late 1990s (Chu, 2003). 
Consequently, when the DPP gained power and joined the WTO, the DPP 
government not only carried out deregulation of economic policy, further 
focusing on privatisation, financial liberalisation and public-private 
partnership to garner political support and campaign donations (Hsu, 2009), 
it challenged domestic industries to face the global market as well as 
international and regional competition. Specifically, the preponderance of 
Taiwanese industries came from small and medium-sized enterprises which 
had limited ability and capital to upgrade their competitive advantages and 
compete with international companies.  
                                            
16 The Mainland Affairs Council provided the policy explanation on 2 January 2006. [Online]. 
[Accessed 6 June 2015]. Available from: http://npl.ly.gov.tw/npl/report/950109/8.pdf 
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In response to the domestic, cross-straits and global developments, the DPP 
government proposed the policy package ‘Challenge 2008 – Six-Year 
National Development Plan’ (hereafter Challenge 2008) in 2002. Challenge 
2008 focused on ten major projects, (1) cultivating talent for the ‘e’ 
generation, (2) developing the cultural creativity industry, (3) developing an 
international base for research, development and innovation, (4) increasing 
value-added production, (5) doubling the number of tourists visiting Taiwan, 
(6) developing a digital Taiwan, (7) developing Taiwan as an operations 
headquarters, (8) improving the transportation infrastructure, (9) conserving 
water resources and the ecology, and (10) constructing new hometown 
communities.  
Therefore, it can be seen that Challenge 2008 was a strategic fix to tackle 
three economic problems: the challenge of global competitiveness, the 
magnet impact of the rising Chinese market and the historical political and 
financial problems (CEPD, 2003, pp.1-3). Moreover, Challenge 2008 was 
expected to build a  ‘green silicon island’ with economic growth, employment 
creation and improvement of living quality (CEPD, 2003). Underlying the 
literal economic goals, it is noted that the implicit political goal of Challenge 
2008 aimed to decrease the threat of China hosting the 2008 International 
Olympic Games (CEPD, 2008) because the grand games would bring a 
considerable international influence and growth in national competitiveness. 
In this vein, Challenge 2008 can be seen as an important political project for 
the DPP to construct ‘a new country’ of Taiwan. In addition, the DPP 
government revised the ten projects in 2005 within the semiotic frame of 
neo-liberalism. The new version encouraged private investment and 
highlighted a partnership strategy between the government and the private 
sector as well as the third sector (CEPD, 2005). This shows that the neo-
liberalism had become the semiotic order in Taiwan’s economic policy and 
acted as the hegemonic discourse in the relevant practice.  
 
5.1.3 the Emerging Civil Society and Taiwan’s Identity 
During the same period, Taiwan underwent a process of social and cultural 
transformation as well as changes in political and economic structure. After 
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the intense political transformation from authoritarianism to democracy in the 
1990s, the emerging civil society and Taiwanese identity were the two main 
changes during the DPP-dominated era from 2000 to 2008.  
 
5.1.3.1 From ‘Folk Society’ to ‘Civil Society’   
Under a series of social movements and a nationwide community 
empowerment movement, with the semiotic practice of decentralisation 
discourse and localisation discourse, the relationship between state and 
society had significantly changed. The state-society relation has shifted from 
antagonism to being complementary with prevalent use of ‘Civil Society’ (公
民 社 會) from 2000 (Fan, 2008). In particular, the concept of ‘cultural 
citizenship’ was advocated by the CCA from 2004, which consolidated the 
imaginaries of ‘citizen’ and its corresponding ‘citizenship’ in cultural policy.  
Before 2000, ‘Folk Society’ (民間社會) was the selected and preferred term 
used by activists and academia, in one way to distinguish the imaginative 
social relationship from the state, and in another way, to legitimise the 
protests and demonstrations against the authoritarian state in the transition 
to democratisation. After the lifting of martial law, some commentators and 
intellectuals used ‘Folk Society’ to advocate society’s autonomy, which 
meant unofficial folk power generated at grassroots level against the 
authoritarian state and the legitimising of grassroots protests (Fan, 2008; 
Lee, 2010). Thus, the folk society asked the authoritarian state to release 
all illegal control over society. They demanded the ‘State Party’ (黨國), the 
term they used to refer to the authoritarian KMT, to stop improper societal 
control. Their substantial claims included the liberalisation of the media and 
unions and university autonomy. During the period from 1987 to 2000, the 
relationship between the state and society was one of antagonism (Fan, 
2008; Lee, 2010). It is worth noting that Chen, Chi-Nan started to propose 
the concepts of ‘Citizen Country’ (公民國家) and ‘Citizen Awareness’ (公民
意識) when he was assigned as the deputy head of the CCA from 1993 to 
1997, and promoted a series of CEPs. Chen, as an anthropologist, found 
that Taiwanese history lacked awareness of citizenship and civil society, 
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and that the term ‘country’ had been understood based on national identity, 
blood relationships, shared culture, and experience (Chen, 1992). As a 
result, the Taiwanese rarely identified themselves as ‘citizens’ or exercised 
their right to participate in public affairs. He actively developed the 
community empowerment project in the CCA. The claims of ‘Folk Society’, 
and the combination of Chen’s discourse and the community 
empowerment movement in the 1990s led to the emergence of civil society 
(Chen, 1992; Lee and Wu, 2008). For instance, Lee (2014) pointed out that 
the rationale of community empowerment is to make people become 
‘citizens’ by participating in community affairs. With the semiotic-practice in 
the constitution of the relevant CEPs, he argues, community empowerment 
contributes to Taiwanese civil society. In this context, activists started to 
claim themselves to be ‘citizens’ with legal rights to participate in public 
affairs in the social movements. Furthermore, they advocated ‘Civil 
Society’ and pushed the state to initiate education reform, media reform 
and financial reform. With the establishment of democratic institutions and 
the first rotation of the ruling party in 2000, the frequency of the discourse 
of ‘Civil Society’ in media coverage surpassed ‘Folk Society’ according to 
Fan’s (2008) survey. 
Advocacy of ‘Civil Society’ provided alternative imaginative relations 
between state and society. The activists and some leaders of foundations 
and associations joined government projects to promote the reforms, which 
formed specific partnerships between state and society (Fan, 2008; Lee, 
2010). These partnerships in the 2000s meant that people expected the 
state to interfere in the social field and tackle the contradictions of markets 
and conflicts among society; at the same time, citizens were expected to 
self-organise and participate in community life (Fan, 2008; Lee and Wu, 
2008).  
Another important development in civil society is the advocacy of ‘cultural 
citizenship’. The discourse of ‘cultural citizenship’ was first presented in 
cultural policy by Chen, Chi-Nan when he was the chairperson of the CCA 
from 2004 to 2006, continuing his advocacy of ‘citizen country’ and defusing 
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ethnic conflicts. Chen issued the ‘Declaration of Cultural Citizenship’ with six 
points17: 
(1) Gaining basic human rights, political rights, and socioeconomic rights 
is not sufficient for the Taiwanese people: we need a new claim on 
cultural rights. 
(2) We believe that both central and local governments have the 
responsibility to provide culture and art events allowing people to 
practise their cultural rights. 
(3) We also believe that society as a whole needs to share the duty to 
support, develop, and maintain cultural and arts activities, heritage and 
resources. 
(4) We believe that citizens should improve their knowledge of local 
culture and arts as the basis of cultural citizenship. 
(5) We advocate an identity forged through the recognition of arts and 
culture rather than based on views of blood heritage, region, or ethnicity. 
(6) Our final purpose is to establish a common society based on culture 
and aesthetics. 
In order to promote the concept of ‘cultural citizenship’, the CCA launched 
a series of activities such as multi-ethnic festivals, ethnic cultural meetings, 
and visual arts exhibitions. Although the discourse of ‘cultural citizenship’ 
made no practical progress in Chen’s term (Wang, 2012), the discourse 
has often been used by the state to justify subsidy, as well as by civil 
society to identify citizens’ rights in policy-making and in debates such as 
the dispute over ‘Dreamers’ (see section 6.3.2). 
Fan (2008) pointed out that there are three different meanings to ‘Civil 
Society’ in the context of Taiwan’s democratisation: encouraging every 
citizen to participate in public affairs, discussing publicly and rationally, and a 
partner relationship between state and society. This partnership led to some 
social movement organisations being included in the decision-making circle.  
                                            
17 The full text can be seen on the website of Ministry of Culture. [Online]. [Accessed 7 June 
2015]. Available from : http://www.moc.gov.tw/information_250_14791.html  
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For example, some activists were, for the first time, appointed to lead official 
agencies or had the opportunity to work in administrative institutions or 
committees such as the Environmental Protection Administration, the 
Ministry of Education, or the National Human Rights Commission. Ho (2010) 
argued that the new partnership type of state-society relations under the 
DPP government loosened five-decades of state-local relations, which the 
KMT had depended on for consolidating its hegemony. Ho (2010) pointed 
out that the increasing involvement of activist movements also brought about 
some legislative successes. The emerging civil society provided greater 
opportunities for the generation of civil discourses and further negotiation 
strategies for the civil actors in the semiotic struggle.  
 
5.1.3.2 Theorising Taiwan and Taiwan’s Identity 
As mentioned in the last section, ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ was the political 
imaginary of nation-building for the DPP government to frame the projects 
overall. It is noted that the main goal of the projects of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ 
for the DPP government was to release Taiwan from the previous Chinese-
centric discourse of ‘Taiwan being part of China’ (Chang, 2004). In this 
sense, the DPP government dedicated a series of state projects to building 
cultural consensus rooted in ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’. In other words, these 
projects entailed narrative content related to ‘Taiwan’ not only aimed at 
building the hegemonic imaginary of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’, but also 
attempting to articulate a nation-building narrative. Chang (2006) defined the 
process as ‘theorising Taiwan’. Through these strategies, the DPP 
government was directly involved in the construction of ‘what Taiwanese 
culture was’, introducing a Taiwan-centric worldview, restructuring the 
framework for the transmission of knowledge and redefining the meaning of 
‘Taiwanese-ness’ (Chang, 2006, p.199).  
Within the process of “theorizing Taiwan”, education policy and cultural policy 
played integral roles. Regarding educational policy, the textbook ‘Getting to 
know Taiwan’ (認 識 台 灣) was introduced into the junior high school 
curriculum in 1997. The Taiwanese Literature Department was first 
established in Aletheia University in the same year followed by other national 
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universities. In 2001, local knowledge was embedded in the new curriculum 
of primary and secondary schools, such that every child had to learn their 
local culture and native language.  
Aspects of cultural policy, building a ‘Cultural Taiwan’ with subjectivity, multi-
culture and creativity were the principles of the DPP’s cultural policy 
according to the 2004 Cultural Policy White Paper (CCA, 2004a, p.239). In 
the Paper, the CCA aimed to develop cultural subjectivity, to make everyone 
identify proudly, ‘I am Taiwanese’. Chen, Yu-Chiou (陳毓秀), who was the 
first chairperson of the CCA in the DPP government from 2000 to 2004, 
emphasised two differences in cultural policy after the first party alternation. 
One was a shift in the theme of cultural policy from unity to diversity; the 
other emphasised the core values of cultural policy in ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ 
rather than the KMT formation of ‘Chinese Taiwan’ (Interview with Chen, Yu-
Chiou, 2012). Accordingly, the CCA, under the DPP administration from 
2000 to 2008, conducted a series of projects to seize the hegemony of 
‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ over the discourse of Chinese nationalism that the 
KMT had constructed for five decades. 
In the beginning, the CCA collected historical data, published a variety of art 
books, and subsidised various kinds of cultural documentaries in order to 
systematically introduce Taiwanese culture and artists and construct a 
privileged identity. Then, the CCA set up the digital National Repository of 
Cultural Heritage (http://nrch.cca.gov.tw/ccahome/index.jsp) as a resource 
for Taiwan-themed museums (Chen, 2004a). This included varieties of 
digitalised historical and cultural data such as music, fine arts, theatre, 
dance, literature, film, architecture, ancient texts, and old photographs, and 
laid the foundations for national cultural development, which can be 
accessed by the public or schools as teaching materials for ‘Local Studies’ 
(鄉土教學). At the same time, the ‘Cultural Heritage Preservation Act’ was 
amended in 2002 from the Chinese-centric perspective, which focused on 
preserving Chinese heritage (especially related to Mainland China), to a 
multicultural perspective, which involved Aborigines, Hakka, Hokkien and 
other ethnic groups’ heritages (CCA, 2004a).   
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As a result of the semiotic practice promoted by the state, people’s identity 
significantly shifted. In 1992, the majority of people still perceived 
themselves as ‘Chinese’ (44 per cent) or ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ (36.5 
per cent). Only 16.7 per cent claimed that they were purely ‘Taiwanese’. This 
situation started to reverse between 1994 and 1996 as Lee, Teng-Hui won 
the Presidential election in 1996 and started his Taiwan-centric policy. The 
figures of those who identified themselves as ‘Chinese’ kept on falling and 
those identifying themselves as ‘Taiwanese’ continued to grow. During the 
DPP government’s active cultural mobilisation, the figure for those claiming 
Taiwanese identity had risen considerately from 36.9 per cent in 2000 to 
48.8 per cent in 2008. By contrast, Chinese identity had decreased 
significantly from 12.5 per cent to 4.1 per cent during the same period18. 
This section has reviewed the three main aspects of the structural context. In 
summary, Taiwan experienced dramatic political, economic, social and 
cultural changes under the rule of the DPP government. In this context, there 
were three main actors (the state, the cultural sector and the civil society) 
participating in the semiotic practice of industrialisation in cultural policy 
between 2002 and 2008. The following sections analyses the semiotic 
practice among these three main actors and explores the semiotic-material 
evolution of industrialisation with economic imaginaries.  
 
5.2 The Rise of Cultural and Creative Industries  
As discussed in the background section of this chapter, the first change of 
ruling party in 2000 led to significant changes in Taiwan. With respect to the 
cultural field, the state’s support for cultural affairs had consequently altered 
multiculturalism and ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ had been selected as the 
essential theme of cultural policy (Interview with Chen, Yu-Chiou, 2012).  
                                            
18  The survey has been conducted by the Election Study Centre, National Chengchi 
University since 1992. [Online]. [Accessed 24 January 2015]. Available from: 
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166# 
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During the first two years of the DPP government, it is evident that the CCA 
dedicated itself to redefining Taiwanese culture and consolidating Taiwanese 
identity through local heritage. In the first year under the DPP government, 
the CCA defined 2001 as ‘the year of Cultural Heritage’ to achieve these 
dual goals. On the one hand, the CCA conducted a great number of 
investigations and projects to promote the preservation of Taiwanese cultural 
heritage. For instance, the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act was amended 
and included traditional art, folk culture and historical buildings, which 
contained a ‘Taiwanese element’. In this revised version, Taiwanese Kua-a hì 
(歌仔戲), Hakka Ba-Yin music and Payuan nose flute music (the music of an 
aboriginal tribe in Taiwan) gained unprecedented approval and systematic 
preservation by the government, including renaissance projects, education 
projects and publications (CCA, 2004a). On the other hand, the CCA actively 
participated in the international activities of the World Heritage List.  Although 
Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the CCA selected twelve spots as 
potential world heritage sites and organised a committee to strive for internal 
acknowledgement and international recognition. This can be seen as an 
attempt to build Taiwan’s national image.  
Then, 2002 was designated the ‘Year of the Cultural Environment’ by the 
CCA. This not only entailed the amendment of, and research into, cultural 
law such as the ‘Cultural and Arts Reward Act’ and the ‘Basic Language 
Law’, a survey of cultural activities and cultural information, but also included 
the construction of cultural facilitates such as the National Museum of 
Taiwanese Literature, National Museum of Taiwanese History, and projects 
for reuse of abandoned spaces (CCA, 2004a).  The goal of 2002 was to 
enhance equal access to cultural affairs, and bridge the gap between city 
and countryside in cultural infrastructure. 
However, the overall outcome was not as positive as the DPP government 
expected. As mentioned above, the DPP government, a new government at 
that time, dedicated itself to conducting ‘new’ economic strategies and thus 
launched a knowledge-based economy to fix economic transformation. 
However, this did not bring the expected advantages. Specifically, the DPP 
government encountered a political and economic crisis in 2002. As a result, 
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the DPP launched the grand cross-sector project ‘Challenge 2008’. About 
the same period, some policy-makers started noticing a trend for cultural 
economy, through which the creative industries became a popular strategy to 
create employment and economic growth as well as bring symbolic capital of 
positive national image, in Austria and Britain. For example, Creative Nation: 
Commonwealth Cultural Policy was translated and published by the CCA in 
1996. In addition, Chen, Chi-Nan, who was the policy consultant of the 
Executive Yuan from 2000 to 2004, thought it could be adopted in Taiwan 
with similar effects, and asked the CCA to research the British Creative 
Industries Mapping Document (Interview with Kuo, Chi-Chou, 2012)19. Soon, 
the term ‘Cultural and Creative Industries’ (CCIs or Wen-Chuang) was 
invented in Taiwan and listed in the second project of ‘Challenge 2008’. With 
the state’s emphasis, CCIs were identified, explained, narrated and spread 
around Taiwan.  
As discussed above, the DPP government launched ‘Challenge 2008’ in the 
face of national and international challenges from 2002 to 2008. Among the 
ten projects, CCIP and New Hometown CEP were two main ones that 
played an essential role in policy-making and implementation and led to 
fundamental changes in industrialisation in cultural policy. This was the very 
first time that the role of cultural policy was highlighted by the central 
government and shifted from the margins to the centre of national 
development plans. In particular, industrialisation was the common topic of 
the two projects and had an impact on the transformation of meanings and 
direction. Both projects were linked with industrialisation in the CEP context, 
while ‘Industrialisation of Culture’ and ‘Culturalisation of Industries’ were 
listed as the principles of implementation of both projects.  Therefore, the 
two projects can be seen as strategic fixes for the state to confront the 
economic crisis and contentious national identity, which led to the 
transformation of industrialisation in cultural policy after 2002. The next 
section will firstly analyse the discursive-material evolution of the CCIP, then 
                                            
19 Kuo, Chi-Chou was the secretary of Chen, Yu-Chiou. Before working in the CCA, he 
studied Cultural Policy at Warwick University. When he was assigned to do research on 
British creative industries in 2002, he found it was the previous version (Creative Industries 
Mapping Documents 1998), and renewed the latest version (Creative Industries Mapping 
Documents 2001) to the CCA (Interview with Kuo, Chi-Chou, 2012).   
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the development of New Hometown CEP will be elaborated on in section 
5.3. 
 
5.2.1 The Semiotic Practice of Cultural and Creative Industries 
According to ‘Challenge 2008’, the CCIs were viewed as the industrial type 
with the highest added-value of the knowledge-based economy and 
expected to suit the production of the ‘Post-Fordism’ era and deepen 
competitiveness. The policy goal was to “extend the creative field and 
develop cultural industries by the combination of humanities and economy” 
(CEPD, 2003, p.46). To achieve this goal, it can be said that CCIs were 
primarily based on economic thinking and served as a ‘cultural turn’ to 
upgrade the national economy. Chung (2012) argues that the CCIs were 
seen as an economic panacea to transform the national economy. However, 
the state did not have a clear economic imaginary of the CCIs and did not 
know how to adopt foreign policy into Taiwan’s context in the beginning. In 
the initial stages, the team only defined CCIs by vague categories, as follows 
(CEPD, 2003, p.46): 
(1) The Core Industries of Culture and Arts. This includes the creation 
and presentation of fine arts, performance arts, visual arts, and 
traditional folk arts.  
(2) The Application Industries. This refers to the application based on the 
above core, such as popular music, costume design, advertising and 
graphic design, film and broadcasting production, and game software 
design.  
(3) The Supportive and Peripheral Industries. This means the relevant 
sectors that support the above industries, such as curatorship, 
professional exhibition, and advertising planning. 
Under this scope, the deputy head of the CCA, Wu, Mi-Cha (2003), claimed 
that the role of the CCIs was not only as a type of knowledge-based 
economy but also as an essential benchmark of the transition from 
traditional economy to cultural economy. ‘Cultural economy’ was officially 
involved in the policy statement. In order to gain public acknowledgement 
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and support for this new concept of cultural economy and the CCIs, the state 
made considerable efforts in project action and the relevant strategic 
discourse.  
In policy projects, the DPP government planned five sub-projects to promote 
the CCIP (CEPD, 2003, pp.46-63). First, it took a cross-sector approach to 
organising the ‘Cultural and Creative Industries Promotion Team’ (hereafter 
CCIs Promotion Team) under the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The CCIs 
Promotion Team took responsibility for coordinating and integrating the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Council for Cultural Affairs (CCA), Council for 
Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) and Ministry of Education. 
Then, in the second and third cross-ministry meetings (March and July 
2003), the CCIs Promotion Team referred to the definition of British creative 
industries20 and the definition of UNESCO’s cultural industries21 and then 
created the definition of CCIs as follows: 
Industries originated from creativeness and accumulation of culture and 
formed and utilised through intellectual properties that have the potential 
to create wealth and employment opportunities and prospects to 
promote upgrading of the overall living environment. (CCA, 2004a, 
pp.125-126). 
Moreover, the CCIs Promotion Team regulated thirteen categories of CCIs 
and assigned supervisory agencies respectively. The Ministry of Economic 
Affairs was the coordinator responsible for all kinds of design industries, 
advertising industries and creative living industries; the CCA took 
responsibility for fostering the talented, environment preparation, and nurture 
art-related industries including visual arts, music and performance arts, 
cultural facilities and craft; the Government Information Office was in charge 
of media industries including film, broadcasting and publishing; and the 
Ministry of Education took charge of cross-field human resource 
development (CCA, 2004a).  
                                            
20 Those industries that are based on individual creativity, skill and talent with the potential to 
create wealth and jobs through developing intellectual property (DCMS, 2001, p.5). 
21 Combines the creation, production and distribution of goods and services that are cultural 
in nature and usually protected by intellectual property rights (CCA, 2004a, p.125). 
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The Second sub-project aimed to cultivate people with arts, design and 
creative talents. Despite the Ministry of Education improving arts and design 
education at every level of schooling, the CCA and Ministry of Economic 
Affairs collaborated on international exchange projects. Based on the sub-
project, five national universities were chosen as ‘Teaching and Resource 
Centres’. These universities had gained good reputations for art and design 
and were located respectively in northern, central and southern Taiwan. 
They were Taipei University of the Arts, Taipei University of Technology, 
Yunlin University of Science and Technology, Cheng Kung University and 
Tainan University of the Arts. As well as these centres, CCIs-related 
departments or graduate schools emerged around Taiwan. According to the 
data provided by Yu, Kuo-Hua, Wu, Jing-Jyi, and Fan, Hsueh-Liang (2012, 
pp.13-14), there were eighteen departments and graduate institutions 
established for ‘Cultural and Creative Industries’ or ‘Creative Industries 
Design’ from 2002 to 2008.  
The third sub-project planned to establish a favourable environment for the 
development of CCIs. In addition to the enhancement of intellectual property 
rights, the project contained infrastructure such as design centres and CC 
Parks. Thus, the Taiwan Design Centre was funded by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and another seven enterprises were set up as an 
integrated platform to promote design industries in 2004 (Chen, 2004, p.38). 
CC Parks were created in five former industrial factories and warehouses 
located in Taipei, Hualien, Taichung, Chiayi and Tainan. After negotiation, the 
five CC Parks were dominated by the CCA to revitalise heritage as a 
platform for cross field and resource integration. For the CCA, the CC Parks 
soon became the core way to promote the CCIs and affect the economic 
imaginary of industrialisation. This will be further discussed in a later section. 
The fourth sub-project focused on six key design industries including 
business design, creative living design, textile and fashion, digital art 
creation and traditional craft industries to transfer their traditional image and 
create jobs. Despite the digital art creation being managed by the CCA, the 
other five industries were dominated by the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
focused on innovation and added value.    
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Lastly, promoting cultural industries was the fifth sub-project of the CCIP. 
Here, the state interlinked the term ‘cultural industries’ within the categories 
of CCIs. There were four types of cultural industries, creative art industries, 
creative publishing industries, creative media and music industries, and the 
animation Industry. On the one hand, the CCA was assigned to assist the 
industrialisation of the creative art industries by nurturing talent, managing 
audience marketing and building partnerships between enterprises and the 
art sector. Accordingly, the CCA named 2004 ‘The Year of the Talented’ to 
emphasise the implementation of the project. On the other hand, the 
Government Information Centre administered the other three industries, 
which were expected to develop with a specific Taiwanese style and build a 
national image for Taiwan in the international market.  
In order to promote the above CCIP, the CCIs Promotion Team needed to 
develop strategic discourses.  They not only introduced foreign experiences, 
but also linked the policy inheritance to the cultural industries and the CEP. 
For example, the CCIs Promotion Team referenced the United Nations and 
the British definitions and policy content of creative industries to claim the 
Taiwanese CCIs were ‘good business’ with economic benefits such as job 
creation, profit increase and increasing the status of the Chinese world 
(CEPD, 2003, p.46). Moreover, according to the first Yearbook of the 
Cultural Creative industries 2003, Yu, Shyi-Kun, who was the Prime Minister 
from 2002 to 2005, took Britain’s creative industries as an example to 
advocate how culture can be an economic activity and can be transformed 
into tangible assets (Chen, 2004). In addition, the CCA sought the definition 
and methods of international society to explain what the CCIs are. For 
example, the ‘CCIs International Summit Conference’ was held in Taipei in 
October 2002, in which Michael Seeney was invited to be the keynote 
speaker and talked about British creative industry policy. In November of the 
same year, the ‘Entrepreneur Forum for Cultural Exchange between Taipei 
and London’ invited Philip Dodd to share the British experience. In early 
2003, the CCA organised an investigation group to visit Britain, France and 
Demark. When they came back, they shared foreign experience and 
organisation mechanisms with the public in Huashan CC Park (華山文創園
區). Furthermore, the CCA subsidised a publishing project to translate a 
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series of books about creative industries. The books include Creative 
industries: Contracts between art and commerce (Caves, 2000), Economics 
and Culture (Throsby, 2001), Arts & Economics: Analysis & Cultural Policy 
(Frey, 2003), Denmark's Creative Potential (The Ministry of Trade and 
Industry and the Ministry of Culture of Denmark, 2000) and The Creative 
Economy: How People Make Money From Ideas (Howkins, 2002).   
Meanwhile, the CCA attempted to constitute an inheritance of accumulated 
experience of cultural industries from the CEP in order to efficiently promote 
the CCIs. The linkages showed the CCA’s attempt to transplant the existing 
semiotic hegemony of industrialisation from the CEP to the emerging CCIs. 
This is evident in the introduction of the CCIs in 2004 Cultural Policy White 
Paper: 
In 1995, the CCA proposed the concepts of ‘industrialisation of culture’ 
and ‘culturalisation of industry’ in the ‘Culture‧Industries Symposium’. 
Cultural industry has become the core of community empowerment. 
Under the impetuses of globalisation and technological advancement, a 
new economic model that centres on ‘innovation’ has been formed, 
called the knowledge-based economy, and the idea of ‘Think Globally, 
Act Locally’ has become a mainstream concept in the twenty-first 
century. To get closer to this idea, the government started to propose the 
CCIP in ‘Challenge 2008’.  Through a combination of art creativity and 
commercial operations, the CCIP is expected to create cultural 
production with local cultural characteristics, deepen cultural identities 
and increase the added value for these industries (CCA, 2004a, p.125). 
In the inclusive discourse, the value of the CCIs represented diverse 
dimensions. It not only highlighted the link with the cultural industries and re-
emphasised the importance of cultural identities and local cultural 
characteristics, but also reclaimed the significance of industrial 
transformation and the economic benefits of the CCIs. Moreover, the cases 
of local cultural industries accumulated a variety of prosperous analyses and 
discourses, the CCA stressed and explained the economic impact of culture, 
which facilitated the concepts of the CCIs being widely disseminated and 
obtaining the support of society (Tsai, 2010).  Specifically, the CCA built its 
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dominant role in the discursive formation of the CCIP. In 2008, when the 
KMT took power and revised the CCIP into the second stage (2008-2013), 
The CCA was assigned to the leading department to take charge of the 
project. In the process, several new discourses were selected to promote the 
CCA’s CCIP and strategically form the economic imaginaries of the CCIs. 
In addition, the National Culture and Arts Foundation22 played a special role 
in the linkage of the CEP and CCIP. In the initial stage, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs assigned The National Culture and Arts Foundation to 
conduct a survey of the CCIs for policy-making. The Foundation’s report 
advised the state to take a core-peripheral approach (Hsueh, 2002, p.63). It 
also conducted thirty-four case studies based on the local experience and 
published a book entitled The Practical Guidebook of Cultural and Creative 
Industries (NCAF, 2004). The editors of this book gave a detailed profile of 
every case and analysed the process based on the stages of creation, 
production and distribution. It aimed to provide strategies for industrialisation 
and culturalisation, which emphasised business thinking, and viewing culture 
as good business (p.6). These case studies included craft industries, 
creative living industries, local feature industries, performance industries, 
cultural facilitation industries and visual arts industries, which all focus on the 
relationship with the local area and are mostly related to community 
industries.  
Through these material projects and discursive practice from international 
and domestic experiences, CCIs became acknowledged in Taiwanese 
society. The term ‘Wen-Chuang’ (the abbreviation of the CCIs in Mandarin – 
文創) has become a very popular word on the street and in society, such as 
‘Wen-Chuang coffee shops’, ‘Wen-Chuang restaurants’ and ‘Wen-Chuang 
fairs’. However, its popularity and arbitrary usage with other objects has 
brought a dramatic change to the community cultural industries with a focus 
                                            
22 The National Culture and Arts Foundation was founded in 1996. It receives funding partly 
from the CCA, and partly from private individuals and groups. It is led by a board of 
directors, who oversee the fund’s operations as well as its budget, and is also served by a 
board of supervisors, who keep tabs on the fund’s financial condition, and ensures that 
funds are being used in the most effective manner possible. [Online]. [Accessed 14 
January 2015]. Available from: http://www.ncafroc.org.tw  
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on indigenousness and participation. In other words, the hegemony of 
industrialisation under the content of the CCIs has replaced the CEP with its 
industrialisation focus on community, democratisation and participation. 
After a two-year implementation, the CCIs Promotion Team reviewed the 
CCIP from the viewpoint of executive effectiveness, objective management 
and funding requirements in 2004 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 2004). 
According to the revised plan (CEPD, 2005), the framework was renamed 
and amended into five projects: (1) organising the developmental 
mechanism for cultural and creative industries; (2) establishing resource 
centres for cultural and creative industries; (3) developing arts industries; (4) 
developing essential media cultural industries; and (5) developing Taiwan 
design industries.  
In summary, there were three main changes related to the content and 
meaning of industrialisation. Firstly, the core-application-support scope of the 
CCIs was deleted in the revised plan and replaced by the thirteen 
categories. According to the interviews with Chen, Yu-Chiou and Kuo, Chi-
Chou (郭紀舟) in 2012, this was a compromise among the different ministries 
who had different concerns. Both of them indicated that since the beginning 
of the CCIP, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the CCA had contradictions 
and conflicts over the content of the CCIs and their strategies of promotion. 
It was difficult to integrate the interests and perspectives of both sides so 
that they promoted the CCIP respectively based on each side’s perception 
(imaginaries) and strategies.  
It can be observed that the core-application-support scope nearly vanished 
in the official policy documents after 2005. In contrast, three grouping types 
of CCIs, arts industries, essential media industries and design industries, 
were distinguished and highlighted in the revised projects. Furthermore, in 
the 2006 Yearbook of Cultural and Creative Industries, the core industries 
became design service industries and popular cultural industries (Chen, 
2007, p.25). It is noticeable that the importance of media industries for the 
CCIs development has been increasing in the state’s policy framework since 
then. The revised plan in favour of the media industries can be attributed to 
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the impact of the ‘Korea Wave’. With the popularity of the Korea Wave in 
Taiwan in the 2000s, Korea’s success was widely discussed in the press and 
academia (Doong, 2013; Kuo, 2011; Kuo, 2010; Kuo, 2012). The 
development and policy of Korea’s CCIs has been used as one of the 
references in the Yearbook of Cultural and Creative Industries since 2003. 
Specifically, the impacts of the media industries in the CCIs have been 
notable in Taiwan since 2008. This will be discussed in the third phase 
(Chapter 6). 
Secondly, there were clear divisions of work in the establishment of resource 
centres for the CCIs. The Ministry of Education maintained the education 
and resource centres to enhance the mechanism of cooperation between 
universities and industries. The Ministry of Economic Affairs set up the 
Taiwan Design Centre in 2004 and aimed to improve Taiwan’s national 
image by the commercialisation of product design. The CCA took charge of 
the five CC Parks with the highest budget of 350 million NT dollars, which 
constituted nearly one third of the total budget of the CCIP from 2002 to 
2007. The Government Information Office was assigned to build an 
information platform for the national media and music industries. This was a 
new infrastructure for private companies to promote Taiwanese films, 
broadcast programmes and pop music. This reveals that the state had 
started to be aware of the impacts of the media and pop music industries.  
Thirdly, the revised project showed an increasing emphasis on quantitative 
assessment of the outcome of the CCIs. It was evident that the goal of the 
CCIP was to achieve significant growth in turnover (by 1.5 times) and job 
creation (by 1.5 times). The Promotion Team encouraged workers in the 
CCIs to participate in national competitions. The number of international 
awards was aimed to double and the value of international brands was 
projected to rise by five times. The pursuit of quantitative outcome implied 
the imaginaries of the economic sector originated from its familiar efficiency 
thinking of market discourse. In terms of the market discourse, ‘culture is 
good business’ had become a popular term to promote the new culture-
economy relations that the CCIs had stimulated. In other words, the market 
discourse had been increasingly stressed in the semiotic practice of 
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industrialisation since 2002. Regarding the state discourse, ‘Branding 
Taiwan’ was related to the DPP’s nation-building project and consolidated 
Taiwan’s identity though selected CCIs projects.    
 
5.2.1.1 Culture is Good Business  
When the CCIs policy was introduced into Taiwan, policy-makers tried to find 
a way to explain the new concept to society. One influential interpretation of 
the combination of culture and economy was ‘culture is good business’ (文化
是好生意). This soon became an appealing term for the public and was 
widely accepted by Taiwanese society. This can be inferred from several 
conditions.  
Firstly, the term was derived from the title of Feng, Chiu-Ling’s book Culture 
is Good Business (2002) and soon the concept that ‘culture is good 
business’ was being been quoted in various official documents and private 
businesses. It might be the first book in Mandarin to publicise the connection 
between culture and good business by Asian cases. As a Malaysian 
Chinese, the author explained that ‘business’ (生意) means ‘vivid idea’ (「生」
動的主「意」) in Mandarin, literally stressing the importance of market 
economy and entrepreneurs in contemporary cultural development (Fong, 
2002, pp.18-22). She takes Asian cases, including Taiwan, Malaysia, Korea, 
Thailand and China, to discuss strategies for making national characteristics 
into a new fashion for market profit as well as developing competitive 
advantages through cultural tourism. Throughout the book, the author 
repeatedly adopts the term from Taiwan ‘Culturalisation of Industries’ and 
‘Industrialisation of culture’ to identify critical strategies and create business 
for Chinese and Asian culture. The book was so popular that it was reprinted 
six times within 6 months (between April and September 2002) in Taiwan. 
Then, the discourse of ‘culture is good business’ became a catchy slogan, 
adopted arbitrarily in the field of CCIs. Compared to the policy narratives 
focusing on employment and economic growth, ‘business’ (生意) is a simple 
and clear message for the general public to understand through the new 
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term of ‘Wen-Chuang’ (CCIs). It was used to reinforce the economic effects 
of culture and explain the fewer subsidies on cultural industries. For 
example, the National Culture and Arts Foundation referred to this book 
when conducting the ‘profile and survey of the cultural and creative 
industries’ (Hsueh, 2002). Then, in the book Knowing Cultural and Creative 
Industries, published by the CCA to introduce the concept of the CCIs, the 
CCA described the thread of ‘culture is good business’ for government to 
follow (Chang, 2003, p.51). Moreover, Chen, Yu-Chiou captured the 
discourse to describe the CCIs as the highest value-added knowledge-
based economy which can ‘make brain into cash’ (Chen, 2003, p.69). In 
addition, Wu, Mi-Cha, the deputy head of the CCA from 2001 to 2004, 
emphasised the importance of art management and the industrialisation 
mechanism in the arts industries to reduce the dependence on subsidies 
(Wu, 2003). Then, Sun, Hua-Hsiang, the research director of National 
Culture and Arts Foundation, explains the features of CCIs include engaging 
culture in substance and employing creativity through business thinking. She 
illustrated that the production of CCIs is a process or service which was a 
pleasurable cultural experience given to consumers during consumption 
(NCAF, 2004, p.6).  
Secondly, the discourse creates an imagined bridge between culture and 
economy/business for the general public. Before the creation of the 
discourse, the perception of cultural policy for most people in Taiwan was 
mainly related to Chinese-based traditional culture and Western classical 
music, performance and classical dance (Su, 2001). For ordinary people, 
there was a big gap between accumulating the cultural capital to appreciate, 
and the economic capital to access, culture and the arts. After the promotion 
of the CEP focused on local projects and the participatory approach, people 
were encouraged to engage with cultural activities and cultural industries 
they were familiar with in government-funded projects. In particular, the 
industrialisation of cultural industries aims to empower and revitalise 
communities, which, more or less, has brought a certain positive relationship 
between cultural affairs and business operation. In other words, the previous 
context had laid the foundation for this discourse to connect culture and 
business, making sense and become a hegemonic discourse. 
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Thirdly, the CCA and CCIs Promotion Team referred to a great deal of 
figures and cases to advocate the economic benefits, such as the creation of 
jobs and wealth, the innovation impact and upgrading the image of the 
regions. The state predicted a prosperous outlook for economic 
transformation, which fitted most people’s expectations. In particular, 
researchers from a business background engaged in the projects. Their 
persuasive surveys and arguments (such as a series of Yearbook of Cultural 
Creative Industries) enhanced its popularity though the media and press.  
Given the above conditions, the discourse ‘culture is good business’ has 
created a new prospect, linking culture and economy in a way that culture 
can really bring concrete economic benefits. The meaning of industrialisation 
thus changed. Although some researchers criticised the discourse and 
argued it was a ‘sale of culture’ (販賣文化) (Han, 2012; Huang and Cheng, 
2007), others have a more positive perspective, arguing that “a ‘sale of 
culture’ is not a bad thing, instead, it is a magic weapon to promote culture” 
(Chieh, 2006, p.6). The discourse has been influential and lasted so far. The 
latest case to employ the term in the government policy took place in Tai-
Chung City where the former mayor, Hu, Chih-Ching (Jason Hu) who was in 
power from 2001 to 2014, claimed that the CCIs is good for the business of 
the city, to promote the city’s image and create economic benefits (Hu, 
2014).   
 
5.2.1.2 Branding Taiwan 
Another specific discourse of the CCIs for the DPP government is 
constructing the national image of Taiwan, though the symbolic power of 
CCIs to shape a more competitive and distinguished image. On the one 
hand, it was expected to facilitate economic transformation and capital 
accumulation in the global market; on the other, it consolidated ‘Taiwan’s 
subjectivity’. 
In the 1970s, Taiwan was renowned for manufacturing industries such as 
toys, umbrellas, bicycles, clothing and small electrical appliances. Then 
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Taiwan emerged as a key supplier of core high-tech industries in the world in 
the 1980s and 1990s. The label of ‘Made in Taiwan’, with products selling 
around the world, used to be a symbol of national pride. However, facing the 
competitive restructure of the global economy and the rise of China, the 
CCIs Promotion Team expected the CCIs would change the national image 
of Taiwan for exports and international trade. Accordingly, in the CCIP 
revised version, the CCIs Promotion Team encouraged designers to 
participate in international competitions, which meant seeking international 
exposure and creating a national creative image. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs intensified the application of the Taiwan-related topic not 
only for facilitating people to identify Taiwanese culture but also for building 
the brand of ‘Design in Taiwan’ in the global market (CEPD, 2005, pp.2-3).  
By doing so, the figure of the international award in the four main 
international design competitions (iF, Reddot, IDEA and G-Mark) had grown 
considerably from 26 in 2003 to 145 in 2008 (Ministry of Economic Affairs, 
2008).   
In addition, the CCA promoted CCIP, advocated ‘Cultural Taiwan’ as a 
replacement for ‘Made in Taiwan’ and wanted ‘creativity and innovation’ to 
become the new symbol of Taiwan (CCA, 2004b, p.241). As Chen, Yu-Chiuo 
(2004b) argues, “one of the most important aspects of the work of Taiwan’s 
cultural and creative industries is using branding techniques to build and 
introduce an image of contemporary Taiwan to the world” (p.7). One case, 
the ‘Taiwan Dress Party’, was launched by the CCA as one of the essential 
sub-projects of the ‘creative art industries’ project in 2002. The next year, it 
was jointly promoted by the CCA and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
held annually until 2008. In this project, ‘wearing Taiwanese dress made of 
Taiwanese cloth’ was the main concept, in order to create a Taiwanese 
national costume (Huang, 2003a). By co-working with industrial associations 
and international companies, the CCA encouraged designers to use 
indigenous culture and local textiles in their fashion designs to present 
diverse Taiwanese culture and establish an innovative image for Taiwanese 
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products. For example, folk region - Ba Jia Jiang23, Puyuma’s cross stitch24 
and Hakka Tung Blossom were the elements for designers to make a 
‘Taiwanese outfit’ (Huang, 2003a; Chen, 2007). As a result, the project 
cultivated young designers and mediated professional designers into 
international fashion stages; more importantly, it stimulated designers to 
discover a great deal of ethnic cultural elements in dress and let the world 
see Taiwan in a different light (Chan, 2008). Through these self-discovering 
practices and the appealing slogan ‘Let the world see Taiwan’, the discourse 
of ‘branding Taiwan’ was formed. In fact, the discourse ‘branding Taiwan’ can 
be seen as a political imaginary for the DPP government to renew Taiwan’s 
national image as a diverse and fashionable country rather than a mono-
Chinese or traditional manufacturing society. It particularly strengthened the 
national identity, as Bi-Yu Chang (2006, p.202) emphasised,  the making of 
‘branding Taiwan’ was expected to cut cultural ties with China.  
Parallel with the development of the two main discourses, one strategic 
approach to economic imaginaries was emerging following the cultural 
policy. One was the ‘CC Parks approach’, which was seen as part of the 
main strategic infrastructure by the CCA to cultivate the CCIs (CCA, 2004b). 
Through the allocation and reuse of space, it can be noted that the state 
actor took a spatial perspective to develop industrialisation in cultural policy. 
The detail will be elaborated in the following sections.    
 
5.2.2 The Economic Imaginary of the CCIP: CC Park Approach  
According to the CCIP, the project ‘Culture and Creative Parks’ (CC Parks) 
was particularly noticeable. It not only gained the majority of funding of the 
state from 2003 to 2008, but was also listed as the first essential project of 
the CCA to facilitate CCIs environment preparation (Han and Liu, 2008). 
According to the data collected by Han and Liu (2008), the annual spending 
                                            
23 Ba Jia Jiang is one of the traditional religion troupes in Taiwan, it refers to the eight 
generals of the King of Hell. 
24
 The Puyuma is one of the tribal groups of Taiwanese aborigines famous for knitting cross-
stitch.   
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on the CC Parks accounted for more than 40 per cent of the whole CCIP 
budget under the DPP government, and the figure rose to 70 per cent in 
2007. Furthermore, the CCA actively strived for the ownership of the CC 
Parks and viewed them as the anchor spaces for the bases of the CCIs 
(CCA, 2004b, p.30). It can be seen that the CC Parks had become the 
preferred strategy for the CCA to promote the CCIs.  
In this vein, the CC Park can be seen as the economic imaginary of the 
CCIP to conduct industrialisation in cultural policy. The five CC Parks were 
located widely in five major cities around Taiwan, Taipei, Taichung, Chiayi, 
Tainan and Hualien. They used to be abandoned warehouses and factories 
of the state-owned Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau under the 
administration of the Ministry of Economic Affairs before 2002. When the 
CCA launched the project for the reuse of abandoned spaces in the late 
1990s, Huashan, one of the CC parks located in Taipei, was one of the 
preliminary models and thus its artist-led experience shaped the imaginary 
of reused spaces (CCA, 2002a). For example, when the CCA decided to 
promote the project of revitalisation of abandoned spaces to the whole of 
Taiwan in 2001, Huashan was a popular reference (CCA, 2004a; CCA, 
2004b). The CCA used the perspective of revitalisation and the experience 
of Huashan to persuade the CCIs Promotion Team and consequently gained 
ownership of the five Parks in 2002 (interview with Yu-Shiou Chen, 2012; 
CCA, 2002a). Since then, the spatial imaginary of these parks had been 
changed in practice and caused a semiotic struggle between civil discourse, 
state discourse and market discourse which led to the discursive shift of 
industrialisation from the community participation approach to the CC Parks 
approach.   
 
5.2.2.1 The Reuse of Abandoned Space and Artist Discourse 
Before the integration of the CC Parks into the CCIP in 2002, the CCA had 
conducted the project for the reuse of abandoned spaces for three years. 
The project was triggered for the emancipation of space by civil society after 
- 123 - 
the lifting of martial law, in which artists and cultural groups played active 
roles in shaping the spatial imaginary of these spaces. 
Since the rapid economic transformation of the 1970s and 1980s, there were 
numerous state-owned properties such as warehouses and factories that lay 
deserted or spare around Taiwan in the 1990s. At the same time, with the 
emergence of political democratisation, civil society asked to liberalise these 
state properties for public use (Huang, 2005; Hsu, 2009). Some cultural 
workers noticed these abandoned spaces and started to ask the CCA to use 
them for cultural purposes in the mid-1990s. Among them, ‘Huashan Arts 
District’, which is located in central Taipei, was one notable site and raised 
artistic discourses on cultural space. In 2002 when the CCA proposed the 
project of CC Parks, Huashan CC Park was viewed as the leading model 
and gained the most funding support (57 per cent of the total funding) from 
the government (Interview with Chen, Yu-Chiou, 2012; Han and Liu, 2008). 
The other four Parks were undergoing long-term renovation during this 
second phase. Therefore, it can be said that the project of the CC Parks was 
mainly established on the case of Huashan Park. 
Huashan Arts District had been a Japanese winery since 1914. After WWII, it 
was taken over by the KMT government and became the Taipei Winery of 
the Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly Bureau. In 1987, the Taipei Winery 
was relocated to the rural area of Taipei City due to urban planning and 
environmental protection (Tsai, 2004). The factories and refining facilities in 
Huashan had been abandoned since then. In 1997, artist Tang, Huang-Chen 
(湯皇珍) and several cultural groups discovered the specific aura in Huashan 
and raised awareness of preserving this site. They hoped to reuse it as a 
multi-functional space for exhibitions and performances in contrast to the 
original state plan for a new building of Legislative Yuan. Consequently, they 
created the artist discourse of revitalisation by borrowing foreign 
experiences, such as art villages and art workshops (Tsai, 2002). In their 
practice, ‘diverse cultural and arts space’, and ‘cultural base sharing with the 
public’ were the repeated appeals. They collaborated with other cultural 
groups and associations to demonstrate, petition, hold forums, and lobby 
legislators to preserve these spaces and their heritages (Tsai, 2002). In this 
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vein, the ‘Association of Culture and Environmental Reform’ was organised 
by visual artists, performance artists, architects, film-makers and art 
educators to promote the artists’ spatial imaginary of Huashan Arts District. 
Through the discursive-practice process, the artists’ discourse seized the 
hegemony of spatial imaginary and guided the state’s project of revitalisation 
of reused space. In 1998, the CCA designated Huashan as an historical site 
and renamed the site ‘Huashan Arts District’ (Huang, 2006).  
In 1999, the CCA chose thirteen trial sites to conduct multiple methods of 
reusing abandoned space; Huashan Arts District was one of the sites. The 
other cases included ‘Guling Street Avant-Garde Theatre’ which was 
transformed from the Japan-colonised police station into a performance 
stage, and ‘Artstock 20’ which used to be an abandoned warehouse of the 
railway-network in Taichung but became reused as an art-village (CCA, 
2004a). At the same time, the CCA officially assigned the ‘Association of 
Culture and Environmental Reform’ to operate Huashan Arts District. During 
this period, artists dominated the space of Huashan and took the perspective 
of creators/producers to plan Huashan Arts District (Li, 2010). In addition to 
self-organising cultural activities to encourage artists’ participation, the 
association welcomed almost every kind of exhibition and performance 
including experimental theatre, avant-garde art and cross-field performance 
without any examination (Tsai, 2004). The association also simplified the 
procedure of application with very low cleaning costs of one thousand NT 
dollars (about £20) per case, thus providing an open and free environment 
for artists and students to rehearsal or display (Tsai, 2004). The low rent 
made most activities free of charge or with affordable tickets from two 
hundred to four hundred NT dollars (about £4-8). Therefore, it soon became 
an essential alternative site filled with a variety of arts and cultural activities 
in Taipei. According to the Yearbook of Huashan Arts District (1999-2001), 
the average usage rate of all spaces in Huashan had increased steadily from 
43 per cent in 1999 to 76 per cent in 2001, and the number of exhibitions 
and performances had risen considerably from 199 in 1999 to 934 in 2001 
(Tsai, 2002, pp.104-107). As a result, artists with diverse backgrounds 
naturally clustered in Huashan Arts District and produced a variety of 
creations. 
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Based on the artists’ efforts in Huashan Arts District and other cases such as 
Artstock 20, the artistic discourse shaped the state’s spatial allocation. In 
2000, the CCA announced that ‘Reuse of the Abandoned Space’ (閒置空間
再利用) would be the most important project of cultural policy in alliance with 
the promotion of the ‘Year of Cultural Heritage’ (CCA, 2004a). Huashan Arts 
District was not only an important case but was viewed by the CCA as a 
“model base for experiment, cross-field creation and nurture of the talented” 
(CCA, 2004a, p.140). The artistic discourse also influenced the city 
government’s spatial planning. In 2001, Taipei City Government designated 
the area of Huashan as a ‘Central Cultural Park’. The Association for Culture 
and Environmental Reform thus extended the space arrangement for the 
broader public, which included art education, community activities and 
volunteer guidance (Tsai, 2002). The joint office for other associations was 
established, the members including the Association of Visual Arts, the 
Association of Galleries, the Association of Female Artists and the 
Association of Film Creation. They issued magazines, e-newsletters and 
videos to interact with neighbouring communities (Tsai, 2004). As a result, 
the original producer-oriented spatial imaginary involved audience and 
neighbouring communities in order to maintain the artists’ discursive 
hegemony over Huashan Arts District.  
In summary, the case of Huashan Arts District has shown that the artists 
accumulated practical experience and discourses can construct the spatial 
imaginary of the reuse of abandoned space. The artistic discourse, which 
focused on the producer-oriented cluster and the incubation of creativity, 
became the privileged imaginary for cultural policy. However, the economic 
imaginaries of CCIs in terms of ‘culture is good business’ and ‘branding 
Taiwan’ gradually changed the hegemony of artistic discourses in Huashan 
Arts District after 2002 and then influenced the other four CC Parks. This will 
be analysed in the next section.  
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5.2.2.2 The Cultural and Creative Park and State Intervention 
When the state was planning the CCIP in 2002, the CCIs Promotion Team, 
led by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, drew on the previous successful 
experience of the industries of ‘Information Technology’ and the model of 
Science Parks (Interview with Kuo, Chi-Chou, 2012; CCA, 2002a). The 
Science Parks model facilitated industrial innovation since the 1980s and 
laid the foundation for the continued economic growth of the 1990s (Ash et 
al., 2011). Thus, the high-tech project of Science Parks was referred to the 
proposal of CC Parks for promoting the CCIs.  
Moreover, the Ministry of Economic Affairs expected to adopt the experience 
of Science Parks which focused on infrastructure for mass production and 
output value to manage the five CC Parks. In their thinking, CCIs were a 
new type of industry, but similar to technical industries based on the 
knowledge-based economy (CEPD, 2003). With the emerging discourse of 
‘culture is good business’, the growth of employment and output value were 
their main concerns. In contrast to Huashan Arts District’s focus on 
cultivating creators and creations by providing affordable and friendly 
spaces; “the Industrial Development Bureau under the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs preferred to invite experienced companies or groups which have 
produced cultural products into the CC Parks”, according to the interview 
with Kuo, Chi-Choi in 2012. This showed the increasingly controversial 
imaginary of CC Parks between the existing organisation and the economic 
sector since the initial stage of the CC Parks.  
At the same time, the DPP government took over privatisation of state-
owned enterprises as they were taken as the surviving supports of the KMT 
party (Hsu, 2009). The state-owned Taiwan Tobacco and Wine Monopoly 
Bureau was thus forced to transform into the Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor 
Corporation. However several factories and warehouses located in Taipei, 
Taichung, Chiayi, Tainan and Hualien had been abandoned for over a 
decade, which caused security problems (CCA, 2002a; Wang, 2011). 
Therefore, the Ministry of Economic Affairs suggested that these five sites 
could be reused for CC Parks to cultivate emergent CCIs. Meanwhile, the 
Bamboo Curtain Studio, whose members participated actively in the 
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Huashan Arts District, investigated foreign cases and published a book 
entitled Creative Programming in Reuse of Spaces – an International 
Perspective (2002) in order to advocate for artist-based spatial imaginary of 
abandoned spaces. They encouraged citizens to access city space and 
create diverse culture by participation (Hsiao and Huang, 2002, pp.10-13).  
In particular, the editors argued that cultural industries, as a strategy for 
revitalising abandoned space, not only focus on building new relations 
between people and heritages or abandoned equipment, but also based on 
this relationship, produce creative industries (Hsiao and Huang, 2002, p.13). 
In this vein, the CCA took Huashan Arts District ’s case and the discourses 
based on Creative Programming in Reuse of Spaces - an International 
Perspective to negotiate with the CCIs Promotion Team and finally gain the 
ownership and management of the five abandoned wineries from the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (Interview with Chen, Yu-Chiou, 2012; Wang, 
2011). Among them, Huashan was viewed as the model for other CC Parks 
because it had gained a reputation as Huashan Art District since 1998 and 
experienced the basic refurbishment, in contrast to the other four parks that 
were seriously damaged and needed thorough examination and renovation. 
In other words, the initial planning of the CC Parks for the CCA was drafted 
by artists and cultural groups and focused on production-orientation and the 
core art industries to create a cluster effect. 
However, under the framework of ‘Challenge 2008’, the state started to 
directly intervene in the management of the five CC Parks by encompassing 
the discourses of ‘branding Taiwan’ and ‘culture is good business’. In the 
Planning Report of Cultural and Creative Parks (2002), the CCA points out 
the four goals of the parks from different perspectives, which reveals the 
changes. The first goal is based on the global aspect that the parks are the 
characteristic of Taiwanese culture. The second goal is focused on the 
industries, that the parks are the showrooms of the overall national 
development in CCIs to the world. The third goal is from the aspect of 
practitioners, that the parks serve for cultural workers though the practice of 
industrial management. The fourth goal is from the local perspective, that the 
parks are the engine of regional regeneration, the symbol of local culture 
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and the media of daily life and culture (CCA, 2002a, pp.3-5). Moreover, 
Chen, Yu-Chiou claimed that CC Parks can “create resource synergy to 
rebuild cultural identity and city memory… and foster local industries to 
revitalise local regions, and to connect with the world by intensifying 
Taiwan’s leading position in the Chinese world” (Chen, 2004a, p.30). The 
above goals and statement showed the state’s political imaginaries that the 
CC Parks could make the world see Taiwan and strengthen the national 
identity by branding Taiwan’s CCIs.  
On the other hand, the economic outcomes of CC Parks were stressed 
along with the artistic discourses. In ‘Challenge 2008’, the parks were set to 
be creative workshops for artists and designers as well as a trade place for 
value-added production (CEPD, 2003, p.52) In this vein, the accumulated 
output value of the CCI’s production and the creation of employment were 
highlighted in the planning of CC Parks. For example, the CCA organised an 
investigation trip to Britain, France and Demark with the CCIs Promotion 
Team in February 2003 in order to understand the strategies of the Orsay 
Museum, Tate Modern and the Institute of Contemporary Arts. The CCA 
soon advocated collaboration between artists and entrepreneurs to operate 
the CC Parks (CCA, 2004b). In the CCA’s initial planning, CC Parks were 
designed as a platform for cultural workers and entrepreneurs to exchange 
ideas, produce their cultural work and to nurture the development of the 
CCIs. Consequently, they changed the management conditions and 
increased the concrete outcome of the economic effectiveness of Huashan 
CC Park.  
As a result, the CCA adjusted the plan of the Huashan Arts District to 
emphasise the mixed industrialisation between arts and business as well as 
the combination of production and consumption. The state’s policy-discourse 
and implementation undermined the hegemony of artistic discourse, which 
resulted in spatial reallocation. The space for young artists was decreased 
and the Taipei government’s subsidy to cultural projects was reduced in 
2003 (Tsai, 2004). In order to consolidate the dominance of artistic 
discourse, the Association of Culture and Environmental Reform held seven 
symposiums to discuss the network of Huashan Park with the CCIs in mid-
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2003. Moreover, the former manager of Huashan Arts District visited creative 
quarters in Sheffield, Manchester and London. She used a metaphor of a 
hive to describe CC Parks and argued the motivation of CC Parks is ‘bees – 
creators’ to advocate that the cluster effect of CC Parks should focus on 
networking, service and marketing (Tsai, 2004). However, their discourses 
and practices had not shaken the dominance of the state’s discourses, and 
as a result, they finally decided to withdraw from the bid to manage the 
Huashan Arts District in 2004 (Tsai, 2004). Soon, the management team was 
replaced by L’Orangerie International Art Consultant Co. Ltd. (橘園國際藝術
策展股份有限公司, hereafter L’Orangerie) and ‘Huashan Arts District’ was 
renamed as ‘Huashan Creative Park’.  
L’Orangerie was founded in 1999, as the first company focusing on curating 
visual arts in Taiwan. In addition to curating art exhibitions in museums and 
executing public art projects, it participated in ‘Artstock 20’ in Taichung, 
which was a typical case of revitalisation of a space abandoned since the 
late 1990s. In the transition of Huashan Creative Park, L’Orangerie 
attempted to industrialise art creation into a commodity value chain by 
combining production and consumption in accordance with the state 
discourse. They set out four positions for managing Huashan Park: (1) 
encourage contemporary avant-garde arts and foster fine arts; (2) revive 
cultural heritage and connect with fashion design; (3) create an exchange 
platform for cultural investment and the added-value of creative industries; 
(4) create a multifunctional field with arts performance and exhibition, design 
workshops and cultural leisure facilitates (Wang, 2011). For them, ‘cultural 
investment’ and ‘cultural leisure’ were the new terms configuring the 
economic imaginary of Huashan Creative Park and its spatial arrangement. 
Despite the fact that L’Orangerie continued to provide spaces for arts 
creation and presentation with low costs, it introduced lots of business 
activities which generated high earnings for popular culture such as the 
press conference of popular music and drama.  The reallocation caused 
certain artists to leave, but the number of the theme exhibitions increased, 
projects such as ‘Creative Living Fair’ and ‘Design Fair’ were popular 
activities for the general public. According to the Final Report of Huashan 
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Creative Park (2004, cited in Wang, 2011, p.92), seminars and forums 
constituted the majority of activities in Huashan Creative Park at 29 per cent, 
followed by exhibitions, which accounted for 16 per cent. However, 
L’Orangerie still suffered from a deficit of nearly 500 thousand NT dollars 
(about £10 thousand) (Wang, 2011).  
In mid-2004 when the DPP continued to hold on power, the state revised the 
‘Challenge 2008’ project and took stronger top-down intervention. In the 
revision, the creation of employment and output-value became the essential 
standard to assess the development of CCIs (CEPD, 2005). It showed the 
economic discourse – ‘culture is good business’ – that CCIs’ economic 
benefit from the creation of employment and profit was generally accepted in 
the meaning-making of CC Parks. On the other hand, in August 2004, Chen, 
Chi-Nan, the chairperson of the CCA from 2004 to 2006, proposed the 
project of the ‘Star of New Taiwanese Culture’ in Haushan Creative Park with 
a budget of 820 million NT dollars (about £12.8 million). In the project-
planning, Chen took the term ‘new type of science park’ to describe CC 
Parks and planned to build a new landmark of the ‘Centre of Contemporary 
Culture and Art’, which included a 28-floor complex involving three main 
CCIs – media industries, design industries and art industries – in Huashan 
Creative Parks (Wang, 2009). For Chen, Chi-Nan and the CCA, the goal of 
the ‘Star of New Taiwanese Culture’ was to provide a cross-field facility and 
space to generate a new Taiwanese culture including cross-field, alternative, 
multiple, future and avant-garde forms of culture and art (Chen, 2005).  
Therefore, the complex was planned to be divided into three parts: (1) a 
multifunctional presentation centre accommodating audiences from 100 to 
2,000, for young artists and diverse types of performance; (2) a centre for 
administration affairs and resource exchange which included offices, 
rehearsal sites, a new media centre, a broadcasting and film library, a design 
centre and studios, a display centre for local culture and travel resources, 
and an exchange platform for cultural activities and groups; and (3) a 
national art village (Wang, 2009, pp.43-48). From the plan of the project, it 
can be seen that the project was expected to consolidate the economic 
imaginary ‘culture is good business’, and the political imaginary ‘branding 
Taiwan’. 
- 131 - 
However, this project caused fierce criticism and demonstrations from artists, 
architects, cultural groups, legislators and neighbouring communities. They 
argued that the tall building violated the reuse of heritage and criticised the 
CCA for neglecting to consult with professionals and the public in the 
process of project planning (Wang, 2009). These criticisms and 
demonstrations forced the suspension of the ‘Star of New Taiwanese 
Culture’. Then, the CCA retook the management of the Huashan Creative 
Park from L’Orangerie in 2005 and closed it for renovation. 
In order to solve the dispute, the CCA lunched a website to discuss the 
project in November 2004.  On the website, the CCA revealed the spatial 
plans of the ‘Star of New Taiwanese Culture’ and proposed explanations in 
response to the criticism (Li, 2010). Furthermore, the CCA invited Gary Hack 
and his team, based at the School of Design at the University of 
Pennsylvania, to visit Taiwan and revise the project. From this it can be seen 
that the CCA wished to rebuild the hegemony of the state’s economic 
imaginary. Another strategy was that the CCA co-hosted a conference with 
the British Council – ‘Culture Regeneration and New City – Cultural Facilities 
and City Redevelopment’ in March 2005 (Chieh, 2005). The conference 
covered three issues: the ‘Cultural Perspective of City Regeneration’, 
‘Sustainable Cultural City’ and ‘Cultural Facilities and Reuse of Buildings’. It 
is evident that the conference was aimed to extend the spatial imaginary to 
urban regeneration by supporting the flagship project the ‘Star of New 
Taiwanese Culture’ in Taipei City.  
Nevertheless, the discourse did not gain social support for the ‘Star of New 
Taiwanese Culture’ project. The cultural groups who participated in Huashan 
Arts District launched a series of demonstrations, rallies, and dramas to 
protest the project. They adopted the perspective of ‘cultural citizenship’ to 
criticise the process of project planning, claiming that it lacked public 
participation, which made Huashan like “a fake public field for cultural 
consumption” (Wang, 2009, p.87). They also introduced foreign experiences 
from Japan and Macao to argue that the new building would spoil the value 
of industrial heritage and ask the state to think of the added-value of the 
CCIs rather than the monetary output value (Wang, 2009, pp.93-95). In 
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addition, some scholars pointed out that the state lacked the industrial policy 
to promote CCIs in CC Parks (Liao, 2014; Han and Liu, 2008), and some 
architects used the concept of revitalisation of abandoned space to argue 
that the state misinterpreted the discourse of ‘co-constitution of old and new’ 
(Wang, 2011, pp.100-101).  
In 2006, Chiu, Kun-Liang (邱 坤 良) succeeded Chen, Chi-Nan as the 
chairperson of the CCA. Chiu shelved the ‘Star of New Taiwanese Culture’ 
project. Instead, the CCA decided to take the strategy of public-private 
partnership to develop the CC Parks and CCIs. Huashan Creative Park was 
outsourced in three parts in accordance with the ‘Act for Promotion of 
Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects’25 in 2007. The first part of the 
project was the ‘Cultural & Creative Industries Space by Rehabilitate, 
Operation and Transfer’, which was bid for by Taiwan Cultural-Creative 
Development Co. Ltd. at the end of 2007. According to the contract, the 
company acquired the rights to renovate and operate for fifteen years. The 
second project was the ‘Film Museum by Operation and Transfer’. The CCA 
signed a contract with the Taiwan Film & Culture Association in February 
2007, and the film museum, ‘Spot Huashan’, was opened in November 
2012. The third project was ‘Taiwan Cultural & Creative Industries Flagship 
Centre by Build, Operation and Transfer’, which was outsourced to the 
Taiwan Cultural-Creative Development Co. Ltd. in August 2010, who were 
awarded a thirty-year contract for the centre's construction and operation 
and further priority for a ten-year contract extension.  
Since then, Haushan Creative Park has been renamed ‘Huashan 1914 
Creative Park’ (called ‘Huashan 1914’ in brief) by Taiwan Cultural-Creative 
Development Co. Ltd. in 2008 with four goals: (1) construct a field for the 
display, exchange and trade of CCIs; (2) cultivate creative people; (3) create 
                                            
25 The Act was promulgated in 2000 and amended in 2001 to enlarge the area of private 
participation from the single category of transportation and tourism to fourteen categories, 
including culture & education and social welfare, which used to be operated by 
governmental bodies. The purpose of the Act is to encourage the public sector to use 
social resources, to invest in and use professional human resources, to achieve the aims of 
public service, and to enhance service quality and reduce administration costs (Chen 2002; 
Huang and Huang 2003). 
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a stage for the ‘best of Taiwan’ to display the past, present and future of the 
creative archives; (4) become the priority site for ‘Cool Play For Fun’ in 
Taipei by constructing a leisure attraction of creative living experience (Li, 
2010). From the literal goals, it not only consolidated the discourse of 
‘branding Taiwan’ but more specifically, showed a turn of spatial imaginary of 
industrialisation in Huashan from producer-orientation which focuses on 
originality and creativity to consumer-orientation which focuses on fun and 
leisure experiences.  
Furthermore, since the private sector has dominated Huashan 1914 and 
taken full responsibility for its profit and loss, the spatial allocation of 
Huashan has changed dramatically. Making a profit to survive in a 
competitive market is the priority for the private operating company. 
Furthermore, ‘Cool Play For Fun’ (酷玩) has become the essential imaginary 
of ‘Huashan 1914’, which attracts people to visit and stimulates 
consumption. Meanwhile, the space for the café and restaurants has 
increased. The discourses and operating practice in Huashan CC Park have 
stimulated the emergence and variations of market discourse and soon 
seized the hegemony of industrialisation in cultural policy in the third phase. 
In other words, the highlight of artists’ discourses such as experiment, 
autonomy and creation of cultural value gradually shifted to an emphasis on 
economic benefit and consumption pleasure. There will be further analysis in 
Chapter Six.  
 
5.3 New Hometown Community Empowerment Project  
In parallel with the development of the CCIP, the other thread of 
industrialisation in the state’s planning is the ‘New Hometown Community 
Empowerment Project’ (New Hometown CEP), which was listed in the 
previous project of the nation-wide grand development plan ‘Challenge 
2008’. The project was mainly inherited from the CEP, but it did not merely 
focus on cultural affairs. The state extended the New Hometown CEP to a 
cross-sector framework. In addition to the CCA, the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture and another six ministries took charge of this 
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project based on community empowerment. It can be said that the extension 
not only changed the previous CCA-dominated direction of community 
empowerment but also affected the semiotic-material evolution of 
industrialisation in cultural policy. Specifically, when most of the state’s policy 
narratives claimed that ‘industrialisation’ originated from the CEP directly 
followed by the CCIP (CCA, 2004a; CEPD, 2008), the semiotic practice of 
the New Hometown CEP actually played an indispensable role in linking the 
meaning-making of industrialisation of the CEP and the CCIP.  
This section will argue that the New Hometown CEP played a 
complementary role, with the CCIP functioning as a strategic fix to enhance 
identity-building and economic transformation under the planning of DPP’s 
‘Challenge 2008’ from 2002 to 2008. Taking the analysis of policy discourse 
and the structural factors, it will focus on the sub-project of industrialisation 
within the New Hometown CEP: the ‘Local Cultural Museum’. The project 
interweaved the retention of discourses such as ‘participation’ and 
‘localisation’ of the CEP, and developed the variation and selection of 
industrialisation discourses of the CCIP, which influenced the direction of 
industrialisation in cultural policy.  
 
5.3.1 The Economic Imaginaries of the New Hometown 
Community Empowerment Project 
After the DPP came to power in 2000, the DPP government continued the 
community empowerment policy and focused on cultural industries and 
community economy.  
Previously, the importance of cultural industries was highlighted by the CCA 
and formed an independent project in cultural policy at the end of the 1990s. 
In 1998, the CCA launched the project ‘Revitalising Local Cultural Industries’ 
to encourage local governments’ cultural centres to collaborate with 
township and community residents in the exploitation of their featured 
industries (CCA, 2004a). After 2000, the DPP government extended the 
scale of the subsidy scheme so that almost every local government and 
more than seventy communities gained funding to nurture community 
workers and organisations, exploit local resources and promote local 
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industries (CCA, 2004a). During the period, preservation and inheritance of 
the traditional skills were the primary imaginaries of the cultural industries for 
the CCA so that the policy narratives and implementation put particular 
stress on the representation of traditional craftwork and the accumulation of 
local identity (Fang, 2013).    
In 2002, the projects of cultural industries were integrated with other relevant 
projects of the CEP into ‘Challenge 2008’ and renamed the ‘New Hometown 
Community Empowerment Project’ (CCA, 2004a). The New Hometown CEP, 
maintained a similar discourse of community empowerment to continue the 
policy inheritance. The discourse of ‘bottom-up’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘resident’s 
participation’ were retained and appeared frequently in the relevant policy 
texts (CCA, 2004a; CCA, 2004b; CCA, 2003; CEPD, 2003). For example, 
the CCA indicated that the above discourses were the principles of the New 
Hometown CEP through which to understand cultural resources and co-
create beautiful hometowns (CCA, 2004a, p.187). In practical strategies, 
leisure agriculture, organic agriculture and tourism based on the 
endogenous and indigenous approach of the CEP became the emerging 
imaginaries for the declining communities in response to the impact of free 
trade under the regulation of the WTO. However, the new industrial 
imaginaries were not feasible for these disadvantaged communities to carry 
out. Therefore, the strategies of community empowerment such as exploring 
local resources and building consciousness of community affairs by 
participation was advocated by policy-makers and consultants, and chosen 
by the villagers or community residents to face the transformation of 
industries (Huang, 2003).  
On the other hand, the New Hometown CEP referred to the selective 
discourses of the knowledge-based economy and shared similar economic 
commitments to the CCIs. Knowledge-based economy, which the DPP 
government had pledged to promote since 2000, and which soon became 
the state’s privileged discourse and permeated through the national policies. 
Under the framework of ‘Challenge 2008’, the purpose of the New 
Hometown CEP was to “elevate community’s vitality by utilising local 
resource, introducing human resource and creativity” (CEPD, 2003, p.240). 
This reveals the variation and selection of discourse of the knowledge-based 
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economy in terms of ‘human resource’ and ‘creativity’. These discourses 
were emphasised in the policy narratives of the CCIs. In the same 
statement, the state claimed that the New Hometown CEP was at the base 
of national reconstruction through “the transformation of social relation, 
culture and arts, spatial facilitation and economic industries” in order to 
“create new employment opportunities and living conditions for residents and 
attract emigrants back, and regenerate local vitality” (CEPD, 2003, p.240). 
The similar discourses of ‘employment’ and ‘regeneration’ also appeared in 
the CCIP with high frequency. These economic discourses highlight the 
economic aspect of industrialisation in cultural policy.  
Furthermore, the community industries and the CCIs were both viewed as 
types of knowledge-based economy. For example, Chen, Yu-Chiou claims 
that “culture is the origin of knowledge” and thus “cultural industries based 
on the transformation of the cultural content is the exemplification of 
knowledge-based economy” (CCA, 2003, p.8). Chen points out that the  
CCIs offer the highest type of added value in the knowledge-based economy 
(CCA, 2003, p.12). In this way, the linkage between culture and economy 
has been intensified. In the framework of the New Hometown CEP, the role 
of community economy and cultural industries became increasingly 
important. The project contained five themes of implementation: (1) 
activation of community organisations; (2) resource integration for 
community empowerment; (3) new tribe movements of aboriginal people; (4) 
new Hakka movements; and (5) communitisation of healthy and caring 
services. Among these, the second theme, the third theme and the fourth 
theme were related to cultural industries in the widely defined communities 
including Hakka villages and aboriginal tribes. In the general communities, 
most projects related to cultural industries were assigned to the second 
theme, ‘resource integration for community empowerment’, and organised 
by the CCA and Ministry of Economic Affairs. On the one side, the CCA was 
responsible for the renaissance of cultural heritage and local industries in 
order to support the link between culture and economy and create a new 
image of Taiwanese industries (CCA, 2003). On the other side, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs took charge of the activation of the local business 
environment and the establishment of supporting schemes for community 
- 137 - 
industries to revitalise the local economy and create employment in the 
countryside and villages. The state expected to promote 70 feature 
industries, assist 1,120 organisers and creators, and increase the total 
revenue by 3.4 billion NT dollars from 2002 to 2007 (CEPD, 2003, p.247). In 
addition, the Hakka cultural industries and aboriginal diverse industries were 
specific projects organised by the Hakka Affairs Council and the Council of 
Indigenous Peoples respectively. Both councils were concerned about the 
crisis of cultural marginalisation and the negative impact of globalisation and 
the WTO, so their industrialisation focused on the renaissance of native 
languages and traditional industries (CEPD, 2003).  
After the DPP government continued into its second term and reshuffled the 
Cabinet in 2004, ‘Challenge 2008’ was revised (CEPD, 2005) The New 
Hometown CEP was modified; one of the obvious changes being the 
previous theme of ‘resource integration for community empowerment’ was 
extended into three sections, including ‘community economy’, ‘community 
landscape’ and ‘community culture’. In the ‘community economy’ section, the 
endogenous approach of local industries was still emphasised but with more 
focus on market distribution and the network mechanism (CEPD, 2005). 
Furthermore, the revitalisation of local towns and high streets was 
increasingly stressed and a new project was formed to implement this.  
Under the management of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, a striking feature 
of the project was that it combined culture, tourism and the living landscape 
to form a network of industrialisation for local communities. The economic 
outcome was expected to assist 2,780 local community industries with a 
profit increase of 86 million NT dollars, and create 25,820 jobs (CEPD, 2005, 
pp.10-11 – 10-15). Cultural festivals and experience tours were the typical 
strategies for communities to promote their industries and create local 
consumption.  
Next, in the ‘community landscape’ section, the state divided communities 
into agricultural villages and fishing villages based on the local features and 
natural resources. The Council of Agriculture encouraged them to diversify 
into leisure industries in order to confront the negative impacts of the WTO 
and globalisation, such as unemployment and declining traditional industries 
- 138 - 
(CEPD, 2005, pp.10-15 – 10-22). The Council of Agriculture advocated the 
discourse of ‘culturalisation of local industries’ to promote leisure industries 
through the integration of industries, community culture and the ecological 
landscape. Folk festivals and eco-tourism were popular strategies adopted 
by the communities. The state planned to subsidise 80 agricultural and 
fishing leisure parks, create 1,000 jobs in these villages and attract 5 millions 
tourists. The ‘community culture’ section was led by the CCA and included 
the purposes of enriching the cultural infrastructure in local areas, 
investigation of communities’ history, workshops for local arts and innovation 
of community empowerment (CEPD, 2005, pp.10-22 – 10-28). The ‘Local 
Cultural Museum’ project can be seen as an influential scheme, as the state 
continually invested 37 billion NT dollars from 2002 to 2007 and expected it 
to be the community hub of local culture and travel information. The project 
will be analysed in the next section.  
The above projects revealed the imaginaries of industrialisation in 
communities had shifted from democratisation towards local regeneration. 
With the transformation of industrialisation, the meaning of hegemonic 
discourse, ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’, had 
been extended and varied. As Chen, Chi-Nan (2005) indicates, the initial 
concept of cultural industries followed the thinking of the CEP. Its goal was to 
stimulate residents to participate in community affairs and develop their own 
indigenous industries which could be produced locally and consumed locally. 
In this way, cultural industrialisation was a means of participation to rebuild 
community affairs between residents rather than the core subject of the 
economic plan. However, the New Hometown CEP was not only the basis of 
autonomous citizen participation, but also adopted as an end in promoting 
community economy. The discourse of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’ transcended the CCA field, and, highlighted by 
the other government sectors, the meaning of the discourse had been 
enlarged to five aspects of community affairs, people, culture, geography, 
landscape and industry (CCA, 2003). Compared to the previous CEP, which 
mainly stressed people’s empowerment, other aspects of community affairs, 
such as cultural identity, geographic features and protection, re-creation of 
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landscape, and industrial economy, were topics in the New Hometown CEP 
(CCA, 2010b).  
From the discourse-practice link with ‘knowledge-based economy’ and ‘local 
regeneration’, the terms ‘culture’ and ‘economy’ were acknowledged together 
with ‘cultural economy’ and embedded into a policy context. In fact, the New 
Hometown CEP shaped a complementary relationship with the CCIP within 
the framework of ‘Challenge 2008’, in which the state integrated the cultural-
economic political construct into national and local cultural strategies. At the 
national level, as the previous section discussed, the industrialisation 
promoted by the CCIP focused on strategies of ‘branding Taiwan’ and 
economic transformation. At the local or regional level, the DPP government 
paid particular attention to revitalising community economies and fostering 
cultural identities in the local areas, and community industries through the 
New Hometown CEP.  
From the variation in policy discourses, it is worth noting the emerging role of 
cultural tourism as a practical strategy of industrialisation in community 
areas. In the 1990s, some community groups developed cultural tours to 
introduce local history, folk art and heritage to the residents, as most of them 
had undergone Chinese-centric education under the rule of the KMT regime, 
and lacked local knowledge (Tseng, 2007). The tours were aimed to increase 
residents’ understanding of local culture and build a local identity.  Economic 
output was not their priority. It was in ‘Challenge 2008’ under the leadership 
of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, that economic outputs generated by 
community industries became a major concern. Since the economic features 
of local cultural industries can be represented as the application of tourist 
resources (Tsai, 2010), the increase in employment and tourism were the 
main criteria to assess the New Hometown CEP. As a result, it attracted 
communities that combined community industries with the network of 
tourism such as guided-tours, homestay, local cuisine and souvenirs of local 
industries, to regenerate the community. It led to a shift of economic 
imaginaries from the endogenous and indigenous approach to the 
endogenous and tourist approach. There were underlying politic causes for 
the approach that will be further discussed in the following sections.  
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5.3.2 The Political Imaginaries of the New Hometown Community 
Empowerment Project 
In its political intention, the title of the project, ‘New Hometown’, was meant 
to make Taiwan the ‘common hometown’ for everyone in Taiwan based on 
his/her current location and local culture (CEPD, 2003). The imposition of a 
‘New Hometown’ implied building a new spirit of an ‘imagined community’ 
(Anderson, 2006) focusing on the ‘common living experience’ in Taiwan 
since the war, regardless of ethnic origin. In addition, the state claimed that 
the ‘new hometown movement’ and ‘new tribe movement’ was implemented 
by the spirit of community empowerment, ‘autonomy’, ‘self-pride’, ‘co-
community’, ‘co-express’ and ‘co-dream’ (自主、自豪、同體、同演、同夢) to 
cultivate local identity and a sense of honour on the common basis of local 
conditions and features (CEPD, 2003, p.240). In other words, the discourse 
of ‘New Hometown’ that the DPP government intended to embed into 
national policies and local practice, as Chang (2006) describes it, functions 
like ‘motherland’ to shape people’s identity from their ethnic origin turning to 
the living land of Taiwan by participating community affairs.   
In the process of meaning-making, the DPP government selected to retain 
some discourses of localisation and participation. For instance, the 
discourse of ‘bottom-up principle’, ‘residents’ participation’ and ‘endogenous 
and indigenous approach’ had been emphasised repeatedly in the policy 
texts and implementation of the New Hometown CEP. The link with the 
previous positive reputations and experiences of the CEP offered the New 
Hometown CEP familiar discourses and feasible strategies to legalise the 
discourse of ‘New Hometown’ and its link with ‘Taiwan’. For example, the 
CCA stated clearly in the 2004 White Paper of Cultural Policy: 
Only through the concepts of community empowerment to keep the 
value of racial integration and cultural diversity in mind to build a new 
‘Humanity Taiwan’, which can make Taiwan become a hometown where 
the heart is for the whole people (CCA, 2004a, p.187).  
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On top of that, the CCA expected the project to resolve ethnical conflicts 
through the discourse of ‘Multicultural Taiwan’ (Wang, 2004). Chiung-Yao 
Fang, who was responsible for the project in the CCA, indicates that the 
project was named after ‘New Hometown’ to “eliminate the identity difference 
between ethnic groups and regions” (2013, p.162). In order to achieve the 
goal, the state planned specific projects for agricultural and fishing villages, 
Hakka towns and aboriginal tribes to develop cultural industries. By 
empowerment and involvement in community affairs, it enhanced people’s 
interest in local culture and it was acknowledged by the people that there 
was a variety of culture around Taiwan. Furthermore, it represented Taiwan 
as having diverse cultural roots and living styles based on the distinct 
geographical environment and local industries in Taiwan. With the emerging 
imaginaries of ‘multicultural Taiwan’, it gradually divorced itself from the 
mono-Chinese root that the former KMT government had devoted 
themselves to constructing. In other words, through the dual discourse-
making process in terms of ‘New Hometown’ and ‘Multicultural Taiwan’, 
cultural awareness and local identity accumulated around society. In this 
way, it promoted the establishment of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’. In terms of 
practical mechanisms, one of the technologies that the CCA employed in 
cultural policy was the ‘Local Cultural Museum’ project, which will be 
analysed in the following section.  
 
5.3.3 The Project of Local Cultural Museum 
Among the New Hometown projects, ‘Local Cultural Museums’ (LCM) can be 
seen as the most important sub-project related to industrialisation in cultural 
policy. It was a sponsoring scheme from 2002 to 2007, to turn new-buildings, 
existing and abandoned spaces into local cultural museums. Until the end of 
the first stage of the project in 2007, the state invested 37 billion NT dollars 
to subsidise 259 museums in communities around Taiwan (Ming, 2011).  
According to the CCA’s definition, ‘local cultural museums’ exhibit “creative 
aspects by combining the characteristics of local landscape, ecology, 
tradition, art and industries” (CCA, 2002c, p.6). The term includes a variety 
of halls and institutions for cultural use, such as public and private museums, 
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libraries, galleries, reused space of historical buildings and heritages. In 
other words, local cultural museums can be seen as community museums 
with diverse types of display and collection based on the local and 
community culture. In the initial planning, the CCA used the discourse of 
localisation to state the purpose of the LCM Project: 
The Project of Local Cultural Museum provides continuity of community 
empowerment, the essential content of domestic tourist project, and the 
starting point of local cultural and leisure industries. It aims to exploit 
cultural heritage, historical buildings and abandoned spaces to combine 
local industrial culture, enrich cultural content of towns and villages, 
cultivate Taiwanese cultural competitiveness in order to be the base of 
local culture, enhance residents’ participation in local research, develop 
consciousness of cultural museums and preserve local historical culture, 
local industries and ancient monuments (CCA, 2002b, no pagination).  
In addition, the CCA claimed the LCM Project had two benefits. On the one 
hand, it realised resident’s cultural citizenship to consolidate their identity, 
while on the other hand, it provided resources for local cultural tourism and 
improved community development (CCA, 2002b). Here, the discourse of 
‘cultural citizenship’ which the CCA advocated in 2004 had become the 
common discourse to justify the discourse of ‘access’ and ‘participation’ in 
the LCM Project. The concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ was introduced into the 
field of cultural policy when Chen, Chi-Nan was in charge of the CCA. He 
attempted to advance the meaning of community empowerment by this 
concept. In this sense, Chen elaborates on ‘cultural citizenship’ at two levels 
(Chen, 2004). The first level of meaning refers to government responsibility 
to securely guarantee everyone’s opportunity to access cultural resources. 
The second level refers to people’s obligation to participate in cultural 
activity. By doing so, the concept of cultural citizenship aims to improve the 
cultural environment and civil society (Chen, 2004). 
When the project was integrated into ‘Challenge 2008’, the economic benefit 
was emphasised in term of discourse of employment.  The state not only 
expected the local cultural museums to serve as a starting point for 
preserving Taiwanese culture but also as a tourist attraction to bring 
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employment and economic benefit to communities (CEPD, 2003, p.251).. In 
order to illustrate the economic outcome, the CCA therefore stressed the 
relationship between LCM and the cultural industries. Chiang, Yu-Chan 
(2006), who was the former section chief of the CCA and in charge of the  
LCM Project, explained four connections between the local cultural museum 
and cultural industries: (1) to be the base of local identity and community 
empowerment; (2) to develop local culture and arts in order to lay a 
foundation for cultural industries; (3) to create a local image to promote local 
tourism; and (4) to stimulate the local economy by tourism (2006, pp.87-88). 
Through the connection, the CCA constructed imaginaries that the existence 
of the local cultural museum could bring positive images of the locality and 
drive the prosperity of the local economy.  
In terms of practical strategies, The DPP government adopted the retention 
of decentralisation inherited from the CEP to justify the huge financial 
investment in communities. As mentioned in Chapter 4, cultural 
infrastructure was scarce in rural areas before the 1990s. Under the 
discursive frame of decentralisation, three of the four main CEP projects 
were related to cultural facilities26. In this vein, city and county governments 
built themed museums based on specific natural and cultural resources. As 
a result, almost every city or county established a museum representing 
local features. However, most facilities were located in the centre of local 
cities and counties. After 2002, the DPP government conducted construction 
of cultural infrastructure further into rural areas. In the LCM Project, the DPP 
government stated that the project could “shorten the gap between cities and 
villages” and “preserve local culture” (Su, 2011). On the surface, the LCM 
Project was constructed as a spatial fix for the regional disparity in cultural 
infrastructure between the urban and the rural areas. Behind these 
commitments, the DPP government actually accused the previous KMT 
rulers of the injustice of regional disparity and deliberate neglect of 
Taiwanese culture. In other words, the DPP attempted to break up the KMT’s 
                                            
26 The four core projects are: 1) promoting cultural activities in communities; 2) enhancing 
cultural facilities in townships; 3) assisting counties to set up county museums and build up 
museum collections; and 4) improving the traditional space of cultural facilities (Su and 
Tsai, 1999). 
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dominance of local factions and clientelism by the reallocation of local 
infrastructure and reconstruction of local identity in communities. Some 
analyses indicate that the DPP resorted to communitarianism in terms of the 
CEP and the New Hometown CEP to eliminate the pro-KMT force (Hsu, 
2009; Huang and Hsu, 2011).   
Moreover, there are other hidden imaginaries of the LCM for the DPP 
government. In the process of building a hegemonic discourse of ‘Taiwan 
subjectivity’, as Anderson (2006) argues, museums play an important role in 
shaping ‘imagined community’. The project can be seen as a mechanism of 
‘representing Taiwan’ and ‘theorising Taiwan’ to consolidate Taiwanese local 
identity. Before that, the development of the museums was established by 
the central government and most of them were involved in the construction 
of Chinese-roots in Taiwan. For example, Chu (2009) argues that the 
national narrative of museums in Taiwan during this period was representing 
the Chinese. After 2000, the focus of the exhibitions in the national museums 
had fundamentally changed to represent Taiwanese-centred culture and 
history (Chu, 2009; Chang, 2004). In the aspect of local museums, the LCM 
Project subsidised diverse types of local cultural museums and encouraged 
communities to use community museums for cultural preservation and 
cultural tourism. As a result, Taiwanese culture was reinterpreted, redefined 
and represented by the local people. In addition, a great deal of local 
discourse was generated in the form of the introduction of community 
museums, community newspapers, community magazines, documentaries 
and various publication of local stories (Tseng, 2007). Moreover, the CCA 
stated that the policy outcome of the LCM Project was a “new landmark of 
the local spirit; the stories and narratives it carried were the genetic treasure 
of Taiwan’s multi-culture” (Su, 2013, p.37). In other words, the LCM Project 
presented diverse Taiwanese culture as well as provided numerous local 
resources for interpretation and further research in theorising Taiwan. These 
indigenous and multicultural discourses with local practice had constructed 
strategic imaginaries of multi-cultural Taiwan and broke the hegemony of the 
Chinese-dominated culture shaped by the previous ruling KMT.  
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At the end of 2007, the CCA launched ‘Bedrock Action’ (磐石行動) to 
continue community empowerment. It took the dual-core strategy based on 
spatial arrangement (LCM Project II) and residents’ participation (New 
Hometown CEP II) (CCA, 2007b). According to the announcement of the 
Premier of the Executive Yuan, the goal of ‘Bedrock Action’ was to “make 
people access cultural resource, implement the right of cultural participation 
and highlight Taiwan’s subjectivity” (Executive Yuan, 2008). In this vein, the 
CCA took the perspective of the ‘cultural living circle’ (文化生活圈), which 
means people’s living area of cultural activities, to connect with cultural sites, 
cultural participation and cultural activities (CCA, 2007b). The LCM Project II 
was expected to fix the dispersion of single museums and scattered 
resources. It took the perspective of ‘cultural living circle’ to develop cultural 
identity and local economy. In this context, ‘shaping the cultural living circle 
and constructing Taiwan’s subjectivity’ had become the main discourse for 
the CCA to promote community empowerment.  
In 2012, the KMT nominee Ma, Ying-jeou won the Presidential election 
again. After that, the revision of LCM Project II focused on cultural 
participation, creation and sharing of cultural resources, and balance 
between city and town while the discourse of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivities’ was 
removed from the policy statement (CCA, 2007a). The discursive changes 
revealed that the KMT government attempted to separate the Taiwan-centre 
frame of political imaginaries from the meaning of industrialisation. There will 
be further discussion of this in Chapter Six. 
 
5.4 Local Practice in Communities  
5.4.1 The Transformation of Industrialisation in Communities 
During the DPP government from 2002 to 2008, industrialisation of the CCIP 
and New Hometown CEP were strategic fixes that worked complementarily 
with the state to deal with the challenges of economic transformation and 
national identity. In the same period, the local communities faced new 
conditions shaped by these state projects, including global competiveness, 
- 146 - 
and other unexpected natural crises, which led to an adjustment of 
industrialisation in local practice. With the continuity of community 
empowerment and deepening democracy, the communities did not always 
follow or depend on the state’s policies and imaginaries without reflexivity. In 
fact, communities had the autonomy and initiative to develop their own 
economic imaginaries of industrialisation in response to the difficulties and 
challenges embedded in the new conditions, such as threatened livelihood 
or natural crises.  
As mentioned earlier (section 5.1), local communities confronted the critical 
predicament of global competition when Taiwan was involved in the 
framework of the WTO. The community implementation of the New 
Hometown CEP shifted from the cultivation of democratic participation to the 
rediscovery of local industries, and when the 921 Earthquake destroyed 
numerous communities around Taiwan in 1999, one of the major methods for 
damaged communities to reconstruct their hometowns was through the 
exploitation of local cultural industries (CCA, 2004a). The scheme of 
community empowerment was adopted by the reconstruction projects and 
brought huge government funding and human resources to facilitate local 
industrialisation (Chang and Liao, 2013). For example, the CCA incorporated 
the previous experience of the CEP into the project of the ‘development of 
921 local cultural industries’ in the damaged communities. This attracted 
architects, space planners, social and cultural workers to collaborate with the 
communities in the innovation of community industries and the exploration of 
promotion strategy. These professionals introduced new practices such as 
eco-tourism and organic farming in some rural communities, which soon 
spread to other parts of the island (Huang, 2000). Communities also worked 
with them to develop experience tours of DIY-crafts or local navigation for 
job creation in local areas. The development laid the foundation for the 
emergence of new economic imaginaries, based on the previous 
‘endogenous and indigenous approach’ and further focused on tourism 
planning for attracting people to visit and consume locally.  
When the DPP government launched the New Hometown CEP, several 
governmental mechanisms facilitated the continuity of tourism-style 
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industrialisation, as analysed in section 5.3. In these national polices, the 
introduction of the advisory panel of experts played an intermediation role in 
the semiotic practice of industrialisation. The policy encouraged intermediary 
organisations to cultivate or foster disadvantaged communities, which 
attracted many foundations or associations that voluntarily took part in 
community industries. They brought industrial knowledge and marketing 
strategies for communities to develop local industries. It was a dialectic 
process whereby some communities gradually empowered themselves and 
were able to generate discourses to elaborate their strategies of 
industrialisation. In other words, the community actors learned lessons from 
the previous experiences of community empowerment and retrieved the 
‘endogenous and indigenous approach’, and then they integrated and 
transformed new knowledge from advisory panels into their thinking and 
practice.  
At the same time, some researchers and community workers proposed 
discourse of local cultural industries based on their observation and local 
cases. From their perspectives, the local cultural industries or community 
industries were distinguished from the CCIs that the state advocated. In the 
state’s discursive strategies, the New Hometown CEP inherited the legacy of 
CEP and stood in parallel with the CCIP within ‘Challenge 2008’, which 
constructed a vague discourse of industrialisation between community-type 
cultural industries and CCIs. As analysed in the previous section, the state 
selected the retention of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of 
Industries’ in both projects to embed the external concept of ‘creative 
industries’ into the Taiwanese context. Consequently, this enlarged the 
meaning of cultural industries and CCIs, which combined community 
empowerment and knowledge-based economy. However, it resulted in an 
ambiguous and blurred meaning of industrialisation and aroused controversy 
in practice (Tsai, 2010; Wang, 2005). Unlike the first phase, when community 
and the state had developed an ‘endogenous and indigenous approach’ to 
promoting cultural industries for community empowerment, most 
communities in the second phase were confused about cultural industries 
and CCIs. For example, Chang and Liu (2009) take the example of Shang-
Ann Community, and find the residents struggled with the discourse of 
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‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ and the national 
policy of CCIP, stating that they “know what the discourse means but do not 
understand how to practise the idea” (p.150).  
Faced with the confusion, some studies pointed out that the contextual 
difference was that cultural industries came from the context of CEP while 
CCIs were introduced from the foreign concepts of ‘creative industries’ and 
‘knowledge-based economy’ (Wang, 2005; Liu, 2006). They argue the value 
of cultural industries focused on community identity and local features whilst 
the value of CCIs focused on economic benefits and creativity. In addition, 
some researchers proposed a specific definition with relevant discourses to 
identify community industries. For example, Chen (2003) takes the case of 
Baimi Village as an example of ‘community creative industries’ to emphasise 
the cultural-added value of local industries. Huang (2003) investigates the 
communities of Linnel Township and proposes ‘community-type cultural and 
creative industries’ as distinct from ‘universal-type cultural and creative 
industries’; the former being based on local tradition and community living 
while the latter possesses the features of mass production, copy and spread, 
such as media industries and design industries. Moreover, he argues for the 
importance of residents’ participation in the practice of  ‘Industrialisation of 
Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’. He illustrates the process of 
industrialisation: “through residents’ discovery of cultural content, which 
shapes cultural meaning on top of traditional industries, and then the cultural 
content is further revitalised to promote the industries” (Huang, 2003, p.41).  
In addition, iia-Chan, who is the director of the New Homeland Foundation, 
proposed the discourse of ‘endogenous industries’ based on the case of 
Taomi Eco Village, to distinguish the operation of industrialisation from other 
general industries (Liao, 2012). Compared to the industrialisation of general 
industries which tends to pursue maximum profit through the mechanism of 
market distribution, the endogenous industries aim to create common 
benefits among community organisations though the network of local 
resources (Sun, 2007).  According to the empirical experience of Taomi Eco 
Village, Liao attempted to construct new economic imaginaries of 
endogenous industries that revise the ‘endogenous and indigenous 
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approach’ by the application of the knowledge-based economy to emphasise 
residents’ learning and the transformation of local resources (Liao, 2012). He 
argues that the product of endogenous industries aims to create indigenous 
attraction by residents’ participation in local heritage and museums, festivals, 
traditional craft, local food and homestays to draw visitors to experience and 
consume (Liao, 2012). 
Through continuous discursive negotiation, local practice and learning from 
each other among communities, new economic imaginaries with the 
endogenous and tourism approach were formed. Compared to the 
‘endogenous and indigenous approach’ which focused on industrialisation of 
single industrial product with the empowerment process, the communities in 
the second phase (2002-2008) drew further attention to building networks of 
endogenous industries with tourism including festivals, tourist attractions, 
cultural tours of local cultural museums, local food and catering and 
homestay. One of the typical cases is Taomi Eco Village. Taomi Village 
depended on government subsidy for the first several years to rebuild the 
whole village after the earthquake. It soon developed its own strategy to 
construct ‘Taomi Eco-Village’ through the endogenous and tourism 
approach. It was regarded as one of the best models of cultural industries / 
cultural and creative industries, which were promoted by governments in 
many official books (CCA, 2010b; CCA, 2003). Furthermore, the experience 
of Taomi Eco Village has drawn attention, with a great deal of media 
coverage, and attracted a considerable number of communities and 
associations to visit and learn, thus it enhanced the symbolic capital of the 
endogenous and tourism approach. In addition, the relevant research and 
conferences facilitated the production of hegemonic economic imaginaries 
through the case study of Taomi community. The next section will analyse 
the discursive-practical process of Taomi Eco Village to understand how the 
community actors undertook a course of action and discourse, and how the 
economic imaginaries were shaped by the local practice. 
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5.4.2 Endogenous and Tourism Approach – the Case of Taomi 
Eco Village  
Taomi Village is a small village which comprises a total area of about 18 
square kilometres located in Puli Township of Nantou County. Before the 921 
Earthquake in 1999, it was an ordinary agricultural village in central Taiwan, 
planting bamboo, mushrooms and tea, but it had been facing industrial 
decline, emigration and an ageing population in the 1990s when the 
government liberalised regulation and imported considerable amounts of 
foreign agricultural products. In these circumstances, the social network was 
weak and most residents lacked awareness of local history and 
environmental connections, such that they felt alienated from their home 
town (Chiu, 2004; Wang, 2009).  
The CEP was introduced in 1994, and Taomi Community Development 
Association (hereafter TCDA) was established in 1996 for acquiring 
government funds to improve community facilities. They did not focus on 
exploration of local culture or local industries, nor did they have community 
consciousness at that time. During the Taiwan 921 Earthquake, 70 per cent 
of Taomi Village was destroyed, including 168 out of the 369 houses, which 
were completely demolished (CCA, 2010b). Due to the agricultural 
resources being destroyed by the earthquake, sustainability of industries 
was the main consideration for the community when reconstructing the 
village (Interview with Liao, Chia-Chan, 2012). Different from the 
industrialisation of Baimi that mostly relied on insiders to the community, the 
Taomi eagerly built partnerships with outsiders to the community to conduct 
industrialisation. The TCDA invited the New Homeland Foundation (hereafter 
NHF), which was established by Liao, Chia-Chan (廖嘉展) in February 1999, 
to assist in the task of rebuilding the village. Liao had lived in Puli Township 
for ten years and decided to set up a non-profit foundation for community 
empowerment and social reform (Liao, 2012). In order to assist in the 
reconstruction of Taomi Village, Liao adjusted the organisation of the NHF 
and set up four departments, community empowerment, cultural industries, 
community learning, and post-earthquake community reconstruction 
(Interview with Liao, Chia-Chan, 2012). The NHF soon came to play a 
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significant role in assisting the village in the production of discourses and 
actions aimed toward industrialisation of endogenous industries in terms of 
eco-tourism.  On the one hand, the NHF promoted the concept of community 
empowerment and introduced external partnerships and funding to link with 
Taomi Village. On the other hand, the NHF collaborated with the TCDA to 
shape the economic imaginaries of eco-tourism.  
This was a dynamic process, filled with negotiations and conflicts between 
the associations of the community, residents, the NHF and other third 
sectors to construct Taomi Eco Village. The first challenge was to shape 
economic imaginaries of endogenous industries for the residents who were 
mostly farmers and lacked the confidence and vision to transform their 
disadvantaged condition (Interview with Liao, Chia-Chan, 2012).  Under the 
circumstance, the NHF and TCDA held a series of activities and discussions 
around reconstruction, including environmental protection and vision-building 
to aggregate a consensus among residents. These collective actions 
provided a cohesive foundation for residents to imagine the industrialisation 
mode of the community. Meanwhile, the NHF invited other organisations and 
groups to assist Taomi Village. Under the assistance of the NHF, two 
organisations conducted comprehensive investigations in order to 
understand the natural and cultural resources in Taomi and design a series 
of workshops to shape the industrial imaginaries of a sustainable community. 
One was the Endemic Species Research Institute, a government academic 
research institution located in Nantou County. The institute found that Taomi 
Village had a great deal of valuable ecological resources. As a tiny village of 
18 square kilometres, Taomi had diverse landscapes such as ponds, 
streams, wetlands, waterfalls forests, all of which were a rich habitat for wild 
animals, including 21 of the 29 frog species, 45 of the 153 dragonfly species, 
and 72 of the 450 bird species in the whole of Taiwan (Peng, 2001). The 
discovery surprised the Taomi villagers and revealed the potential for eco-
tourism (Chiu, 2004). The other organisation was the regional regeneration 
team led by Dr Chen, Chr-Ji and Shih-Hsin University. The university team 
worked with the residents to explore the historical and cultural resources. 
They also organised workshops and training in local culture, local food, 
guided tours, and homestay (Chiu, 2004). With these non-profit 
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organisations’ assistance, Taomi’s eco-tourism started trial operation in 
2001, receiving considerable coverage and gaining funding from the Philips 
Company for lighting facilities and the training of eco-guides.  
However, it was not easy for the residents to change the economic 
imaginaries of previous industries and engage in these courses in the 
beginning. They soon suffered visitors’ criticism for unprofessional 
homestays and an untidy environment. In addition, the disagreements 
among the three assisting groups led to the withdrawal of the university 
(Chiang and Chang, 2008). The NHF therefore introduced a relief 
programme, with government funding, so that unemployed residents could 
earn subsidies by cleaning the village and attend training classes (Liao, 
2012). Through learning and consultation with the NHF and the Endemic 
Species Research Institute, eco-tourism as the vision of a new type of 
industrialisation was identified by most residents (Interview with Chung, Yun-
Nuan, 2012).  
In the practical process of eco-tourism industrialisation, the TCDA designed 
several visits during 2000 and 2002, to learn from other communities’ 
experiences and exchange ideas. They visited Baimi Clog Village, Erjie 
Community in Yilan County, and Fu-Ben, Young-Ping and Young-Le 
Communities in Changhua County. These visits not only helped the TCDA 
and residents to understand the relationship between community 
empowerment and cultural industries, but also brought in some schemes to 
keep the community cultural industries sustainable (Chiu, 2004; Liao, 2012). 
For example, they adopted Baimi’s scheme of a ‘community fund’ into the 
eco-village, in which every eco-tourism operator would give 5 per cent or 10 
per cent of their income to the community for public use or facility 
maintenance (Interview with Chung, Yun-Nuan, 2012). Moreover, residents 
collaborated with senior craftsmen as an autonomous construction team to 
restore wetlands and the surrounding landscape by ecological methods 
(CCA, 2010b). With funding from the CCA, Taomi residents and the NHF 
preserved the earthquake-damaged community centre and transformed it 
into the community museum. In the planning process of the museum, 
residents participated in the narratives of local history and culture, and 
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donated their private collections for exhibition (CCA, 2010b). The museum is 
currently the entrance to Taomi Eco-Village, where it not only displays local 
culture and earthquake implications for visitors but also consolidates local 
identity for the residents.  
While Taomi community was practising indigenous strategies to conduct eco-
tourism, the NHF introduced the discourses of ‘green economy’ and 
‘knowledge-based economy’ to empower Taomi residents, who constructed 
the economic imaginaries of Taomi Eco-Village with the endogenous and 
tourism approach. On the one hand, the NHF and Endemic Species 
Research Institute held a series of ‘Green Workshops’, covering ecological 
ethics, natural values, eco-technology construction and ecological guide 
skills for residents to learn ecological knowledge and participate in the 
preservation and construction of an eco-friendly environment (Wang, 2009). 
Moreover, the NHF assisted the TCDA to get government funding to promote 
eco-tourism. They strategically selected three species (frogs, dragonflies and 
birds) which are easy to identify as the topics of eco-tours, and provided 
training for the residents to learn the skills of catering for and hosting 
tourists. These workshops and training were aimed to empower residents 
with qualified abilities to shape the vision of eco-tourism as one of the green 
economic industries that would contribute to a sustainable community and 
improve their lives.  
On the other hand, the economic imaginaries of ‘knowledge-based economy’ 
were translated and realised as ‘education and learning’ by the NHF (Yen, 
2004; Chang and Liao, 2013). In the NHF’s elaboration, the practical 
meaning of knowledge-based economy is the way that people can make a 
living from eco-tourism by learning and interpreting (Interview with Liao, 
Chia-Chan, 2012). Liao’s explanation is that “learning is the fundamental 
strategy of endogenous industries. This learning is based on the local culture 
and history to fully understand the ecology of the hometown and further 
develop interpretation of this place” (Interview with Liao, Chia-Chan, 2012). 
Through learning and participation in community discussions, residents 
accumulated the knowledge and ability to transform Taomi community from 
an agricultural village to an eco village. In this vein, the NHF introduced the 
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system of licensed guides to conduct tours with privileged certification. In the 
first stage, nine residents passed the examination to obtain certificates and 
started guiding eco-tours. They were able to gain substantial income by 
offering the services of eco-guides and interpretation. The monetary reward 
fulfilled the economic imaginaries of endogenous industries and this system 
of licensed guides reflects the efficacy of the knowledge-based economy. As 
a result, it consolidated the hegemonic discourse of knowledge-based 
economy with a learning strategy in eco-tourism. Chung, Yun-Nuan (鐘雲暖), 
the director-general of TCDA, said that “what we sell in Taomi is a kind of 
knowledge-based economy, in terms of the stories addressed by the guides 
with professional certification” (Interview with Chung, Yun-Nuan, 2012). To 
date, there are thirty tour-guides with certification and half of them take shifts 
to participate in the community’s eco-tourism (CCA, 2010b, p.219).  
In semiotic practice, the discourses of ‘green economy’ and ‘knowledge-
based economy’ within the practice of tourism constructed the new economic 
imaginaries of local industrialisation based on endogenous and tourism 
approach in Taomi Eco Village. According to the survey conducted by the 
NHF in 2002, 94 per cent of respondents said they knew eco-tourism was 
developing in Taomi Village, and more than 70 per cent would like to 
continue to participate in the construction of Taomi Eco Village (Liao, 2012).  
After 2005, TCDA insisted on the approach and dominated the construction 
of the Eco Village while the NHF shifted their relationship to a ‘soft 
partnership’ and focused on the project of ‘Paper Dome – Newland 
Community Education Centre’ to promote learning strategies in community 
empowerment and industrialisation (Liao, 2012). Then some members of 
TCDA, along with residents, organised the Taomi Natural Preservation 
Association and Taomi Eco-Tourism Association to conduct environmental 
protection and eco-tourism, which led to the reorganisation of the TCDA. 
Some of the members organised another committee to promote Taomi 
Leisure Agricultural Park. Conflicts among the associations arose due to 
different interests, but were sorted out through communication and the 
complementary network (Chiang and Chang, 2008). The TCDA transformed 
its responsibility into community welfare and the Committee of Taomi Leisure 
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Agricultural Park focused on integrating resources for leisure agriculture, 
agricultural industries and culture. The three associations have built trust 
with each other due to close interpersonal relationships and regular dinner 
meetings (Interview with Chung, Yun-Nuan, 2012). In 2008, the Paper Dome 
began operation, which enhanced the cluster effect of the Eco Village. In 
2007, there were 17 homestays, 2 campsites, 10 small restaurants, and 30 
eco-guides for eco-tourism (Wang, 2009). By 2011, the number of tourists 
visiting Taomi Eco Village reached 400,000. According to Liao’s research 
(2012), the endogenous industries of eco-tourism and the learning-visit of 
Paper Dome had created 188 jobs (about one-sixth of the whole population) 
including more than 30 immigrants (Interview with Chung, Yu-Nuan, 2012). 
Moreover, the network of eco-tourism has constantly extended to include  24 
homestays, 2 campsites, 13 restaurants, 5 DIY-craft tours, and 36 eco-
guides, which contribute about 130 million NT dollars  (Liao, 2012, p.137). 
The endogenous and tourism approach not only challenged the privileged 
discourse of industrialisation shaped by the state but also had a significant 
influence on the evolution of industrialisation. Compared to the state’s policy 
and preferred spatial approach of CC Parks and local cultural museums, the 
industrialisation of local community by the endogenous and tourism 
approach was developed on the basis of the local resources and 
collaborative networks between community residents, associations, and the 
third sector. The actions and discourses have affected some governmental 
departments to adjust the subsidy scheme. For example, the Small and 
Medium Enterprise Administration, a department within the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, started to foster small enterprises with local historical and 
cultural features, and the Soil and Water Conservation Bureau, which under 
the administration of the Council of Agriculture, developed the ‘Rural 
Rejuvenation Programme’ in 2010 to support the declining farming 
communities against the outflow of people and the challenges of 
globalisation while preserving the ecological environment. The learning 
strategy of the NHF influenced the project. According to the Rural 
- 156 - 
Rejuvenation Act27, village residents must complete a series of training 
courses before submitting a community revitalisation plan. The purpose of 
the training is to help residents better understand the village’s resources and 
unique characteristics so that they can shape the community vision and 
conduct revitalisation projects. The project has played an increasingly 
important role in the constitution of industrialisation in the third phase (2008-
2012), which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
 
Conclusion 
From the above analysis, it can be observed that industrialisation 
experienced a paradigm shift from 2002 to 2008. The state and local 
communities played co-constituted roles in the shift. At the same time, the 
actors competed for the interpretative hegemony of industrialisation in 
cultural policy. Their discourses and practices contributed to the semiotic 
practice of meaning making in the evaluation of industrialisation.  
On the one hand, the state launched the CCIP and the New Hometown CEP 
as economic and political fixes for industrialisation in the field of cultural 
policy, which created the favoured imaginaries of the CC Parks approach 
and LCM approach to transforming the economic structure and consolidating 
Taiwan’s subjectivity. On the other hand, the local communities conducted an 
endogenous and tourism approach to counter heavy economic crises 
resulting from the WTO and natural disasters. During the semiotic practice 
between the state projects and local practice in the second phase, the new 
concepts of ‘culture is good business’ and ‘branding Taiwan’ were privileged 
and encompassed into the meaning of industrialisation, while the retention of 
‘localisation’ and ‘participation’ and the highlighting of ‘cultural citizenship’ 
were constantly supported by the local communities and transformed by the 
‘endogenous and tourism approach’. 
                                            
27 The detail of the Rural Rejuvenation Act can be seen from the project’s website. [Online]. 
[Accessed 18 March 2015]. Available from: 
http://www.ey.gov.tw/en/Dictionary_Content.aspx?n=A240F8389D824425&sms=D8F3EB1
5472D7847&s=39D67559042A3BF1 
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However, the condition of industrialisation has changed since the KMT 
regained power in 2008 and Taiwan encountered another global financial 
crisis at the same time. Due to the specific political ideology and economic 
imaginaries, the KMT government proposed the second stage of the CCIP 
and adjusted the strategies of the New Hometown CEP, which led to the 
consolidation of the hegemonic discourse of ‘culture is good business’ and 
shifted the policy imaginaries from ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ towards being 
ROC-based. More importantly, these policy changes has raised questions 
and caused conflicts in civil society. The discursive and practical 
developments of industrialisation will be analysed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 Industrialisation of Cultural Policy III (2008-2012) 
Introduction 
The discursive practice of the CCIP and the New Hometown Project 
suggest that the DPP’s intention in utilising the concept of CCIs in 
accordance with the discursive formation of ‘culture is good business’ and 
‘branding Taiwan’ was as a strategic fix in response to economic 
transformation and to strengthen Taiwanese identity. With the state’s 
initiation of the policy, local governments, communities, associations and 
private enterprises took part in the co-constitution of industrialisation and 
developed economic imaginaries of the ‘CC Park’ and the ‘endogenous 
and tourism approach’. However, the given discursive structure of 
industrialisation has changed since 2008. One of the main factors is that 
the KMT replaced the DPP’s presidency and continued to hold power from 
2012 to date. This political rotation had caused dramatic variation in 
national policy as KMT’s political ideology embraces the ‘Republic of 
China’, which is distinct from the former DPP government’s claim of 
‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ in the national identity. Moreover, the KMT 
government favours neo-liberalist economic projects in response to the 
global financial crisis of 2008. These political-economic structural changes 
not only shaped a new discursive condition of industrialisation in relevant 
cultural projects but also regulated the selection of economic imaginaries 
of industrialisation in cultural policy and local practice. 
In order to analyse the co-constitution of industrialisation and the formation 
of the economic imaginaries in cultural policy after 2008, this chapter firstly 
investigates the structural variation in political issues of ROC-rebuilding 
and economic integration with China, which were crucial factors in the 
evolution of the state discourse. The KMT government emphasised the 
market discourse of the ‘Grand-Chinese market’ to promote this economic 
liberalisation. However, these policy strategies encountered difficulties in 
implementation in their interaction with civil discourses of endogenous 
approach generated by the civil society. Having experienced the second 
change of ruling party through general elections, which Huntington (1991, 
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pp.266-267) called the ‘two-turnover test’, Taiwan underwent a 
consolidated democracy (Rawnsley, 2014; Fell, 2012; Cheng and Fell, 
2014). This not only represented a democracy mechanism between the 
state and the society, but also was accompanied by the flourishing of civil 
society and the relevant social movements with heterogeneous discourses 
and strategies, in response to state policies.  
Therefore, the second section analyses the context of the resurgence of 
such social movements and the emergence of civil discourses. The 
structural transformation from political-economic environment and civil 
society set the conditions for the cultural policy and the meaning-making of 
industrialisation. This is evident in the transformation of the second stage 
of the New Hometown Project and CCIP. Despite the KMT inheriting these 
projects’ names, they changed the policy imaginaries toward a ROC-base 
and made them more market-friendly in their second stages, which raised 
intense opposition from civil society and civil movements. The third section 
elaborates on the policy discourses of the framework of ‘Creative Taiwan’ 
which is the second stage of CCIP from 2009 to 2013, the development of 
the ‘Law for the Development of Cultural and Creative Industries’ and the 
establishment of the Ministry of Culture. The fourth section focuses on the 
discursive transformation of New Hometown CEP. Faced with the variation 
of policy imaginaries and institution changes, local practice in communities 
had undergone dramatic changes. The final section discusses two trends 
of local practice: the reflexivity of the endogenous and tourism approach 
and the rise of the cultural and creative village (文創聚落). It also looks at 
the cases of ‘Dragonfly Beads Art Studio’ and ‘Teihua Music Village’ in 
order to elaborate on the strategic discourse and struggling local practice. 
The local practice of these two cases provides prominent imaginaries of 
the public and the state, which reconstructed industrialisation in cultural 
policy. 
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6.1 Political Changes and Economic Integration with China 
After the configuration of ‘New Taiwanese’ and ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ 
promoted by Lee, Teng-Hui and Chen, Shui-Bian as analysed in Chapter 5, 
‘Taiwanese identity’ had seized the hegemony in the meaning-making 
practice in society during the first decade of the 2000s. One piece of 
evidence is that ‘Taiwanese identity’ has become common strategic 
rhetoric in the election campaigns. Both of the two major political parties 
(the DPP and the KMT) expressed ‘Love Taiwan’ and ‘Taiwan priority’ in 
their campaigns for the 2008 elections; moreover, the shape of Taiwan 
island had become the preferred icon in both campaign instruments and 
strategies (Fell and Chen, 2014). Another salient development was the 
increasing number of people in Taiwan who identified themselves as 
Taiwanese. According to the survey conducted by the renowned Election 
Study Centre at National Cheng-Chi University28, the number expressing 
Taiwanese identity had increased to 48.4 per cent in 2008 from 17.6 per 
cent in 1992, whilst the number of those identifying themselves as Chinese 
sharply decreased from 25.5 per cent to an historical low of 4.0 per cent 
during the same period.  
However, it is worth noting that there were a significant number of 
respondents (more than 40 per cent) still holding dual identity, in which 
people identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese, during the 
same period. The figure of dual identity was 43.1 per cent in 2008, slightly 
less than that of Taiwanese identity at 5.3 per cent. This reveals that 
Chinese-nationalism, which was imposed by the former authoritarian KMT 
government from 1949 to 2000, still had strong implications for the people 
of Taiwan. Even though the former DPP government was devoted to 
constructing ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ between 2000 and 2008, it did not 
replace the five-decades of Chinese-identity based on the imaginaries of 
‘Republic of China’ (ROC). The broad acceptance of dual identity in the 
public gave the KMT a space for articulation of its version of Taiwan 
                                            
28 The institution has conducted the survey twice a year since 1992. The data is publicly 
released and maintained online. [Accessed10 May 2015]. Available from: 
http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166 
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identity with the imagined ROC in the 2008 general election. As in  
Kaeding (2009) analysis, the KMT portrayed a very ‘Taiwanised’ image in 
the discourse of ‘New Taiwanese’ as a means of amalgamating KMT’s 
Chinese heritage and Taiwan’s identity to assure voters of his commitment 
to the sovereignty of Taiwan in campaigns. As a result, the KMT gained 
landslide majorities in parliamentary seats and then the KMT candidate, 
Ma, Ying-Jeou, won the presidential election 29 . Consequently, this 
constituted a new discursive-material condition with structured continuity 
and structuring changes of policy.  
Since Ma’s inauguration, the KMT government changed the policy 
discourse of ‘Taiwanese subjectivity’ and replaced it with the discourse of 
‘ROC’. For the KMT’s ideological imaginaries, Taiwan is part of the 
Republic of China (ROC), which the predecessor of the KMT established in 
Mainland China in 1912. Even though the KMT adopted Taiwan-themed 
campaigns to win the presidential election, when Ma was inaugurated as 
president, he committed to construct his version of Taiwan’s identity as an 
integral part of the Chinese nation (Hughes, 2014). This was distinct from 
the hegemonic discourse of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ supported by the former 
DPP government. This was evident in Ma’s first inauguration address. He 
recalled, for example, the past sixty-year achievements of the ROC in 
Taiwan’s economic development and defined the democracy of Taiwan as 
a significant contribution to ROC’s centennial history:  
The Republic of China was reborn in Taiwan. During my presidency, we 
will celebrate the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of 
China. This democratic republic, the very first in Asia, spent a short 38 
years on the Chinese mainland, but has spent nearly 60 years in Taiwan. 
During these last six decades, the destinies of the Republic of China and 
Taiwan have been closely intertwined. Together, the two have 
experienced times good and bad. On the jagged path toward democracy, 
the ROC has made great strides (Ma, 2008). 
                                            
29  The political corruption was another critical factor for the DPP’s defeats in 2008, 
particularly the allegation scandals of President Chen, Shui-Bain and his family (Fell, 2012; 
Garver, 2011). 
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In his address, Ma reclaimed the importance of the ‘1992 Consensus’ of 
‘One China, Respective Interpretations’ 30 , of which the former DPP 
government had never claimed legitimisation, to serve as the foundation 
for consultations across the Taiwan Strait. Ma’s government tried to use 
the discursive strategy of the ‘1992 Consensus’ to repair the isolated 
international space and the intense hostility from the PRC, which were 
caused by Chen’s proposal of ‘one country on each side’. During the 
former DPP government, eight countries31 terminated formal diplomatic 
relations with Taiwan; moreover, the Chinese government reclaimed 
military attacks to deter the Taiwanese independence movement. In order 
to defuse the conflicts and extend the external relations, Ma highlighted the 
importance of the ‘1992 Consensus’ as the basis of re-approaching 
relationships with the PRC. Furthermore, Ma pledged to maintain the 
status quo across the Taiwan Strait by a principle of ‘Three Nos’ – no 
unification, no independence, and no use of force – to pursue 
reconciliation and truce in cross-Strait relationships. In addition, Ma argued 
that sovereignty does not matter to resolve cross-Strait issues. Instead, he 
emphasised that ‘common Chinese heritage’ can help Taiwan and 
Mainland China ‘attain peace and co-prosperity’ (Ma, 2008). As a result, 
Ma (2008) called for a resumption of cross-Strait talks in his inauguration 
address to achieve ‘normalisation of economic and cultural relations’ and 
expected the eventual possibility of a cross-Strait peace accord.  
From Ma’s address, it can be seen that the KMT government intended to 
construct the dominant discourse of ‘ROC’ over the DPP’s discourse of 
‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ which aimed at consolidating an identity for Taiwan 
as an entity separate from China. In this way, the KMT government 
                                            
30 The consensus gives both sides respective interpretation of ‘One China’. He repeated 
frequently on many later occasions, defining ‘one China’ as the ‘Republic of China’ 
established in 1912 whose sovereignty covers the whole China, but its ruling regions 
presently are limited only to the areas of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu (The China 
Post, 2011). According to Ma’s interpretation in 2011, the consensus made it possible for 
Taipei and Beijing to temporarily shelve the sovereignty controversy and focus on practical 
and mutually beneficial issues that it have never undermined or ceded the ROC’s 
sovereignty (The China Post, 2011). 
31  Republic of Macedonia, Republic of Liberia, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenda, 
Senegal, Republic of Chad, Republic of Costa Rica and Republic of Malawi. 
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attempted to shift identity politics back toward the pro-status quo centre 
from the pro-independence that the former DPP government promoted, 
and put cross-Strait relations on a new track in search of closer 
cooperation and greater international space (Garver, 2011; Fell, 2012).  
Under Ma’s discursive framework of the ‘1992 Consensus’, China returned 
positive and immediate feedback. Three weeks after Ma’s inauguration, a 
series of cross-Strait consultations were resumed. ROC’s Straits Exchange 
Foundation and the PRC’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan 
Straits achieved several agreements such as direct flights, the arrival of 
Chinese tourists, direct shipping links, postal services, and food safety 
(Young, 2008). At the end of 2008, Taipei Zoo accepted two giant pandas 
sent by the PRC, the offer of which had been refused since 2005 
(Jennings, 2008). The two pandas were named ‘Tuan Tuan’ and ‘Yuan 
Yuan’ by the PRC as a rhetorical combination of ‘Tuan Yuan’ which means 
‘reunion’ in Chinese. In addition, the KMT government conducted a series 
of discourses and projects to facilitate the hegemony of ‘ROC’ and revive 
Chinese identity in Taiwan. For example, the KMT government abandoned 
the previous efforts to apply for membership of the United Nations under 
the name of ‘Taiwan’. Moreover, the reference to PRC as ‘China’ was 
restricted to use in official documents as Ma asked every government 
agency to refer to the opposite side of the Strait as ‘Mainland China’ (中國
大陸) , the ‘Mainland’ (大陸) or  the ‘Mainland area’ (大陸地區) rather than 
‘China’ since this is based on the definition of the Constitution of ROC and  
the ‘Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and 
the Mainland Area’ (Lee and Lin, 2011).  
Another strategy of consolidating Chinese identity was to put Taiwan into 
the framework of Chinese culture. One such cultural project is the 
establishment of the ‘Taiwan Academy’ (台灣書院) around the world. As 
one of Ma’s manifestos of cultural policy, the Taiwan Academy is 
functionalised to “showcase Taiwan’s unique Chinese culture” with a goal 
to “bring Chinese culture that features Taiwan’s unique characteristics to 
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the world”32. To date, Taiwan Academies have opened in New York, Los 
Angeles, and Houston, while contact points have been set up in 64 
countries including the Centre of Taiwan Studies, in the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London. 
With regard to economic policy, the KMT government continued to follow 
the dominant neo-liberalism and further emphasised free trade, especially 
the liberalisation of cross-Strait bilateral trade. In the last chapter, it was 
shown that Taiwan experienced authoritarian politics post-war, which 
shaped the developmentalism-oriented economy. Since 1980, the process 
of democratisation had created a privileged structure for the dominating 
principle of neo-liberalism as the democratic movement adopted 
privatisation in its fight against authoritarian rules (Chu, 2011; Tasi, 2010). 
In addition, the hegemony of neo-liberalism was strengthened after the 
former DPP government’s joining of the WTO. Within the evolution of this 
specific historical structuration, Tasi (2010, p.92) pointed out that the 
discourses of ‘respect of market mechanism’, ‘open economy’ and 
‘globalisation’ have become the common base of economic imaginaries for 
Taiwanese society to embrace the market-oriented regulations and 
advocate the internationalisation of the domestic market. The dominant 
imaginaries of ‘neo-liberalism’ promoted the discourse of ‘small 
government’ and ‘outsourcing to private contractors’, which were prevalent 
in Taiwan (Chu, 2011, p.279). Moreover, the strategic imaginaries of neo-
liberalism have been followed by the KMT government to fix the Asian 
financial crisis in 2008. According to the statistics, the GDP growth in 
Taiwan dropped considerably from 5.7 per cent in 2007 to 0.1 per cent in 
2008 (CEPD, 2009b). The growth figure in 2008 was lower than Hong 
Kong (2.5 per cent), South Korea (2.2 per cent) and Singapore (1.1 per 
cent), so the KMT government adopted further liberalisation and free-trade 
strategies in its economic policy.  
In this vein, Ma proposed ‘Love-Taiwan 12 Projects’ to revitalise the 
dynamism of Taiwan’s economic growth and intensify international 
                                            
32  The overview of Taiwan Academy is available form the official website 
(http://www.taiwanacademy.tw/article/index.php?sn=17). [Accessed 18 July 2015]. 
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competition by encouraging private participation and investment in public 
construction projects (CEPD, 2009a). The projects called for a total 
investment of 3.99 trillion NT dollars over the next eight years (2008-2016), 
with 2.65 trillion NT dollars of the total coming from the government and 
1.34 trillion NT dollars from the private sector. It included twelve prioritised 
public construction projects: (1) a fast and convenient island-wide 
transportation network; (2) Kaohsiung Free Trade Zone and Eco-Port; (3) 
Taichung Asia-Pacific Sea and Air Logistics Hub; (4) Taoyuan International 
Air City; (5) Intelligent Taiwan; (6) industrial innovation corridors; (7) urban 
and industrial zone renewal; (8) farm village regeneration; (9) coastal 
regeneration; (10) green forestation; (11) flood prevention and water 
management; and (12) sewer construction. In implementation, the 
Executive Yuan revised the legal strategies of ‘Act for Promotion of Private 
Participation in Infrastructure Projects’ to deregulate the restrictions and 
strengthen incentives for private participation (Executive Yuan, 2009b). 
Among the projects, the fifth project, ‘Intelligent Taiwan’ encompasses the 
establishment of CC Parks, the allocation of 10 billion NT dollars from the 
National Development Fund for start-up investment in enterprises related 
to CCIs, and a variety of incentives for cultural workers and enterprises to 
engage in international marketing and participate in international 
exhibitions (Executive Yuan, 2009b). These show the state adopting the 
market discourse of ‘investment’ with the dominant imaginaries of neo-
liberalism to plan the CCIP. This had led to profound implications on the 
discursive formation and structural configuration of industrialisation in 
cultural projects, which will be analysed in the following sections.  
In addition, with the resumption of cross-Strait talks, the KMT government 
pledged closer economic ties with China and planned to sign the 
‘Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement’ (hereafter ECFA) as the 
preferential trade framework for further liberalisation on bilateral trade. As a 
matter of fact, there had been significant growth in the direct bilateral trade 
since both China and Taiwan were admitted to the WTO in 2002, especially 
after the former DPP government twisted the trade policies with China from 
‘proactively liberalise, effectively manage’ (積 極 開 放 ， 有 效 管 理) to 
‘proactively manage, effectively liberalise’ (積極管理，有效開放). The 
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growth of trade flows increased from US$10.62 billion in 2000 to US$98.28 
billion in 2008 (Chow, 2011). In 2004, China replaced the United States as 
the largest export market for Taiwan. After Ma, Ying-Jeou took office in 
2008, a series of trade pacts and transportation connections across the 
Taiwan Strait were signed. The signing of the ECFA was a major economic 
proposal for Ma’s first term, but it caused controversy (Fuller, 2014; Chow, 
2011). 
Under the dominant economic imaginaries of neo-liberalism, the ECFA is a 
precedent of a free trade agreement within the foundation of the WTO, 
which aims to reduce tariffs and commercial cross-Strait barriers. The KMT 
government expected that economic integration with Mainland China 
would benefit Taiwan's economy and also help establish free trade deals 
with other countries. Therefore, the ECFA can be seen as a strategic fix for 
the KMT government to break through the cross-Strait stalemate and 
Taiwan’s international isolation. However, the DPP and other civil groups 
worried that economic integration would sacrifice Taiwan’s sovereignty and 
vulnerable industries. Therefore, they held a number of large-scale 
demonstrations to protest the negotiations. The conflicts and controversies 
led to a television debate between President Ma and the chairperson of the 
DPP, Tsai, Ing-Wen (蔡英文).  
According to the transcript of the debate (about fish, 2010), Ma advocated 
the discourse of opportunities to emphasise the advantages of the ECFA. 
He focused on two aspects: firstly, the ECFA would leverage Taiwan’s 
export-oriented economy due to the tariff reduction and the legalisation of 
investment and cross-Strait regulation and thus attract foreign investment 
and reduce the unemployment in Taiwan; and secondly, the ECFA would 
seize Taiwan’s global competitiveness from being marginalised in East 
Asian economic integration, since other countries had, or were going soon 
to have, trade agreements with China or other regional groups such as the 
Association of South East Asian Nations. This would lead Taiwan to sign 
multiple free trade agreements with other countries. Nevertheless, Tsai 
adopted the contested discourses of threats, to stress the disadvantages 
of the ECFA, such as the impact on unemployment and economic 
inequality due to liberalisation. She raised sceptical concerns about 
- 167 - 
China’s political intention behind the economic agreement and criticised 
the ECFA as being sugar-coated, such that it might damage Taiwan’s 
sovereignty. As a result, the DPP and other small political parties called for 
a national referendum on the ECFA. 
However, the proposal of a referendum was rejected by the committee. 
The ECFA pact was eventually passed and signed in 2010 as the KMT 
held an overwhelming legislative majority. The ECFA includes three parts: 
(1) normalisation of cross-Strait trade flows under the WTO; (2) preferential 
trade arrangements with an ‘early harvest’ list of 539 commodities of 
Taiwan’s export to, and 267 commodities of import from, China; and (3) 
coordination/cooperation of industries and division of labour (Chow, 2011, 
p.185). Furthermore, the ECFA functionises a framework for further major 
economic negotiations: merchandise trade, investment protection, service 
trade, and trade dispute settlement. Since then, the relations between 
Beijing and Taipei have improved markedly. 
In summary, the KMT government had shaped the distinct political 
imaginaries and economic imaginaries since 2008. On the one hand, they 
tried to re-impose the discourse of ROC to link with Taiwanese identity and 
seized the hegemony of the ‘1992 Consensus’. On the other hand, they 
promoted economic integration with China under the dominant framework 
of neo-liberalism. As a result, they strategically reduced the tension across 
the Taiwan Strait and stabilised economic integration with China, which 
created a specific political-economic structure, as Fell and Chen (2014) 
suggest, where China has been the major policy concern for Taiwan’s 
ruling parties. However, KMT’s policy discourses and strategies received 
widespread criticism. They not only caused a resurgence of social 
movements but also stimulated the contested discourses from the 
opposition parties and civil society. More particularly, the celebration of 
ROC’s centennial in 2011 led to a series of cultural controversies and set 
another discursive-practical condition of industrialisation, which will be 
elaborated in the following sections.  
 
- 168 - 
6.2 The Resurgence of Social Movement and Civil 
Discourses 
As analysed in Chapter 5, the emerging discourse of ‘civil society’ provided 
alternative and imaginative partnership relations between state and society 
during the DPP government. It has been known that the civil groups took 
strategic alliance with the opposition DPP to resist the authoritarian KMT in 
the 1990s, then many social activists were recruited into policy-making 
circles to pursue social reforms within the institutional structure under the 
DPP government (Hsiao and Ku, 2010; Ho, 2010). The increasing 
involvement of the activist movements brought about legislative successes 
in the initial stage, such as the passing of the ‘Gender Equality in 
Employment Act’ (2002), ‘Employment Insurance Act’ (2002) and ‘Basic 
Environment Act’ (2002) as well as the establishment of new institutions 
such as the Human Rights Consultative Commission (2000).  
Although the partnership resulted in some significant achievements, most 
of the social reforms promoted by the activist movements and civil society 
were unable to leverage further structural changes during the DPP 
government from 2000 to 2008 (Ho and Lin, 2011; Ho, 2010; Hsiao and 
Ku, 2010). On the one hand, the pan-KMT camp still dominated the 
Legislative Yuan, which resulted in an antagonistic political climate where 
reform issues became politicised and thus limited the mobilisation of civil 
groups and the impacts of social movements to formulate further reform 
policy (Fell, 2012; Hsiao and Ku, 2010). On the other hand, the DPP 
government had not consistently committed the reform promises as 
President Chen had put economic growth as his top priority and ignored 
civil groups’ policy proposals. In order to fix the economic recession in 
2001, the Chen administration adopted neo-liberalist strategies and 
promoted privatisation policy. As Ho (2010) argues, Chen’s pledge to  
‘salvage the economy’ (拼經濟) overrode the reform commitments of 
welfare redistribution and led to internal conflicts in the incorporation 
partnership. In addition, the financial scandals of Chen and his family 
caused several mass demonstrations to demand Chen’s resignation in his 
last two years in power. In this way, many social activists felt frustrated at 
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the institutional reform with a loss of trust between the partnership of civil 
society and the state (Ho, 2010; Hsiao and Ku, 2010).   
The tensions and conflicts increased in the relationship between civil 
society and the state with the return to KMT rule. Since the KMT won the 
presidential election, taking nearly three-quarters of the seats in the 
Legislative Yuan in 2008, the KMT government reverted to its previous 
conservative-orientated ideologies and pro-business policy. This shrank 
the institutional access for liberal-minded social activists to participate in 
governmental committees and policy-making circles (Hsiao and Ku, 2010; 
Fell, 2012; Ho, 2014b). Ho (2014b) and Fell (2012) point out that a more 
aggressive economic growth philosophy prevailed, clearly signalling that 
the proposals of labour activists and environmentalists were no longer 
welcome in governing circles. Moreover, Ma’s resumption of cross-Strait 
talks and the signing of an agreement without transparent mechanisms, 
raised concerns from the opposition and civil groups. They accused Ma’s 
cross-Strait economic policy of hurting Taiwan’s sovereignty and damaging 
local small-medium scale industries.  
The switch to a conservative agenda and China’s market alarmed activists 
and stimulated the revival of social movements. Due to the previous 
frustrating partnership with the DPP government, most of them kept a 
cautious stance on an alliance with the DPP to develop their autonomous 
strategies and independent discourses. The discursive strategies of social 
movements and the practice of large-scale demonstrations not only 
presented the discontented rhetoric of civil society but also generated 
influential civil discourses to negotiate with the state and the business 
sector in order to affect the direction of policy. With the resurgence of 
social movements, civil discourses have played a critical role in the 
evolution of hegemonic struggle. Some of the selected civil discourses with 
strategic practice seized the hegemony in the discursive-material struggle 
and gradually transformed the social norms and social values from 
economic development to environmental justice. For example, Tu, Wen-Lin 
and Chiu, Hua-Mei (2010) argue that the participants of environmental 
movements come from diverse backgrounds that extend the links with 
local and global environmental groups to generate resistant discourses 
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against the dominant state discourse which focuses on the economic 
benefit of Science Parks.  
Apart from the environmental groups and local residents, other 
intellectuals, lawyers and students were engaged with anti-pollution 
movements of Science Parks and proposed critical discourses, which 
demand to put the environmental issues within the process of capital 
accumulation in high-tech industries. Other movements showed a similar 
pattern of strategic alliance and selected discourses. For instance, Ho 
(2014b) analysed the resurgence of social movements under the Ma 
government and found that a common thematic discourse of ‘justice’ 
emerged and was shared by many social movements such as ‘land justice’ 
of farmers’ movements against the government’s compulsory land 
purchase programme, and ‘generational justice’ of labour movements 
highlighting the corporate domination and bankrupt social insurance. 
These movements of activists exploited new technology, independent 
media and social media to disseminate their diverse arguments widely and 
mobilise the general public to protest or compete against state or market 
discourses. In addition, many cultural workers progressively engaged in 
social movements and took creative and relatively soft strategies to 
support civil discourses. For example, Wu, Cheng (吳晟), the renowned 
poet, conducted a series of cultural actions with arts workers including 
hundreds of singers, writers, dancers and theatre workers to oppose the 
Kuo-Kuang Petrochemical Project 33  (Chou, 2012). The movement in 
accordance with arts action filled with poetry and music enriched the 
movement’s discourses and drew the public’s concern to participate in 
demonstrations, which finally forced the Ma government to abandon the 
project (Chou, 2012; Ho, 2012a). Ho (2012a) argues that one of the 
influential elements of the civil discourse is the discourse of ‘citizen’ with 
altruism beyond politically partisan calculation. In other words, highlighting 
                                            
33 The project was recognised by the DPP government to fix the local economic decline in 
Yunlin County since 2005. It was a public-private joint venture and located in a large-scale 
wetland thus caused local protests. It was suspended since then as it could not pass the 
environmental impact assessment. In 2008, the Kuo-Kuang investors decided to relocate 
the project to Changhua Country, which was perceived to be a favourable environment 
provided by the local KMT government (Ho, 2012a). 
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‘citizen’ through these cultural links and arts actions preformed in the 
movements exerts leverage to empower their civil discourses to counter 
dominant state discourses and market discourses. This not only deepens 
the autonomy of civil society but also enhances the transformative 
influence of civil discourse in the discursive struggle. 
During the dialectical process of discursive struggle, two main 
developments of civil society and social movements were engaged in the 
articulation between civil discourse and structuration, which created the 
conditions and leverage for civil discourse of industrialisation in cultural 
policy. 
The first development resulted from the negative reflections of the 
economic integration with China. When the Ma government aggressively 
reassumed a series of cross-Strait consultations, it faced tough and 
complex challenges from civil society. Some of them argued that the talks 
and economic integration were moving too fast and might damage 
Taiwan’s sovereignty (Ho, 2012a). They therefore raised protests against 
China’s visiting representative Chen, Yun-Lin in November 2008. The 
demonstrations received excessive policing and provoked a student-led 
mobilisation called the ‘Wild Strawberry movement’34. They condemned 
police violence and demanded the liberalisation of the Parade and 
Assembly Law35 . Their discursive tactics included a sit-in at Freedom 
Square and the online broadcasting of their protests. In order to spread 
their appeals and discourses, they employed digital technology to upload 
the relevant clips and news, and used social media to mobilise participants’ 
activities (Hsiao, 2011). This soon gained feedback from other universities 
and their protests sprang up quickly around Taiwan as well as Kaohsiung, 
Tainan, Taichung, Changhua, Hsinchu and Chiayi. Hundreds of cultural 
                                            
34 The name ‘Wild Strawbery’ has two meanings (Hsiao, 2011). On the one hand, it recalls 
the ‘Wild Lily’ student movement of 1990, which led to vast political reforms and Taiwan's 
first general democratic election. On the other hand, the word ‘Strawberry’ makes ironic 
use of the term ‘strawberry generation’, a description of Taiwan's youth, employed 
pejoratively by their elders to portray the newest generation as soft, lacking strength of 
character and political convictions. 
35 For more detail about the Wild Strawberries see the official website:  
http://action1106.blogspot.co.uk/2008/11/protest-statement.html and English blog: 
http://taiwanstudentmovement2008.blogspot.co.uk/. [accessed 10 June 2015]. 
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workers supported the movement to defend freedom of expression and 
assembly. The campaign instigated the resurgence of social movements 
and sparked further debates about the economic integration with China 
and freedom of speech. For example, other movements such as labour 
movements, farmers’ movements, environmental movements, anti-nuclear 
demonstrations, consumers’ movements, judicial reforms and cultural 
movements showed similar rejuvenation and adopted technology to 
generate their discourses to struggle with the dominant state discourses.  
The second development is the ‘China factor’, one of the typical cases of 
which was the ‘Anti-media Monopoly Movement’ of 2011. The ‘China factor’ 
was proposed by Wu, Jieh-Min to describe the leverage mechanism 
worked by China’s government and its collaborators such as businessmen 
and media groups to influence Taiwan’s democracy, direction of policy, 
media and public opinion (Wu, 2009). It was soon acknowledged by the 
Taiwanese academic world and consistently used in the media and public 
discourse in Taiwan. For instance, Ho (2014a) argues that Taiwanese 
social movements have been forced to respond to the China factor after 
the KMT regained power.  
In the context of the ‘Anti-media Monopoly Movement’, the ‘China factor’ 
refers not only to the Chinese government but specifically to Taiwanese 
businesspeople with economic interests in Mainland China, so that it has 
become a major issue of anti-China interference (Rawnsley and Feng, 
2014, p.108; Chou, 2013). For example, since Want Want Holdings 
Limited, one of the largest food manufacturing companies in Asia, took 
over China Times Media Group36 in 2008, the editorial line of the China 
Times has been skewed in favour of China’s state corporatism and aligned 
with KMT’s cross-Strait policy37 (Chen, 2013). In addition, Tsai, Eng-Ming 
(蔡衍明), the head of Want Want China Times Group, often imposed his 
                                            
36 The China Times was founded in 1950 in Taipei and used to be one of the major 
newspapers famous for its liberal stance. In 2008, it was sold to a pro-China Taiwanese 
business tycoon Tsai, Eng-Ming, the head of Want Want Holdings Limited. 
37 Want Want Holding’s internal newsletter reported that after Tsai acquired the China Times 
Group in 2008, he met with Wang, Yi, PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office Minister, and elucidated 
that the goal of his procurement of the China Times Group was “to use the power of the 
media to further cross-Strait relations” (Chen 2013). 
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pro-China rhetoric and political stance in his media, which raised questions 
about media ownership and the impact of media freedom in Taiwan 
(Rawnsley and Feng, 2014; Harrison, 2012; Chen, 2013). In 2011, the 
Want Want China Times Group expressed its intention to buy out China 
Network Systems, the second-largest cable TV provider in Taiwan. This 
merger would potentially allow the group to occupy one-third of the overall 
media market. Consequently, the Anti-Media Monster Youth Alliance in 
association with the Association of Taiwan Journalists and a range of other 
civil and media reform groups organised diverse campaigns to urge the 
National Communications Commission to oppose the merging scheme and 
raise public awareness of the negative impact of a media monopoly.  
The movement constantly evolved and responded to unfolding events 
through multi-dimensional discourses and strategies. They organised 
petitions, demonstrations, as well as using global social networking 
activities. For example, an ‘Anti-media Monopoly Demonstration’ was held 
on Journalist Day (1st September) in 2012, which drew nearly a hundred 
civil groups and more than ten thousand citizens to Taipei (Chen, 2013). 
Moreover, lots of professors from seventeen universities offered free 
classes for three weeks to students and the public interested in learning 
about the implications of a media monopoly and the meaning of a diverse 
media environment (Chen, 2013). The activists also launched an outreach 
project in the form of a truck tour in 2012, called ‘On the truck through 
Taiwan, Unite Everyone’, travelling around Taiwan to advocate their claims 
to the local public and make connections with local civil groups. They stood 
in front of train stations, night markets and temples using megaphones to 
explain the dangers of a media monopoly and the deteriorating quality of 
democracy in Taiwan.  
In addition, the campaigners began using social media to spread the 
issues worldwide. They launched a campaign called ‘What’s Next?’ on their 
official Facebook page and invited participants to download a PDF 
document with the text ‘Oppose media monopoly. Reject the black hand of 
China. Safeguard freedom of the press. I protect Taiwan in ___’ (‘反對媒體
壟斷、拒絕中國黑手、捍衛新聞自由、我在___守護台灣’), encouraging 
people to write their location in the blank space provided, photograph 
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themselves holding it and upload the photo to the Facebook page 
(Harrison, 2012). As a result, the interrelated discourse of ‘anti-media 
monopoly, anti-China interference and safeguarding press freedom’ was 
supported by a great deal of people in Taiwan and overseas, and further 
raised questions over the KMT government’s economic cross-Strait 
integration (Rawnsley, 2013).  
With the outreach alliance and the legislative pledge from the civil society, 
the National Communications Commission released a draft of the 
Broadcasting Media Monopolisation Prevention and Diversity Preservation 
Act (also known as the ‘Media Anti-Monopolisation Act’) in 2013 and then 
resolved that the merger scheme was disqualified because the Want Want 
China Times Group did not fulfil the required conditions (Shan, 2013). 
In summary, the resurgence of social movements, particularly the ‘Wild 
Strawberries Movement’ and ‘Anti-Media Monopoly Movement’, have 
generated influential civil discourses and strategies in response to the 
discourse of the ‘China factor’ as well as challenging the KMT 
government’s privileged economic imaginaries that the economic 
integration with China would benefit the whole society. The complex 
political, economic and social situation set specific conditions for the state 
to adjust the relevant New Hometown CEP and CCIP, which not only 
changed the policy meaning of industrialisation but also aroused civil 
society’s disagreement. These discursive-practical debates will be 
analysed in the next section. 
 
6.3 The Semiotic Struggle of Industrialisation  
The previous sections show how the KMT government attempted to rebuild 
ROC-themed political imaginaries and promote ECFA-framed economic 
imaginaries since they retook power in 2008. Within these semiotic frames, 
the KMT government proactively imposed these imaginaries into the 
second stage of the CCIP. Accordingly, ‘Creative Taiwan – Development 
Programme of Cultural and Creative Industries (2009-2013)’ (hereafter 
Creative Taiwan) was initiated in 2009 and the ‘Law for the Development of 
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Cultural and Creative Industries’  (hereafter CCIs Law) was passed in 
2010.  
However, both ‘Creative Taiwan’ and the ‘CCIs Law’ were accused by the 
cultural sector and civil groups of showing that the state was in favour of 
the market mechanism and over-commercialisation, and this caused 
debate. The discursive struggles of industrialisation between the state and 
civil society are analysed in the first and the second part of this section. 
The third part focuses on an influential semiotic struggle of industrialisation 
that resulted from the ROC’s centennial event – ‘Dreamers’. It uncovers a 
series of protests and cultural movements to ask the CCA to reform 
cultural policy and the strategies of the CCIs. The relevant discursive-
practical struggle will be conducted in the second part.  
In response to these debates, the new Ministry of Culture (MOC) which 
replaced the CCA and was established in 2012 proposed a new direction 
for cultural policy and identified economic imaginaries of industrialisation. 
The fourth part will discuss the continuity and changes of the CCIP and the 
semiotic struggle between the state and civil society.  
 
6.3.1 ‘Creative Taiwan’  
Since the KMT government regained power, the state initiated a series of 
governmental mechanisms, including forums, cabinet meetings, project-
settings and law-making to develop the second stage of the CCIP. 
In spring 2009, the Office of the President held the sixteen meetings and 
six roundtable forums of the CCIs. The participants came from the 
government sector, industrial sector, cultural sector and academic sector 
and were divided into several industrial groups to discuss the difficulties 
and propose suggestions. The final report states that “the CCI is ‘the fourth 
wave’ of economic initiative that succeeded the third wave - information 
industries” (Yang, 2009, p.290). On top of this, the state positioned the 
CCIs as one of the ‘six emerging industries’ in a cabinet meeting about ‘the 
current overall economic situation and the countermeasures’ and claimed 
the government should input further resources into the CCIs to extend the 
scale, increase the industrial profit and attract private investment 
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(Executive Yuan, 2009a).  The CCA was assigned to be the leading 
department and collaborated with the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the 
Government Information Office to propose ‘Creative Taiwan’. The project 
regulated the state’s funding scheme of the CCIs in favour of market 
discourse which involved wider private investment. These meetings and 
their development reveal that the KMT government not only viewed the 
CCIs as a strategic fix to deal with the 2008 financial crisis, but also show 
that market discourse has seized the hegemony in the semiotic practice of 
industrialisation.  
Based on the meetings and forums, ‘Creative Taiwan’ was expected to 
“develop the Grand Chinese market and create Taiwan as the hub of 
cultural and creative industries in the Asia-Pacific region” (Executive Yuan, 
2009a, p.11). In order to achieve this goal, the CCA developed two major 
strategies: environmental readiness and flagship projects. 
According to the plan, ‘environmental readiness’ was designed to develop 
an industry-friendly environment for CCI development with a commitment 
to five major executive measures (CCA, 2010c, pp.24-67): 
(1) Diverse capital apportionment. In one way this provides subsidies to 
innovation projects and micro-enterprises including talented individuals 
and small studios. In another way, it establishes schemes of venture 
capital and investment. The schemes aim to attract big corporations to 
co-invest in CCIs with the National Development Fund.     
(2) Industrial research, development and guidance. This includes research, 
surveys, and data analysis. By setting up a one-stop service centre, it 
aims to provide advice and guidance to CCIs.   
(3) Market circulation and development of international markets. This 
measure aims to integrate resources to develop Chinese and overseas 
markets. In addition to organising an international expo of CCIs in 
Taiwan, the CCA assists the industrial sector to participate in the CCI 
expo in major Chinese cities and build cross-Strait cooperation 
mechanisms.  
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(4) Talent cultivation and matching mechanisms. This focuses on talented 
and young artists, the promotion of visual and digital arts, and the 
development of intermediary schemes.  
(5) Maximise cluster effects. This measure takes a cluster perspective to 
link the five CC Parks (Huashan, Taichung, Chiayi, Tainan and Hualien) 
with the city development, regional industries and tourist resources. 
The CCA identified that the CC Parks serve as the catalyst for the 
region to develop culture and economy, and the functions of CC Parks 
are expected to implement state project ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’ though the involvement of private resource 
and creativity to regenerate public assets.  
With regard to the strategy of ‘flagship projects’, the Executive Yuan 
selected six industries with the most economic potential as flagship 
projects, which are the television industry, film industry, popular music 
industry, digital content industry, design industry and craft industry. By 
definition, the flagship industries are more mature, hold greater profiting 
potential, and have a wider range of industrial effects (Executive Yuan, 
2009a). According to the project, the former Governmental Information 
Office was responsible for the media industries including the television 
industry, film industry and popular music industry; the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs was in charge of the digital content industry, design industry; and 
the CCA took charge of the craft industry. These flagship projects were 
given specific funding (about 200 million NT dollars) and resources to play 
a leading role in exploring Chinese and overseas markets.   
The above content of ‘Creative Taiwan’ shows two noticeable discursive 
variations, selection and retention of industrialisation. First, ‘Taiwan’s 
subjectivity’ or ‘Taiwanese identity’ which was encompassed in the DPP’s 
version of industrialisation was not emphasised in ‘Creative Taiwan’. 
Instead, the industrialisation of the KMT’s version pursued the profit of the 
Chinese market by encouraging cross-Strait cooperation. For instance, the 
flagship projects of the three media industries aimed to develop the 
Chinese market, so the Governmental Information Office’s tactics gave 
priority to co-production with China’s industries (Governmental Information 
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Office, 2009). Secondly, market discourse seized the hegemony in the 
meaning-making of industrialisation. It is evident that the two major 
strategies highlighted the establishment of market mechanisms. For 
example, ‘venture capital’ was selected as the privileged strategy to foster 
the CCIs. Specifically, the discourse of ‘co-investment’ was used to 
encourage partnership between public and private sectors in the flagship 
projects.  
 
6.3.2 ‘Law for the Development of Cultural and Creative 
Industries’ 
Apart from ‘Creative Taiwan’, the KMT government drew up the ‘CCIs Law’, 
laying the legal basis and framework for CCI development. However, 
several issues arose during the hearing sessions and roundtable 
discussions.  
Since the ‘CCIs Law’ was originally drawn up by the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs in 2003, the previous draft was bounded by a manufacturing and 
high-tech mindset. The previous draft paid much attention to land usage 
and CC Parks’ clustering effect which were the privileged instruments in 
the economic sector. However, these imaginaries led to criticism from 
entrepreneurs in the CCIs. In a roundtable forum called ‘Cultural Policy? 
Industrial Policy? The Questions of the CCIs Law’38, Hsu, Li-Ling (徐莉玲), 
the chief executive officer of the ‘Xue Xue Institute’ (學學文創志業) which 
was founded in 2005 in Taipei and has a business focus on education, 
research and exhibition of the CCIs, criticised that nearly twenty per cent of 
content of the ‘CCIs Law’ was related to land development and how to 
exploit CC Parks. She argued that the draft overlooked state discourse 
about why to develop the CCIs, how to protect originality and respect 
creativity, and the supporting mechanism for cross-section integration39. A 
similar critique was discussed in the hearing sessions and media coverage 
                                            
38 The forum was held by the Taiwanese Foundation in Taipei on 18 September 2008.  
39 The full text of the forum was not published. The script of Hsu, Li-Ling was released in a 
personal blog called ‘Culture Creative Industries’ on 16 October 2008. [Online]. [Accessed 
18 June 2015]. Available from: http://ppt.cc/WvkyH 
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(Jiang, 2009; Han, 2009). For instance, Jiang (2009) argues that the object 
of the ‘CCIs Law’ was investors and big enterprises rather than creative 
workers, and the goals of the CCIs are investment for profit rather than to 
enrich society’s vitality. Moreover, she criticises the state’s attempt to 
create economic imaginaries for the people by using rhetoric such as 
‘Science Parks’ and ‘more production equals more employment 
opportunities’. 
Under mass pressure from civil society, the KMT government assigned the 
CCA to revise the draft ‘CCIs Law’. The CCA’s final version deleted the 
majority of controversies related to land use but maintained the 
governmental support for CC clusters. The ‘CCIs Law’ was promulgated in 
February 2010, including four chapters regulating the defining categories, 
the scheme of assistance, reward and subsidy and tax incentives. Here 
they use the term ‘cultural and creative villages’ to refer to the wider 
definition beyond the CC Parks. Act 25 of the CC law, as stated below, 
shows the emphasis on the core creative and independent workers as well 
as cultural and creative enterprises (CCA, 2010a).  
(Act 25) The Government shall support the establishment 
of cultural and creative villages, and shall as a priority assist core 
creative and independent workers to situate in the said villages. The 
Government shall, through the clustering effect by involving different 
groups, further promote the development of Cultural and Creative 
Enterprises.   
Through the discursive-strategic debate between market discourse and 
civil discourse, the role of ‘citizen’ is put into the context of ‘CCIs Law’. This 
is evident in Act 2 which indicates the principles of the CCIs and Act 3 
which identifies the definition and categories (CCA, 2010a).   
 (Act 2) To promote the Cultural and Creative Industries, the Government 
shall strengthen artistic creation and cultural preservation, reinforce the 
combination of culture and technology, emphasise a balance of 
development between cities, counties and regions, value local 
characteristics, elevate the citizens’ capacity for cultural appreciation, 
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and enhance the popularity of cultural art so as to comply with the 
international trends. 
(Act 3) The ‘Cultural and Creative Industries’ referred to in this Act 
means the following industries that originate from creativity or 
accumulation of culture which through the formation and application of 
intellectual properties, possess potential capacities to create wealth and 
job opportunities, enhance the citizens’ capacity for arts, and elevate the 
citizens’ living environment. 
In addition, compared with the definition given in the 2004 Cultural Policy 
White Paper which states the CCIs aim is to “promote upgrading of the 
overall living environment”, and the definition in ‘CCIs Law’ states that CCI 
“enhances the citizens’ capacity for arts, and elevates the citizens’ living 
environment” (CCA, 2004a, p.126). This reveals the concept of ‘citizen’ has 
been widely acknowledged and identified in ‘CCIs Law’. 
Whilst the state privileges market discourse to make the meaning of 
industrialisation and develop CCIs, civil actors can leverage their civil 
discourse through the name of ‘citizen’ in the semiotic struggle. One of the 
prominent cases is the dispute surrounding ‘Dreamers’, which will be 
analysed in the next section. 
  
6.3.3 The Dispute about ‘Dreamers’  
‘Dreamers’ was a grand-scale musical organised by the CCA on the 10th 
and 11th of October 2011 as a centennial ceremony for the Republic of 
China40. However, it soon caused a series of controversies about the 
adequacy of funding and further debates about industrialisation and overall 
cultural policy. The civil discourse generated by the dispute not only 
challenged KMT’s political imaginaries of ROC but sparked a storm of 
debate about cultural policy and industrialisation.  
                                            
40 It can be watched on youtube via the following links :  
  part 1(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=250RmLcef7o); 
  part 2(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qt0q5m2Sg7U). [Accessed 5 June 2015] 
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‘Dreamers’ was written and directed by Lai, Sheng-Chuan (賴聲川) and the 
main project was conducted by his team the ‘Performance Workshop’ (表
演工作坊), which is one of the important theatrical troupes and has 
produced more than fifty dramas since 1984. The storyline highlighted the 
people who, in 1911, were devoted to establishing the Republic of China in 
concert with a young person in 2011, pursuing his dream. The music was 
produced at an unprecedentedly high expense of 215 million NT dollars 
(about 4.5 million pounds), which in itself received harsh criticism from the 
artistic community and intellectuals. Most of them not only took an 
aesthetic perspective to critique that ‘Dreamers’ is insufficient in dramatic 
form and content, but also criticised the misallocation of state funding (Lin, 
2011; Hung, 2011; Chi, 2011; Tseng, 2011). For example, Tseng, Dau-
hsiong (曾道雄), an opera baritone and a winner of the 2011 National 
Award for Arts, described the cost of Dreamers as “terrifying” and asked 
the government to examine the funding mechanism (Tseng, 2011).  
Moreover, Yan, Hung-ya (Hung-Hung, 鴻鴻), a playwright and director of 
the ‘Dark Eyes Performance Lab’, pointed to the inadequacy and inequality 
of arts and humanities funding and said that the expense of government 
events, such as the Deaflympics in 2009, Flora Expo in 2010 and 
Dreamers in 2011, had squeezed out routine cultural events and general 
subsidies (Shih and Chang, 2011).  
Another influential discourse on ‘Dreamers’ focused on the political 
imaginaries of ROC. They criticised political intervention in arts that makes 
culture an instrument of political propaganda and a policy advertisement 
(Chi, 2011; Chen, 2011; Hung, 2011). One of the most powerful criticisms 
was made by Hung-Hung’s article, entitled ‘There is no art but politics, no 
Taiwan but ROC’ (Hung, 2011) which followed similar arguments to 
criticise the government for seriously contaminating the performing arts 
and the state’s intention to shape the imagined nation of ROC.  
The critiques surrounding ‘Dreamers’ thereafter surged to a cultural 
movement. A group of cultural activists and arts workers established the 
‘Preparatory Office for Cultural Age Foundation’ (hereafter Cultural Age) 
and organised a public petition in November 2011, entitled ‘End the 
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Centennial Fireworks and Begin the Cultural Age’ (終結百年煙火，開啟文
化元年), calling for sweeping reforms of cultural policy. Apart from asking 
for the resignation of the CCA’s chairman, the demands of the campaign 
included an end to the politicisation and commercialisation of cultural 
activities, and an increase in the cultural budget to 4 per cent of annual 
government expenditure from its current level of 1.3 per cent as per Ma’s 
election manifesto (Taipei Times, 2011). Under great pressure, the 
chairperson of the CCA stepped down. Activists of Cultural Age organised 
a welcome party in terms of ‘let the power of cultural imaginaries carry on’ 
(讓文化想像的權力繼續抗爭) for the new chairperson with diverse cultural 
activities. Furthermore, they took advantage of the presidential election to 
call on the three main candidates: Ma, Ying-Jeou who was the incumbent 
President and the candidate of the KMT, Tsai, Ing-Wen who was the 
chairperson of DDP, and James Soong who was the chairperson of People 
First Party, to debate cultural policy and development strategies. This was 
the first time that presidential candidates participated in open questioning 
solely on the issues of cultural policy in Taiwan. The Cultural Age collected 
questions from civil society and broadcast to the general public live on air 
and online on the Taiwan Public Television Service. The questions covered 
culture and economic development, CCIs, CC Parks, language and 
culture, arts education, public broadcasting, cultural diplomacy, culture and 
politics, the loss of talent, job security of cultural workers, and the cultural 
budget. In other words, ‘Dreamers’ can be seen as the last straw that 
provoked a series of protests and debates about cultural policy and CCIP.  
Through the live broadcast, these questions were exposed to the general 
public and drew further discussions on the industrialisation of the CCIs. 
The civil groups questioned the state about three themes of cultural policy: 
cultural citizenship, the CCIs-oriented cultural policy, and the privatisation 
model of the CC Parks (Wang, 2012). The discussions and reflexivity of 
these themes extended to the establishment of the Ministry of Culture 
(MOC), which is the focus of the next section.  
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6.3.4 The Establishment of the Ministry of Culture 
In May 2012, Ma, Ying-Jeou continued his second term, and the CCA was 
upgraded to the Ministry of Culture (MOC) as part of a larger governmental 
reorganisation. With the introduction of the new institution and the 
announcement of new objectives of cultural policy, the call for reform of 
cultural policy from ‘Cultural Age’ and civil society continued and 
accompanied the semiotic struggle of industrialisation. 
The Ministry of Culture mainly encompassed the CCA as well as the 
Government Information Office and its subsidiary media industries 
including film, broadcasting and television, popular music, and the 
publishing industry. These media industries had been invisible in the 
context of cultural policy in the past, but are now viewed as strong cultural 
and creative industries. In response to the integration, the MOC 
reorganised the departments and created new departments including the 
Department of Cultural and Creative Development, the Department of 
Audio-visual and Music Industry Development, and the Bureau of Audio-
visual and Music Industry Development. These new departments all 
related to CCIs, which raised doubt and criticism about the MOC’s 
overemphasis on industrial development in cultural policy. For instance, 
Han, Bao-De (2012), the renowned architect, curator and educator, 
criticised the core values of cultural policy claiming that the MOC was the 
Ministry of Cultural and Creative Industries in substance.  
Apart from this, the Minister of the MOC, Lung, Ying-Tai, proposed four 
new policy objectives: soilisation (the grass roots approach) (泥土化), 
internationalisation (國際化), value-enhancing industrialisation (產值化), 
and cloudisation (雲端化). The four objectives serve as guidelines of 
cultural policy (see Table 6.1) as well as a response to the civil discourse 
on the thorough reform of cultural policy. It is worth noting the variation and 
selection of the discourse in ‘soilisation’ and ‘value-enhancing 
industrialisation’. The MOC used the discourse of ‘soilisation’ to highlight 
citizens’ cultural citizenship and reclaim the importance of community 
empowerment projects which had been overlooked in Ma’s first term (see 
section 6.4). In this sense, the term ‘localisation’, which was commonly 
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used in the previous cultural policy (see Chapter 4) and can be translated 
as ‘Taiwanisation’, was replaced by a relatively neutral discourse of 
‘soilisation’. Moreover, the ‘New Hometown Project’ which implied DPP’s 
political imaginaries of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’ was shifted to the ‘7835 
Villages Project’ although the contents of both are highly correlated. 
Furthermore, the MOC created the discourse of ‘value-enhancing 
industrialisation’ to put the focus of industrialisation onto value-added or 
value-enhancing applications (MOC, 2013c).  
 
Table	6.	1	: The objectives of cultural policy, 2012-2014 	
Objective Meaning Policy 
Soilisation  To ensure that every 
village and township 
in this nation, 
regardless of its 
geographic 
remoteness, has an 
equal chance to 
achieve its full 
cultural potential. 
Grassroots policies: to assist 
communities in remote areas by 
creating a vibrant cultural and 
creative environment tailored to 
their needs. By evenly distributing 
financial and educational resources 
among cities, villages and offshore 
settlements, the Ministry hopes to 
secure equal cultural rights for 
every citizen in the nation’s 7,835 
registered communities. 
Internationalisation To contribute to the 
nation’s soft power 
by promoting 
Taiwan’s unique 
blend of modern and 
traditional cultures on 
the international 
stage.  
International promotion policies: 
to create more opportunities for 
Taiwan-based artists and groups to 
showcase their works to a global 
audience. By offering consultations 
and sponsorships as well as 
tapping into overseas networks, the 
Ministry hopes to continue 
nurturing Taiwan’s growing cultural 
influence in the international 
sphere. 
Value-enhancing 
industrialisation  
To enhance the 
overall output and 
value of the nation’s 
cultural and creative 
sectors. 
Value-enhancing policies: to help 
derive new products from a 
singular creative idea. From 
bringing a comic book to the silver 
screen to creating an array of 
keepsakes based on a celebrated 
cultural tradition, the Ministry hopes 
such culture-derived products will 
help inspire more creative workers 
to think outside the box. 
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Cloudisation 
(digitalisation) 
To offer the nation’s 
citizens equal 
accessibility to 
cultural resources by 
harnessing the power 
of cloud computing. 
E-culture policies: to offer more 
cultural services, educational 
information and interactive 
gateways via the Web. From 
establishing online databases of 
museum archives and gallery 
collections to preserving the 
nation’s heritage and memories in 
digital form, the Ministry hopes to 
erase the digital divide and help 
disseminate cultural resources to 
every household through the truly 
borderless Internet.  
Source: Ministry of Culture; http://english.moc.gov.tw/article/index.php?sn=239.  
(Accessed on 21 January 2015) 
Furthermore, some researchers argue that the MOC overlooked the 
conflicts between ‘soilisation’ and ‘value-enhancing industrialisation’, and 
the CCIs-related projects put particular stress on industries rather than 
citizens (Jiang and Jheng, 2012; Liu, 2012). For example, Jerry Liu, a 
scholar and a consulting member of the ‘Special Unit for the Drafting of 
Culture Basic Law’, shared his reflections on cultural policy and proposed 
questions one month after the establishment of the MOC on his personal 
Facebook page. He analysed the four objectivess and claimed they would 
only be beautiful slogans if the state did not develop a discursive 
framework to converge the overall national cultural policy (Liu, 2012). He 
also argued the state should explain “how the subjectivity of arts and 
culture can present in the discourse of value-enhancing industrialisation”; 
“what the core thought of cultural subsidy and investment is”; and “what 
the state’s stance on the free trade of cultural products and service is” (Liu, 
2012). His article was shared seventy times within three days. 
In response to the questions, the MOC held a series of ‘Cultural Forums’ 
from June to August 2012. There were nine forums with the themes of 
CCIP, independent publishing, public broadcast media, subsidy scheme of 
the film industry, international links of the video and music industries, 
fostering strategies of cultural and art teams, the 7835 villages project, 
reviews and prospects of the Cultural Heritage Preservation Act, and the 
prospects of cultural policy. The arrangement of the themes and forums 
- 186 - 
were highly related to the CCIP and media industries, which revealed that 
cultural policy had shifted to a greater orientation to the CCIs.  
At the same time during the forums, twelve enterprises were selected and 
qualified for a MOC scheme of venture capital investment. However, 
‘Cultural Age’ and other civil groups questioned the selection procedure 
and the appropriateness of venture capital investment as a model of 
industrialisation in the CCIP. It began an intense discursive struggle about 
the scheme of venture capital and investment between the state, the 
investors and the cultural sector. Fang, Guo-Jian (方 國 健), general 
manager of Taiwan Wen-Chuang No.1 venture capital enterprise (台灣文創
一號創投基金公司) which is one of the twelve qualified enterprises, argues 
the advantage of the scheme of venture capital investment is that it can 
facilitate CCIs to gain enough capital and resources as well as share the 
investment risk with the state’s National Development Fund. He 
emphasised this investment scheme has been working quite well in high-
tech industries and it would benefit the CCIs to expand the scale of the 
CCIs and maximise the profit (Interview with Fang, Guo-Jian, 2012). The 
MOC held a similar market discourse to justify clustering effects and 
market development of this scheme.  
However, the cultural sector and civil society developed a different civil 
discourse. They questioned the scheme for its lack of evaluation and 
because they felt that it could lead to the investment projects centring on 
high-profit media and entertainment industries. Feng, Chien-Shan (2012), 
a media scholar, also argued that the scheme was highly questionable 
even though it might meet legal regulations (Feng, 2012). He advised the 
state to invest in public broadcasting services rather than private venture 
business. Hu, Yung-Fen (胡永芬), a member of ‘Cultural Age’, criticised the 
same scheme for allowing enterprises to invest in projects which are 
affiliated with their business (Interview with Hu, Yung-Fen, 2012). Another 
civil discourse expresses the worries that the scheme tends to invest in 
cross-Strait co-production for the greater Chinese market profit that may 
suppress or self-limit the freedom of creativity under the Chinese 
government’s censorship. For example, Wang, Shau-Di (王 小 棣), a 
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director, argues that the scheme creates a distorted situation where “the 
Taiwan government listens to the venture capital enterprises, whilst these 
enterprises follow China’s regulation” (The Journalists, 2012).  
In order to examine the implementing of cultural policy and commitment of 
the MOC, the ‘Cultural Age’ invited cultural workers from diverse areas, 
officials, and legislators and held six forums titled ‘Crisis Decryption’ in 
2013 when the MOC was established on the 400th day (Hong, 2013). The 
topics included: (1) the overall examination on the MOC; (2) CCIs 
investment vs. cultural subsidy; (3) the mission of the Taiwan Broadcasting 
System; (4) art’s urban dynamic, urban gentrification, cultural governance 
and heritage preservation; (5) the ecological thinking of industries and 
culture; and (6) the effect of the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in 
Services in the publishing industry. In the discussions, civil actors argued 
that the state pursues false cultural imaginaries with business, economic 
value and CCIs-related facilities such as the ‘Northern Centre of Pop 
Music’ and ‘Taichung Metropolitan Opera House’ whilst putting the real 
cultural infrastructure (such as the ‘National Film Centre’) aside (Hong, 
2013). They took ‘cultural citizenship’ to ask the state to build a transparent 
scheme of policy-making and implementation (Hong, 2013).  
It is noticeable that social networks and technologies have facilitated civil 
discourse to contend with the market discourse in the meaning-making of 
industrialisation. The civil actors exchange information and take action via 
the communication software, and mobilise participants through social 
media and social networks. The instant features of social media help 
participants to understand the situation and progress, as well as spread 
information, visual records and news to the wider public. For instance, Hu 
indicates that most members of the ‘Cultural Age’ discussed campaigns via 
social networking and participated in street action together despite only 
having three part-time workers to take charge of the administrative affairs 
(Interview with Hu, Yung-Fen, 2012). Moreover, all the forums can be 
watched via the official blog of ‘Cultural Age’41 and are easily shared via 
                                            
41 All the forums can be watched via the official blog of Cultural Age. [Accessed 15 June 
2015]. Available from:  
- 188 - 
social networks and social media. In other words, these technological tools 
extend and enhance the influence of civil discourse.  
In short, the KMT government’s privileged industrialisation was conducted 
through a series of governmental technologies which favour market 
discourse by an investment approach. However, the civil groups have 
developed counter-discourses and diverse strategies to compete. In 
particular, the discourses of ‘citizen’ and ‘cultural citizenship’ have drawn 
the public’s attention, which forced the state to involve ‘citizenship’ in the 
‘CCIs Law’ and other cultural policy. 
 
6.4 New Hometown Community Empowerment Project II  
The first stage of the New Hometown CEP suggests that it played a 
complementary role with the CCIP to co-constitute the meaning of 
industrialisation with the political imaginary of Taiwan’s subjectivity and the 
economic imaginary of regional revitalisation (see section 5.3). At the end 
of the New Hometown CEP (2002-2007), the CCA reorganised the 
framework and proposed ‘Bedrock Action’ as the second stage project.  
Compared with the first stage of the New Hometown CEP which was a 
grand cross-sector project under the framework of ‘Challenge 2008’ with a 
total budget of 50.5 billion NT dollars (CEPD, 2005), the ‘Bedrock Action’ 
only focused on the affiliated cultural facilities and community cultural 
activities with a budget of 4.824 billion NT dollars (CCA, 2007b; CCA, 
2007c). In fact, having experienced the six-year division of the work under 
the framework of ‘Challenge 2008’, the industrialisation of the ‘New 
Hometown CEP’ was divided and institutionalised into nine ministries or 
councils such as the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Hakka Affairs Council, 
Council of Indigenous Peoples and Council of Agriculture. In this vein, the 
                                                                                                                           
  http://renewtwculture.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/blog-post_16.html (Forum 1 to 3) 
  http://renewtwculture.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/blog-post_17.html (Forum 4 to 6) 
  The summary of the discussions can be found on ‘Artouch’ website. [Accessed 15 June 
2015]. Available from: 
   http://www.artouch.com/m/artco/story.aspx?aid=2013082212263 (Part I) 
   https://artouch.com/m/artco/story.aspx?aid=2013082212468 (Part II) 
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scale and budget of the ‘Bedrock Action’ proposed by the CCA were much 
smaller than the first stage project.  
The dual-cores project of ‘Bedrock Action’ encompassed two sub-projects: 
‘Local Cultural Museum Project II (2008-2013)’, and ‘New Hometown CEP 
II (2008-2013)’. In the press conference of retrospect and prospect at the 
end of 2007, the chairperson of the CCA introduced the new concept of 
‘Cultural Living Circle’ for the ‘Bedrock Action’ and highlighted the core 
value of Taiwan’s subjectivity (CCA, 2007a). The ‘Cultural Living Circle’ 
was a spatial field where residents conducted a variety of cultural activities 
in their daily lives. In this sense, the CCA reclaimed the importance of 
‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of Industries’ by six thematic 
resources, people (participation), culture (cultural activities), geography 
(ecology and environmental protection), landscape (historical and natural 
landscape), industries (local industries) and facilities (cultural and 
educational facilities) (CCA, 2007b, p.2). By integrating these resources, 
the project aimed to provide equal access to cultural resources for 
residents (CCA, 2007b), which is a similar focus to the first stage, which 
revealed that the LCM II was continually viewed as a spatial strategy to fix 
the uneven resource distribution between urban areas and rural areas. In 
this context, LCM Project II focused on the connection of local cultural 
museums that aimed to link residents’ participation, cultural facilities and 
cultural activities to realise cultural citizenship, advance the local cultural 
environment, develop cultural tourism and create employment (CCA, 
2007b, p.6).  
The New Hometown CEP II aimed to promote sustainable communities, 
consolidate local identity, cultural citizenship and cultural industries and 
transform local cultural features for cultural tourism in response to the 
difficulties and challenges that the previous projects encountered in 
practice (CCA, 2007c). Similarly, the discourses of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’, 
‘residents’ participation in knowledge learning’ and the approach of ‘cultural 
tourism’ can easily be found in the text of New Hometown CEP II. In this 
context, it includes three strategies: establish research and consulting 
mechanisms to assist administration affairs; deepen community culture by 
community documentary and community theatre; and encourage 
community industries’ innovation and experimentation (CCA, 2007c). 
Among them, the third strategy emphasised the establishment of 
development mechanisms for community cultural industries. It encouraged 
alliance among local industries to build alternative types of production 
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models that privilege culture-orientation, benefit-sharing, and quality of life 
(CCA, 2007c, p.54). The strategy also promoted consumers’ cooperative 
purchase to construct a direct way to link producers and consumers. It 
distinguished the production model of community cultural industries from 
the market-mediated industries. 
In DPP’s initial planning, two semiotic developments were worthy of note. 
On the one hand, the retention of discourses such as ‘Taiwan’s 
subjectivity’, ‘local identity’ and ‘cultural tourism to promote local economy’ 
were easily found in the LCM II and New Hometown CEP II. It released 
that the DPP government aimed to maintain and construct political 
imaginaries and economic imaginaries through these two projects. On the 
other hand, the selection of the discourse ‘cultural citizenship’ has become 
the core value of these CEP-related projects and has gradually become 
involved in the meaning-shaping of industrialisation in cultural policy. In 
these policy texts, the discourse of participation, which has been 
emphasised in the CEP since the mid 1990s, has often been accompanied 
by the discourses of ‘civil society’ and ‘cultural citizenship’. The discourse 
of ‘cultural citizenship’ has become a strong state discourse since 2004 to 
justify the CCA’s policy and subsidy, such that the LCM II emphasised 
equal access to cultural resources.  
When the KMT government retook power in 2008, the CCA continued to 
implement two projects but overlooked the discourse of ‘Taiwan’s 
subjectivity’ and ‘local identity’ and further cut the budget of the two 
projects. In the revised version of LCM II (2008-2015), the MOC extended 
the project for two more years, whilst the total budget was reduced from 3 
billion NT dollars to 2.6 billion NT dollars. Moreover, the CCA only achieved 
64 per cent of the budget during the original period from 2008 to 2013 
(MOC, 2013a). In the revised text of the LCM II, the MOC maintained the 
discourse of ‘bottom-up’, ‘residents’ participation’, ‘community autonomy’, 
‘sustainability’ and ‘cultural citizenship’ to emphasise the importance of 
local cultural museums. However, the MOC viewed these cultural facilities 
as having a supporting role in regional and national projects instead of 
fixing uneven regional resources between the urban areas and rural areas 
(MOC, 2013a, pp.12-13).  
In New Hometown CEP II, only 68 per cent of the budget was implemented 
in promoting the three sub-projects during the same period. Moreover, the 
alternative type of production model in community cultural industries and 
the scheme of consumers’ cooperative purchase disappeared in the 
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revised version (MOC, 2013b). In contrast, the MOC planned to integrate 
this project into the ‘7835 Villages Project’ with the discourse of ‘soilisation’ 
to improve cultural resources in rural areas (MOC, 2013b, p.B).  
Notably, the KMT government did not promote the two projects or the 
related industrialisation as actively as the DPP government. Tseng, Shu-
Cheng (曾旭正), the former director of Community Empowering Society 
and a senior scholar, indicated that the KMT continued the projects but 
‘community empowerment’ had rarely been seen in the central 
government’s policy, and other departments had reduced the relevant 
projects assisting community empowerment (Tseng, 2014, p.6). He argues 
that the CCA had a passive attitude to implementing the relevant CEPs 
that he described as having experienced a “period of setback since 2009” 
(Tseng, 2014, p.17).  
In summary, the KMT government’s support for the relevant CEP 
considerably declined and the MOC shifted the policy focus from cultural 
identity and community economy to equal access to cultural resources 
between villages. As a result, the second stage of the LCM and New 
Hometown CEP no longer played complementary roles in the semiotic 
practice of community industrialisation in the third phase. In contrast, the 
local communities and civil groups developed diverse styles of 
industrialisation and played increasingly independent and influential roles 
in the interpretation of community industrialisation.  
 
6.5 Local practice 
The previous analysis has shown that the funding cuts and the reduced 
governmental support to relevant CEPs, as well as the privileged market 
discourse of CCIP shaped challenging conditions for local communities in 
the third phase. However, the flourishing civil society and the emerging 
discourse of cultural citizenship created opportunities for local people to 
continually develop industrialisation. The challenges and opportunities 
configured specific conditions and led to diverse economic imaginaries in 
local practice. 
With the decline of New Hometown CEP, communities and regional 
associations actively developed their discourses and strategies of 
industrialisation. Most of them maintained industrialisation as a strategic fix 
to the negative impact of globalisation and neo-liberalism. In order to 
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preserve their local cultural identity and make a sustainable way of living, 
they conducted a variety of strategies and developed diverse discourses to 
support their local industries. Most of them were based on the endogenous 
and tourism approach but revised their strategies based on their respective 
local resources.  
Moreover, the National Culture and Arts Foundation noticed multiple 
developments in local practice and chose twenty-five cases, categorised 
into five styles: LOHAS (lifestyles of health and sustainability), travel, 
creative arts, space and cohesion (NCAF, 2011). The classification 
simplifies the contextual and formative factors but reveals diverse practices 
with grassroots features, mostly at a micro or small scale, generally 
presenting the distinct concerns of public interest and imaginaries of multi-
value life style. Taomi Eco Village is one of the cases and identified as 
being of cohesion type.  
There are more and more people or groups taking part in cultural and 
creative industries in local areas. Some of them develop individual studios 
or companies to run their businesses. One of these cases is ‘Graceful 
Farmer’, which combines three sectors of arts factory, country fun and 
music factory to explore possibilities of cultural and creative industries in 
an agricultural village. ‘Graceful Farmer’ was organised in 2009 by a group 
of graduate students from Tainan National University of the Arts in Togo 
village (土 溝 村), a very typical Taiwanese agricultural village with a 
population of 1700 in the rural area of Tainan City which still relies on 
agricultural industries. Since 2004, the students have assisted Togo Village 
Association for Agricultural Preservation to promote community 
empowerment in Togo village. In 2009, the students graduated but stayed 
and became residents of Togo village. They organised ‘Graceful Farmer’ 
based in the village to promote local music, community arts activities and 
agricultural industry. In 2012, they worked together with the association to 
constitute the imaginaries of ‘Togo Arts Museum’. They aimed to make the 
whole village become an arts museum in which the agricultural sculptures 
and paintings through residents’ participation and traditional craft skills 
were located in the living environment of the village. Unlike other 
community privileged endogenous and tourism approach, Togo village still 
relies on agricultural industries more than tourism, as the association is 
concerned that the negative impacts of tourism and commercialisation may 
damage their life quality (Rhythms Monthly, 2014, pp.64-66).  
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In addition, two trends have arisen in local practice in the third phase: the 
reflexivity of endogenous and tourism approach, and the rising of the 
cultural and creative village. Both trends have brought variation, selection 
and retention of industrialisation and structuration. 
  
6.5.1 The Reflexivity of Endogenous and Tourism Approach  
The first trend is community reflexive strategies of the endogenous and 
tourism approach. After 2008, the CCA no longer actively interpreted the 
meaning of industrialisation for cultural industries nor regulated the 
developmental strategies for community industries. On top of that, the 
market-mediated and profit-driven style of CCIs that the state preferred to 
promote through the project of ‘Creative Taiwan’ and the supporting 
approach of investment seized superiority in the policy discourse. Under 
this condition, most communities maintained the endogenous and tourism 
approach and strived for other departments’ funding, such as the Hakka 
Affairs Council, Council of Indigenous Peoples and Council of Agriculture, 
or the third sector such as non-profit organisations to maintain cultural 
industries. Among them, the Council of Agriculture’s ‘Rural Rejuvenation 
Programme’, more or less, played a substitute role for the CCA’s 
community empowerment projects in supporting the community.  
Actually, the trial scheme of the ‘Rural Rejuvenation Programme’ was 
started in 2004 by the Soil and Water Conservation Bureau under the 
administration of the Council of Agriculture as part of the New Hometown 
Project (2002-2007) under the framework of ‘Challenge 2008’. In this 
context, the programme takes the same principles as the CEP such as 
‘bottom-up approach’ and ‘community autonomy’ and shares similar 
discourse such as ‘participation’ and ‘revitalise industries’ to revive the 
economic vitality of rural villages including agricultural villages, fishing 
villages, aboriginal tribes and island communities (The Soil and Water 
Conservation Bureau, 2012). The programme was formally launched in 
2008 and adopted a similar learning strategy, which the NHF conducted 
and promoted in the case of Taomi Eco-Village. In terms of learning 
approach, it asks communities to attend specific training workshops and 
then design their own projects so that they can qualify to get subsidies. In 
this way, the ‘Rural Rejuvenation Programme’ can be see as an 
agricultural version of the CEP in that it also takes empowerment and 
industrialisation as a set of strategic fixes to the declining agricultural 
economy and outflow of people. This is particularly evident since 2010 
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when the ‘Rural Rejuvenation Act’ was passed. The statement of Article 1 
presents a similar goal and function to community empowerment:  
The Rural Rejuvenation Act is enacted to facilitate the rural sustainability, 
revitalisation and rejuvenation, to improve production infrastructure, to 
conserve rural ecology and culture, to upgrade quality of life, and to 
construct a new rural prosperity and beauty (Council of Agriculture, 
2010). 
Therefore, facing the CCA’s budget cuts in community empowerment 
projects, a variety of agricultural communities took part in the ‘Rural 
Rejuvenation Programme’ to continue empowerment projects as well as 
cultural industries (Tseng, 2014). In this sense, the main economic 
imaginaries of the ‘Rural Rejuvenation Programme’ are the transformation 
of the agricultural economy and the creation of local jobs. Accordingly, it 
has attracted a great deal of communities to apply for the programme in 
order to continue their existing community cultural industries. Until 2012, 
2054 communities participated in the project, which accounts for a third of 
all communities (Council of Agriculture, 2015). 
Apart from the ‘Rural Rejuvenation Programme’ and the learning approach, 
in fact, the past fifteen-year experience of community empowerment has 
shown that most communities are more aware of the difficult situation 
caused by free trade and the global financial crisis. Meanwhile they 
gradually understand, or are informed of, the importance of autonomy and 
sustainability in developing community industries. Although the state 
initiated the relevant CEP with the state’s political and economic 
imaginaries, the participants, including community leaders, residents, 
cultural workers, local historians, activists and professional organisations 
have worked together with reflexivity in community affairs.  
The dialectic process between the project discourse and local practice 
through a constant task of ‘cultural translation’ (Yang, 2014) co-constitutes 
the community’s imaginaries and action strategies. Yang (2014) took the 
case of Linbian community (林邊社區) for example and found that through 
‘cultural translation’ between the community actors and professional 
actors, the community is mobilised to constitute the community 
imaginaries. This indicates that residents inter-translate their local and 
practical knowledge with action groups’ conceptual knowledge, 
professional discourse and policy to build their imaginaries and strategies 
of actions. To put it another way, some communities strategically select 
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government projects and funding, and participants interact through ‘cultural 
translation’ to constitute imaginaries of hometown and achieve their own 
goals in the local practice.  
In addition, Wang (2011), based on the long-term participant observation 
and interviews of experienced community workers, argues that community 
actors have successively performed the task of cultural translation to 
create pluralism and diversity, and their local institutional reflexivity 
mobilises the possibilities of networked communities in the face of global 
neo-liberalisation (p.2). In other words, community actors have learned 
from previous experience to constitute their own imaginaries of 
industrialisation through cultural translation. They are constantly 
repositioning their strategies within the context of changing policy and 
struggling with the market discourse under the framework of neo-
liberalism. It is obvious from the case studies of Baimi Clog Village and 
Taomi Eco Village mentioned in sections 4.4 and 5.4, that both have 
continued to develop specific strategies of industrialisation based on their 
reflexivity of the conditions and cultural context, to promote their local 
industries. By endogenous and tourism approach, their industrialisation in 
clog industries and eco-tourism provide alternative economic imaginaries 
to sustain the community. 
 
6.5.2 The Case of Dragonfly Beads Art Studio 
In this context of reflexivity, some local enterprises of the cultural and 
creative industries attempt to combine industrial development with 
community empowerment. One of the typical cases is Dragonfly Beads Art 
Studio, which was founded in 1983 by Shih, Siou-Jyu (施 秀 菊) in 
Sendiman Township, which is a Paiwanese tribe42  in Pintung County, 
southern Taiwan. Shih was a nursery teacher and enthusiastic about the 
renaissance of bead-making skills. She and her husband set up a small 
studio to innovate with beads and promote Paiwanese culture and the 
bead products. The glass bead is one of the three treasures43  of the 
Paiwan Group.  
                                            
42 In July 2015, the population of Paiwan was 97,078, accounting for approximately 17.8 per 
cent of Taiwan's total indigenous population; data gathered by the Council of Indigenous 
Groups. [Online]. [accessed 7 September 2015]. Available from: 
http://www.apc.gov.tw/portal/index.html 
43 It is believed that the beads are the most precious gift granted from the Creator that 
symbolise not honour and magnificence but the status and power of the owners. The other 
- 196 - 
In 2000, Shih left her job and refurbished a studio, the ground floor of 
which has become an exhibition shop and workshop, and the first floor has 
turned into an aboriginal café serving Paiwanese light meals and drinks. 
The complex drew media coverage, showing that the production of glass 
beads had great potential (Wu, 2008). However, according to the interview 
with Shih, Siou-Jyu in 2012, they did not have any idea about CCIs at that 
time. She states, “my husband and I played and explored different skills, 
sometimes we failed but gradually we recruited more staff to join in this 
studio. Now it becomes what the government call a ‘cultural and creative 
industry’” (Interview with Shih, Siou-Jyu, 2012). It wasn’t until the state 
started to introduce the discourse of CCIs in 2002 and selected ‘creativity 
living industries’ as one of the categories of CCIs, that Dragonfly Beads Art 
Studio was frequently chosen as an excellence model by the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs to promote the concept of the CCIs and introduce the 
practice of industrialisation (Chen, 2005; Chen, 2007).  
According to the survey conducted by the National Culture and Arts 
Foundation, the industrialisation of Dragonfly Beads Art Studio included the 
creation of the specific Paiwanese meaning of beads and the constant 
innovation of the specific types, the establishment of standard handmade 
procedure, the promotion by the exhibition shops in airports, hotels, 
museums and the scheme of online shopping (NCAF, 2006). Bearing 
similar economic imaginary of endogenous and tourism approach in mind, 
they designed experience activities and the tribe guide tours of visitors to 
show their unique beads and further promote Paiwanese culture (Wu, 
2008). Through this industrialisation, the Studio has a stable staff of 30 
tribeswomen, all of them from local tribes (Interview with Shih, Siou-Jyu, 
2012).  
With the stable growth of the bead industry, Shih was thinking of the next 
step to fix the economic and cultural plight of the Paiwan group, so that the 
people can work in the tribe and cherish their tribal culture (Interview with 
Shih, Siou-Jyu, 2012). She organised the ‘Association of Timur Cultural 
Industries and Arts’ (地磨兒文化產業藝術協會, hereafter Timur Association) 
in 2006 to revitalise Pariwanese culture and find ways to increase local 
employment. In 2008, Dragonfly Beads Art Studio participated in the film 
‘Cape No.7’ ( 海角七號) which broke the historical record for a Taiwanese 
                                                                                                                           
two treasures are pottery vessels and bronze knives. Paiwan group is the second-largest 
group of the sixteen recognised indigenous groups in Taiwan. 
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film at the box office. With the popularity of the film, Dragonfly Beads Art 
Studio gained nationwide fame and generated huge profits that drew the 
attention of venture capital companies. The venture investment was the 
privileged strategy of industrialisation that the state attempts to promote by 
the policy of ‘Creative Taiwan’. However, the state and the venture’s 
economic imaginaries clashed with Shih’s imaginaries. Shih argues that 
the venture capital companies focus on profit of capital accumulation, 
which is not her core concern as she is more concerned about the 
preservation of aboriginal culture (Interview with Shih, Siou-Jyu, 2012). 
Moreover, the preferred tourism approach of venture companies is to 
establish hotels by land acquisition, which may have negative impacts on 
the local environment and the tribes (Interview with Shih, Siou-Jyu, 2012). 
This uncovers the gap in the imaginaries and practical strategies between 
the state and venture companies, and local tribes.  
The revolutionary change resulted from the reconstruction following 
Typhoon Morakot44 in 2009, when the Timur area started to develop tribal 
empowerment and indigenous industries (Interview with Shih, Siou-Jyu, 
2012). The Timur tribe was seriously damaged, as thirty per cent of the 
population lived in the damaged areas and transportation was blocked for 
several months. During the post-disaster reconstruction, the Timur 
Association strategically applied for funding from the Workforce 
Development Agency to create local employment so that people could stay 
and work in the tribe. Furthermore, they took part in the ‘Rural 
Rejuvenation Programme’ to construct a vision for their tribe. Through 
collective learning and discussion, the tribespeople gradually became 
aware of their unique natural and cultural assets (Interview with Shih, Siou-
Jyu, 2012). Accordingly, the Timur Association proposed a project to build a 
sustainable tribe. According to the leaflet made by the Timur Association 
(2014),, the project linked three neighbouring tribes, Timur, Tjavatjavang 
and Tukuvulj, and planned to reshape the tribal industries through 
ecotourism and tribal culture. During the three-year reconstruction, they 
worked and consulted with Dr. Chen, Mei-Hui and her Community Forestry 
Laboratory at National Pingtung University of Science & Technology to 
                                            
44 Typhoon Morakot hit Taiwan on August 8, 2009, causing severe flooding throughout 
southern and eastern Taiwan. The storm produced unprecedented amounts of rainfall of 
2,854 mm in three days and triggered enormous mudslides, causing billions of dollars in 
damage and killing about 700 people (Taipei Times, 2013).  
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empower themselves by learning the knowledge of ecotourism and 
constructing local industries.  
With the economic imaginaries of local employment by ecotourism 
strategies, the three tribes have different directions of industrialisation. The 
Timur tribe focuses on Paiwanese arts and cultural industries. By operating 
the Sandiman Cultural Museum, they exhibit and present tribal art and 
culture, and promote cultural commodities such as glass beads and 
handmade crafts. Meanwhile, the museum serves as the travel centre to 
provide information about tribal culture and ecotourism. The Tjavatjavang 
tribe started with the renovation of traditional slate houses, stone paths 
and the rebuilding of traditional buildings such as the tribal observatory and 
taro kilns (Community Forestry Laboratory, 2015). Then they focused on 
the training of tour-guides to develop tribal tours. The Tukuvulj tribe 
emphasises the reconstruction of indigenous agriculture. They took organic 
methods to plant typical goods such as millet, coffee and taro. They built a 
supply-demand mechanism with Timur’s restaurants, and designed DIY 
activities in coffee roasting, winemaking and indigenous cuisine 
(Association of Timur Cultural Industries and Arts, 2014).  
Since the three tribes are connected along Taiwan Provincial Highway 24, 
they formed a network, ‘Tai-24 Travel’. As a result, the project has 
increased to employ forty local people, and reshaped local industries to 
support the tribal ecotourism (Kuo, 2012). In fact, the industrialisation 
functioned as a strategic fix not only to reshape the tribes’ economic 
activities, but also to bridge the cultural gap between the old generation 
and the young generation. During the process of industrialisation, the 
seniors present and teach tribal history, culture and skills to the younger 
people. The imaginaries are constituted through discursive discussion and 
practice as Shih describes:  
By the projects and programmes, the young generation discusses what 
kind of tribe they want. The old generation shares the ancient stories and 
the young generation records and learns the tribal culture. Though the 
mechanism, we share, think and imagine, to assemble a jigsaw puzzle 
which is the dream of our tribe (Interview with Shih, Siou-Jyu, 2012).  
Specifically, the process of industrialisation has enhanced tribespeople’s 
cultural identity, especially the use of the native language and the 
preservation of traditional skills (Interview with Shih, Siou-Jyu, 2012). 
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6.5.3 The Emergence of the ‘Cultural and Creative Village’   
The second trend is the emergence of the ‘Cultural and Creative Village’ 
(hereafter CC Village). The term has become notable and involved in 
policy discourse, which can be traced back to the regulation of Article 25 in 
‘CCIs Law’. 
The Government shall support the establishment of cultural and creative 
villages, and shall as a priority assist core creative and independent 
workers to situate in the said villages. The Government shall, through 
the clustering effect by involving different groups, further promote the 
development of Cultural and Creative Enterprises. (CCA, 2010a) 
According to the regulation, the CCA formulated a funding scheme to 
encourage creators and independent workers to station themselves in CC 
Villages since 2011. In the CCA’s definition, the CC Village is a geographical 
field where cultural and creative industries are highly centralised, and the 
scope is not necessarily limited to a clear boundary such as in the same 
building, the same street or even the same administered region (CCA, 2011). 
However, Ciou and Yu (2014) criticise the official definition of CC Village for 
only emphasising a cluster of industries. They take the case of Hai-An Road 
CC Village (海安路文創聚落) to argue that its formation experienced various 
periods, from the creation of arts street, the artists assembly, to the local 
company’s alliance with local resources. In other words, the meaning of 
‘village’ refers not only to a historical or geographical area of settlement, but 
also describes a form of natural grouping with local features of industries 
and cultural resources. In Taiwan’s context, the formation of CC Villages is 
embedded in the social, spatial and ecological structure where creative 
workers interact with local people and group with the local resources to 
gradually shape a structured community and a network of cultural and 
creative industries.   
Actually, there were an increasing number of ‘CC Villages’, although most 
of them did not use the term, formed in the local areas around Taiwan prior 
to the ‘CCIs Law’ and state’s subsidy scheme. Then the term was 
‘anchored’ by the ‘CCIs Law’ and the government’s project discourse. 
Almost at the same time, some media noticed the phenomenon of the ‘CC 
Village’ and promoted the concept. In this way, it has been acknowledged 
and shaped popular imaginaries for this kind of grouping. For instance, a 
magazine called ‘La Vie’, which has been published since 2004 and 
focuses on creative design and lifestyle, hosted the ‘Taiwan Cultural and 
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Creative Industries 100 Awards’45 in 2014. It is worth noting that the Award 
separated CC Parks and CC Villages into two categories. According to 
their definition, CC Park means a concrete area with a clear promotion 
approach of clustering with centralised management, intense capital and 
purpose-oriented to promote industrial cluster (La Vie, 2014). They indicate 
the concept of the CC Park originated from ‘Challenge 2008’ with its aim to 
integrate the CCIs resource and revitalise abandoned space to stimulate 
the development of CCIs (Lin, 2014). With regard to the CC Village, it is 
defined as a geographic space with grouping feature emphasising 
decentralised management and flexible market-orientation. It is expected 
to serve as an open field for creative workers to group together and 
exchange ideas (La Vie, 2014). 
As the two categories shown, the CC Villages and CC Parks have formed 
in different temporal and spatial contexts and thus refer to different 
imaginaries of creative clustering. The CC Parks, such as Huashan CC 
Park, are designated by the government and imagined as Science Parks 
that focus on cluster effects of industries at an appointed site. On the 
contrary, CC Villages are formed rather autonomously by non-government 
organisations and local people, where a local network has been gathering. 
The civil groups, cultural workers and local industries group together to 
constitute the imaginaries of multi-values such as heritage preservation, 
cultural renaissance and revitalisation of local industries.  
 
6.5.4 The Case of Teihua Music Village 
Among the diverse types of CC Villages, Teihua Music Village is a specific 
case, which was organised by a non-profit foundation and indigenous 
musicians, with official support, in eastern Taiwan. Compared to western 
Taiwan, where major cities are located with transportation and essential 
industrial development, eastern Taiwan is relatively underdeveloped and 
filled with natural landscapes and aboriginal culture.  
Teihua Music Village was established in 2010 by the Lovely Taiwan 
Foundation (台灣好基金會) in Taitoung City with clear visions to develop 
indigenous music industries and local industries. In order to achieve these 
visions, they worked with local musicians and strategically applied for 
                                            
45 The categories include CC events, CC leaders, CC figures, CC entreprises, CC brands, 
CC parks, CC villages, CC exhibitions, CC marketing platforms and CC products.  
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funding support from the Tourism Bureau in the first three years from 2010 
to 2013. Since 2013, Teihua Music Village and the Lovely Taiwan 
Foundation have maintained the industrialisation approach and continually 
developed music industries and local industries. Its model of 
industrialisation has gradually been highlighted and promoted by the 
Ministry of Culture and local Taitung County Government (Taiwan Cultural-
Creative Development Foundation, 2013; Lan, 2013). It was selected in the 
Top 10 CC Villages by ‘La Vie’ magazine in 2014. 
The Lovely Taiwan Foundation was founded by Ko, Wen-Chang (柯文昌), 
the chairperson of the WK Technology Fund, in 2009. Ko invited Hsu, Lu 
(徐璐) as the chief executive officer of the Lovely Taiwan Foundation. Hsu 
used to be a journalist and a former chief executive officer of Chunghwa 
Telecom Foundation, which conducted projects for communities and tribes. 
Moreover, Ko invited Lin, Hwai-Min (林懷民), who is a renowned artist and 
the founder of the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre, and Yen, Stanley (嚴長壽), 
who is the chairperson of the Alliance Cultural Foundation, to be the 
Foundation’s consultants. Before the establishment of the Foundation, all 
of them participated in the campaign against the construction of Suhua 
Highway as they argued the highway would damage the local environment 
and would not resolve the economic difficulties of local communities and 
tribes in eastern Taiwan, as they lack stable distribution channels and 
marketing strategies (Hsu, 2014; Interview with Lovely Taiwan Foundation, 
2012).  
From this background, the Lovely Taiwan Foundation aimed to build a 
niche for local and indigenous industries. Therefore, the Foundation set up 
the ‘Lovely Taiwan Shop’ (台灣好店) in Taipei City to integrate resource and 
assist culture and industries of villages and towns towards sustainable 
development in Taiwan (Interview with Lovely Taiwan Foundation, 2012). 
The shop displays and sells a variety of handmade products. Every 
product is attached to a story card introducing stories about the community 
and tribal workers, which give a symbolic meaning and further build a 
brand for the product (Interview with Lovely Taiwan Foundation, 2012). In 
addition, the Lovely Taiwan Shop is expected to serve as a platform in five 
aspects: community/tribe sales, fair trade, linkage between industries and 
enterprise, story, and packaging design and marketing (Lovely Taiwan 
Foundation, 2013). In this platform, they especially privilege the discourse 
of ‘fair trade’ to ensure all surpluses are put into the Development Fund to 
assist communities’ and tribal industries (Hsu, 2014).  
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The other strategic project is Taihua Music Village. The experience of the 
anti-Suhau Highway campaign stimulated Ko, Wen-Chang and Hsu, Lu to 
explore another industrial possibility in eastern Taiwan. According to the 
interview with Fong, Jheng-Fa (豐政發) in 2012, the manager of ‘Teihua 
Music Village’ and a member of the Amis tribe, the Foundation found the 
abandoned dormitory of Taiwan Railway Administration in Taitung City and 
rented the square in 2009 but had not decided how to revitalise the 
abandoned space. The natural crisis of Typhoon Morakot led to the strategy 
of Taihua Music village. Like Timur tribe, the typhoon caused severe damage 
in Taitung Granville Village, which is the hometown of Hu, Te-fu (胡德夫), an 
aborigine singer and the founder of Taiwanese Folk Music in the 1970s. The 
Lovely Taiwan Foundation organised the ‘Sing for Home’ fundraising 
concerts and continued working with Granville village (嘉蘭村) in its cultural 
reconstruction46. In one of the discussions about the reconstruction, some 
Taitung aboriginal singers including Hu, Te-Fu and Panai Kusui (巴奈・庫穗) 
expressed their expectation of singing in the hometown rather than working 
in big cities such as Taipei or Kaohsiung (Hsu, 2014; Interview with Fong, 
Jheng-Fa, 2012). Prior to Teihua Village, there was no stable music 
performance venue in Taitung and most local composers and musicians had 
to move and work in big cities instead of contributing to local areas. In this 
context, a consensus for a music village was formed in the discussion and 
accompanied by two thematic imaginaries of industrialisation: music platform 
and slow fair (Interview with Fong, Jheng-Fa, 2012). It can be seen that the 
initial idea of Taihua Music Village was viewed as a strategic fix to the 
scarcity of music industries. 
Almost at the same time in 2009, the Bureau of Tourism, under the 
administration of the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 
launched the ‘Project Vanguard for Excellence in Tourism’ (觀光拔尖領航方
案) as part of the KMT government’s essential economic policy.  
As per the background analysis in section 6.1, the state selected six 
emerging industries (biotechnology, medicine and health care, tourism, 
green energy, high-end agriculture and CCIs) to transform Taiwan’s industrial 
structure in response to the Asian financial crisis. Tourism was viewed as 
“the leading service industry for Taiwan in the twenty-first century” (Ministry 
                                            
46 The concert raised a total of nearly 10 million NT dollars. Similar to Timur’s  reconstruction 
project, they adopted traditional building skills to rebuild the ‘Trbial Square’, the ‘Tribal 
chief’s home’ and the ‘observatory tower’ (Interview with the Lovely Taiwan Foundation, 
2012).  
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of Transportation and Communications, 201, p.2). Following the direct 
transportation links across the Taiwan Strait, the KMT government 
expected to shape Taiwan as a tourist transit centre in East Asia and an 
important attraction for international tourism, generating 550 billion NT 
dollars in tourism revenues, creating 400 thousand direct and indirect 
tourism jobs, and attracting 200 billion NT dollars in private investment 
(Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 2011).  
To achieve these goals, the Bureau of Tourism proposed a project 
entitled ‘International Spotlight’ (國際光點), which took dual approaches 
of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ to promote Taiwan’s tourism. In the ‘top-
down’ aspect, the Bureau of Tourism set five themes for regional 
development including Northern Taiwan, Central Taiwan, Southern 
Taiwan, Eastern Taiwan and Nationwide Taiwan. Among them, Eastern 
Taiwan was expected to be ‘Leisurely Living & Nature Taiwan’, with the 
emphasis on bicycles, aboriginal life, organic recreational farming and 
dolphin/whale ecology (Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 
2011, p.17), which is similar to the imaginaries of Teihua Music Village that 
the Lovely Taiwan Foundation preferred to construct with the local people. In 
the ‘bottom-up’ aspect, the state encouraged the local governments 
and the private sector to propose projects based on their regional 
themes. Specifically, the state preferred the proposals to link with 
leisure agriculture, cultural and creative industries, ecology and tribal 
culture (Ministry of Transportation and Communications, 2011, p.18). 
Due to the common economic imaginaries of eastern Taiwan, the 
Lovely Taiwan Foundation applied for the project and got the funding to 
establish ‘International Spotlight - Eastern Taiwan’ from 2010 to 2013. 
‘Taihua Music Village’ is one of the four spotlights in eastern Taiwan47. 
With the financial support of state funding and collaboration with local 
cultural workers, Taihua Music Village presented two features of 
industrialisation, one being the intermediary role of music industries 
between consumption and production. With the aspect of consumption, 
Taihua Music Village serves as a music platform to provide an outdoor 
stage for indigenous singers and other kinds of musical performance; 
meanwhile the local residents and visitors can participate in music 
                                            
47 The other three spotlights are located in Chishang, Makutaay and Hualien. The details 
can be found on the website of the project. [accessed 11 September 2015]. Abailable from: 
http://www.lovelytaiwan.org.tw/Spotlight/index.htm) 
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activities. The normal music performances run from Thursday to 
Sunday. The musical director Jheng, Jie-Ren (鄭 捷 任), who has 
produced a great deal of aboriginal music and theatre music, planned 
the monthly programme such that around seventy per cent of the 
performances are related to local and indigenous music. Mainstream/pop 
music, Hakka music and other genres of music constitute the other thirty per 
cent. The convergence and exchange of diverse music attracted domestic 
and international musical workers to perform in Teihua Music Village 
(Interview with Fong, Jheng-Fa, 2012). Specifically, every Wednesday night 
is ‘Singers and Songwriters’ (唱作聚家) which is open for everyone who is 
interested in music and would like to share with others. It runs a ‘first come 
first play’ system, so that six participants can sing or play three songs every 
Wednesday night. Moreover, ‘Tiehua Specialty’ is the local theme night 
reserved for local bands to perform on stage. The price of entrance tickets 
ranges from 100 NT dollars to 350 NT dollars (about £ 2 to £7) including a 
standard drink. The relatively inexpensive entrance fee and the outdoor 
stage aim to make local people able afford to consume and participate. 
In respect of production, the cultivation of local music talent is one of the 
main concerns of the Teihua Music Village. They proposed a project entitled 
‘Rock and Record – engagement in your own music production’ in 2012 and 
gained half the funding (560 thousand NT dollars) from the Ministry of 
Culture. The five-month project aimed to nurture local people with 
professional knowledge and practical skills of the music market, recording 
production and marketing strategies (Interview with Fong, Jheng-Fa, 2012). 
Furthermore, Teihua Music Village has held the Foehn Bands Contest (焚風
樂團比賽) since 2011, for teenagers and talented youngsters to encourage 
them to ‘sing their songs’ (Zeng, 2013). The winners would be recommended 
by the Teihua Music Village to perform in the corporate live houses, such as 
Riverside and the Wall, in Taipei.  
As the intermediary between consumption and production, the Teihua Music 
Village constituted the economic imaginaries of nurturing local music 
industries. The local aboriginal musician Xiao Lu was interviewed by a 
journalist, and said, “Tiehua Village has provided a place where the musical 
community can come together and develop our own perspective on music” 
(Mckimm, 2013). Moreover, music director Jheng, Jie-Ren was 
interviewed by a journalist and said: 
If we take the perceptivity of industrialisation, I hope the ‘root’ can be 
grown in this village. This may be different from the thinking of the 
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Bureau of Tourism. However, if performance workers, management 
workers, arts administration, musical workers and so on, can all find a 
job here, it would create something about music industries through the 
stimulation of diverse music elements that cross-boundaries of art forms 
(Huang, 2010). 
The process reveals the economic imaginaries of the Teihua Music Village 
were the result of reflexive strategy and cultural translation with the local 
cultural and music workers, rather than directly regulated by the Bureau of 
Tourism.  
Apart from serving as a music platform, the other feature of industrialisation 
is to provide a platform for local industries. There are permanent shops 
including Lovely Taitung Shop, Good Buy, Wood X Space and Slow Fair. The 
discourse of locality and the concept of fair trade are emphasised in these 
shops. For instance, Lovely Taitung Shop is a branch of Lovely Taiwan Shop. 
It takes the same strategic discourse as the Lovely Taiwan Shop by 
indicating that the products are all made in the communities and tribes 
around Taiwan and the surpluses go straight back to assist these industries 
(Interview with Fong, Jheng-Fa, 2012). Good Buy is run by the local 
enterprise which started business in Edoulan tribe in 2008. It focuses on 
introducing and selling tribal products and artworks based in the Taitung 
area. Wood X Space is a small exhibition hall, where three local carpentry 
workshops display their driftwood sculptures and products. ‘Slow Fair’ aims 
to advocate alternative imaginaries of tourist industrialisation for Taitung 
economic development instead of the investment projects of building grand 
hotels such as Miramar Resort48 which the local government attempted to 
promote (Interview with Fong, Jheng-Fa, 2012). Slow Fair is symbolised by a 
slow living experience which is non market-mediated, and a close link 
between producers and consumers. Consequently, it is designed for 
independent local handicraft makers and eco-friendly farmers. The qualified 
vendors display and sell products on Fridays and weekends. The selection 
criteria include originality, local handcraft or agricultural products, eco-
friendly and fair trade. These selective values and local stalls constitute the 
                                            
48  In 2004, the Taitung county government signed a build-operate-transfer investment 
contract with the Miramar Group to construct a six-hectare hotel complex on the beach. 
However, the project failed to pass the official environmental impact evaluation. The 
Taitung County Government argued the project would bring huge economic benefits and 
create many jobs (Wang, 2007). The relevant lawsuits related to the project are still in 
progress. 
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other economic imaginaries for Slow Fair in Teihua Music Village, which 
emphasise local/tribal features, respect for the local environment and 
workers.  
The musical platform and industrial platform shape the unique tourist and 
travelling experience in Teihua Music Village, so that it has become a very 
popular tourist attraction and brought substantial economic implications and 
policy changes of industrialisation. The total number of visitors grew 
significantly to an average of five thousand per month in 2012 and the figure 
of international visitors increased stably, which satisfied the official 
requirement (Interview with Lovely Taiwan Foundation, 2012). In light of the 
case of Teihua Music Village focusing on local industries, the Bureau of 
Tourism recently issued a press release to highlight the link between the 
International Spotlight Project and local industries. They state that the project 
“guides the local industries and living culture up to the international stage, 
which not only generate economic benefits but also create a new 
developmental direction for local industries” (Bureau of Tourism, 2015). 
Moreover, Taiwan Railways Administration collaborated with the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Ministry of Culture to propose a project that 
encourages young people to rent spare property and develop cultural and 
creative industries (Lan, 2013). 
In summary, the semiotic practice of Teihua Music Village highlighted a 
specific endogenous feature of the CC Village which is the priority of 
industrialisation serves indigenous cultural workers and local industries. It 
has not facilitated the music industries or local industries but provides 
alternative imaginaries of the CC Village, distinct from large-scale 
development models such as the Miramar Resort, for a region or city 
government to promote tourism economy.  
 
Conclusion 
Under the KMT government from 2008 to the present, the industrialisation 
of cultural policy has followed divergent paths. On the one hand, the 
former CCA and the successive MOC privileged market discourse which 
focused on profitable flagship industries and cross-Strait collaboration by 
venture investment to generate economic growth and upgrade economic 
structure in the global competition. However, this raised criticism from 
cultural groups on the China factor and overlooked the local cultural 
- 207 - 
workers. In response to the civil discourse, the current MOC, on the other 
hand, highlighted ‘cultural citizenship’ and ‘soilisation’ to promote micro- 
and small industrialisation in local towns and villages. Yet the MOC did not 
further develop discursive strategies to connect the two divergent paths or 
elaborate why and how the discursive practice of cultural citizenship would 
justify the legalisation of investment in the field of cultural policy, or identify 
the extra-market benefit of cross-Strait collaboration. The conflicts between 
the state actor and civil actor have continued and led to the debate of 
‘Crisis Decryption’ (section 6.3.4).  
Within this divergent policy context, the local practice has constantly 
developed various types of industrialisation by the endogenous and 
tourism approach with reflexivity. Furthermore, the CC Villages have paid 
specific attention to local cultural workers and provided alternative thinking 
and strategies of industrialisation at the level of regional development. 
Nevertheless, owing to a lack of discursive practice to connect the two 
paths at the policy level, the sense-making and meaning-making of 
industrialisation has inevitably been filled with worries, confusions, and 
conflicts between the state and civil society. This has set a greater 
challenging condition for the future semiotic practice of industrialisation.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has analysed the dynamic and dialectic trajectory of 
industrialisation in Taiwan’s cultural policy and local practice from 1994 to 
2012. It was inspired by the theoretical perspective of the Cultural Political 
Economy and Jim McGuigan’s three discourses of cultural policy, to 
investigate the evolution of semiotic practice between policy discourse and 
structuration over the past two decades. The research has conducted a 
critical semiotic analysis of the main industrialisation-related policy 
discourses and an empirical analysis of local practice grounded in the cases 
selected and interviews with the relevant actors. In this conclusion, the first 
section summarises the research findings and implications, the second 
explains the research limitations and suggests several points for future 
research.  
 
7.1 Researching Findings and Implications 
This research aimed to explore the evolution of industrialisation in the co-
constitution between policy discourse and local practice in the field of 
cultural policy. Through critical semiotic analysis of the relevant policy 
discourse and the semiotic practice of local practice, the research traced the 
emergence of industrialisation back to the early 1990s and the 
transformation to date. More prominently, this thesis revealed that the 
projects of cultural industries and CCIs emerged as a strategic response to 
changing political, economic and social structuration. In this context, the 
meaning of industrialisation has been entangled in multiple state projects 
and multiple articulations with local practice and diverse imaginaries.  
Through the analysis, three core research findings and implications have 
emerged. Firstly, the industrialisation discourse ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’ has been mobilised by the state as a strategic 
fix in the three respective phases to manage the issues of democratisation, 
the formation of national identity, the challenges of economic transformation, 
rural regeneration and cultural citizenship.  
When Taiwan experienced dramatic political democratisation in 1994, the 
CCA launched the important Community Empowerment Project. 
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Industrialisation was selected to empower people to be concerned about 
community affairs and local culture through participating in local cultural 
industries. Within this context of democratisation, the state discourses of 
‘decentralisation’, ‘localisation’ and ‘participation’ constituted the struggle 
between the state and local society, and involved the meaning of 
industrialisation. During the process, the economic imaginary of 
industrialisation by the endogenous and indigenous approach was initially 
proposed by the CCA, which co-invested the strategies with local 
communities in the production of hegemony. The case of Baimi Clog Village 
played a prominent role in co-shaping this approach with policy workers. The 
approach resonated with other local communities and thus consolidated the 
hegemony of economic imaginaries in the first phase from 1994 to 2002 
(Chapter 4). 
With the progress of democratisation, when the DPP government was in 
power and faced with the impact of joining in the WTO and the political and 
economic emergence of China, the projects of cultural industrialisation and 
CCIs were served up as strategic fixes with multi-values. During the second 
phase, from 2002 to 2008, industrialisation, on the one hand, maintained the 
meaning of empowerment and localisation, where the latter involved the 
political imaginary of ‘Taiwan’s subjectivity’; on the other hand, it was 
embedded in the economic imaginary of knowledge-based economy and 
added to the market discourse of ‘culture is good business’, to advance the 
national competitiveness and reconcile the declining rural economy. In this 
context, the economic imaginaries of industrialisation had different practical 
directions in the state’s projects and in local practice. The state privileged the 
CC Park approach for greater economic profit, while most communities 
shifted to the endogenous and tourism approach with the social-economic 
purposes of empowerment and rural regeneration. The case of Taomi Eco 
Village strategically shaped the approach to building a sustainable local 
community. Meanwhile, the discourse of ‘cultural citizenship’ was highlighted 
by the CCA and cultural groups in the semiotic practice of industrialisation 
and this resonated with the discourse of ‘participation’ (Chapter 5). 
When the KMT government retook power in 2008 and encountered the 
global financial crisis, policy priorities of industrialisation were placed on the 
profit-oriented flagship industries and cross-Strait collaboration, for pursuing 
global competitiveness and the greater Chinese market. In this context, the 
state privileged market mechanisms and the investment approach, which led 
to criticism from the civil society and cultural groups. In the semiotic struggle 
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of industrialisation, the cultural groups and other civil groups placed the civil 
discourse of ‘cultural citizenship’ against the state’s market discourse of 
investment. Despite the civil discourse of ‘cultural citizenship’ having evolved 
into ‘CCIs Law’ and relevant projects, and the MOC not having clear 
discursive strategies on issues including public funding and private 
investment, supporting citizens/cultural workers or supporting industries, 
industrialisation of cultural policy has still diverged. Faced with confusing and 
divergent policy imaginaries, local communities/tribes have continued to 
develop local industries by the endogenous and tourism approach with 
reflexivity. The case of ‘Dragonfly Beads Art Studio’ was one of the essential 
cases that strategically selected a governmental programme and utilised 
tribal resources to build a network of industrialisation and consolidate the 
tribal identity. The other case of ‘Teihua Music Village’, not only symbolises 
the rise of the CC Village, but shows the priority of industrialisation for 
cultural workers and local industries, which has provided alternative 
clustering imaginaries to other local practice and the state (Chapter 6).  
Secondly, by investigating the underlying semiotic-practice struggles of 
‘industrialisation’ and the co-constitution process between the set of 
industrialisation discourses and structuration over the past twenty years, this 
research has illustrated the trajectory of industrialisation in a newly 
democratised case. It has argued that, in spite of knowledge-based 
economy and neo-liberalism, democratisation by empowerment project and 
cultural citizenship as well as localisation by the endogenous approach 
proved to be more influential in the meaning-making of industrialisation in 
Taiwan. The result highlights policy implications for the industrialisation of 
cultural policy in Taiwan and other newly democratised countries. For 
Taiwan’s future policy discourse of industrialisation, this research suggests 
that the discursive strategies based on ‘citizens’ and ‘the public’ may 
facilitate the state bridging the divergent paths of industrialisation in cultural 
policy, for example, the discourse of ‘public investment’, which focuses on 
investing in the existing public broadcasting system instead of the private 
sector. The strategy clarifies the legalisation of investment by public funding, 
highlighting profit-creation as well as cultural citizenship, which might 
reconcile conflicts with cultural groups and civil groups. By doing so, the 
public broadcasting system can be the state’s ‘flagship project’ of 
industrialisation and bring along the development of CCIs in collaboration 
with other entrepreneurs, providing reasonable material support for cultural 
workers and offering accessible cultural resource to citizens.  
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For other countries with similar democratic progress, the case of Taiwan 
could provide significant experience and lessons to develop projects of 
cultural industries or CCIs. Taiwan’s case indicates that the cultural 
industries do not naturally contain the economic discourse; they can bear 
democratic meanings, such as empowerment, participation and cultural 
citizenship, by state projects and local practice to engage people in public 
affairs and cultural events. In particular, the four cases of this research show 
that the actors of the communities or civil society are not always confined 
within the meaning-frame set by the state’s policy, they are the meaning-
makers and policy-makers to promote, negotiate, and compete with the state 
to construct the economic imaginary of industrialisation in favour of their 
needs. Furthermore, the development of the third phase in Taiwan 
demonstrates that the advance of digital technology and social media have 
enhanced people’s mobility and ability so that they could generate and 
distribute civil discourse more easily in response to the state discourse or 
increasingly influential market discourse.  
Thirdly, this research has theoretical implications for cultural policy studies 
and CPE. In the field of cultural policy, this research adopted the theoretical 
perspective of CPE with three discourses of cultural policy (McGuigan, 2004) 
and unpacked the dialectic between the discourse formation and 
structuration. The essential concepts of CPE, such as economic imaginaries 
and the production of hegemony, could facilitate future research in cultural 
policy studies to account for how economic discourse has increasingly 
played the dominant role in cultural policy and to shed light on the structural 
conditions required for this. More importantly, it has presented the dynamics 
between the state discourse, market discourse and civil discourse and 
elaborated how some hegemonic discourses have been produced by 
specific actors and practices.  
Jim McGuigan did not clearly explain the actors in these discourses and how 
the practices work. In this research, the state has played an influential role in 
shaping the three discourses in response to the political-economic-cultural 
conditions, while the key players from the CCA and MOC infused specific 
concepts or concerns into the meaning of those discourses. From the 
interviews with Chen, Chi-Nan and Chen, Yu-Chiou, it is evident that both of 
them showed high interest in promoting the industrialisation of cultural policy 
through a series of projects and managed to interpret their democratic 
meaning and Taiwan’s subjectivity as well as the economic benefits inherent 
to the three discourses. By comparison, the later chairpersons of the CCA 
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from 2006 to 2012 rarely developed new ideas in the meaning of 
industrialisation. It was the first minister of MOC, Lung, Ying-Tai, who 
proposed new terms and tried to add new distinctive meanings into the 
industrialisation of cultural policy. For example, the terms of ‘soilisation’ and 
‘value-enhancing industrialisation’ are used to distinguish industrialisation in 
the different contexts between community industries and profitable CCIs. 
This research has shed light on the application of three discourses, which 
might help future studies to investigate the actors in the three discourses 
and analyse how the actors interact, negotiate or defend the discursive 
struggle for hegemony and configure the structuration.  
From the theoretical perspective of CPE, the research provides an empirical 
approach with the supplement of three discourses of cultural policy for 
applying CPE in cultural policy studies to investigate the evolution of 
hegemonic discourse and structuration. As elaborated in section 3.1, the 
framework of CPE is very complicated and lacks an empirical research 
strategy to operationalise the analytical concepts (van Heur, 2010c); 
moreover, the theory of CPE does not explain clearly how to analyse the 
causal mechanisms of social reality. The analysis and case studies 
presented in this thesis demonstrate that the three discourses can serve as 
analytical tools of CPE to uncover the operation of semiotic struggle. In this 
case, they have revealed how the hegemonic discourse of industrialisation 
has been selected, constituted, implemented and managed between the 
state’s policy and local practice.  
In addition, this research not only stresses the role of the state in semiotic 
practice of industrialisation but also highlights the operation of civil 
discourses and the implications of civil initiatives, which might bring new 
insights into future CPE research to investigate the dialectical constitution of 
social relations and phenomena.  
 
7.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research  
Reflecting on the limitations of the study, there are two issues, which might 
both merit further investigations in the future. 
First, this research has not presented a detailed analysis of the discursive 
formation and practice of entrepreneur actors, but has focused more on the 
discursive-practice struggle in the meaning-making of industrialisation 
between state actors and community actors.  This is because these two 
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groups have played influential roles since the initial advocating of 
industrialisation in 1995, to date. As well as these two stakeholder groups, 
the research has analysed the role of the intermediary in local practice 
through the case of the New Homeland Foundation and the Lovely Taiwan 
Foundation, and found that they played essential roles in the ‘cultural 
translation’ between the abstract policy discourse and empirical experience.  
However, the role of entrepreneurs has been increasingly significant in the 
industrialisation of policy discourse and practice. More importantly, 
entrepreneurs were the most prominent actors in the CC Parks and in the 
investment projects of industrialisation. For example, in the ‘Creative Taiwan’ 
project, the state encouraged the business sector, including entrepreneurs, 
to co-invest in CCIs with the National Development Fund. Actually, this 
research attempted to interview some entrepreneurs for the project, but only 
one agreed to be interviewed, and therefore, the data was not sufficiently 
‘rich’ to analyse the public-private partnerships and their power relations in 
the semiotic practice of industrialisation. The MOC revised the investment 
project in July 2015 and released regulations to encourage more 
entrepreneurs or companies to invest in CCIs (MOC, 2015), which may lead 
to the variation of discourse and bring about alternative economic 
imaginaries. Therefore, future research may fruitfully investigate the role of 
entrepreneurs in the constitution of the market discourse and the process of 
semiotic struggle. 
The second limitation of the study is the absence of a ‘local government’ 
perspective and the connectivity between central government and local 
practice of community/tribal industries. In 1999 the Local Government Act 
was passed, which meant that more money and power were allocated to 
local government. The role of local governments has become increasingly 
important in interacting with state policy and local communities. This aspect 
was considered at the beginning of the project, but rejected because the 
state has played a more powerful role in regulating the related cultural policy 
of industrialisation and allocation of resources to local governments during 
the 2000s. However, according to the amendments of the Local Government 
Act in 2010, five special municipalities were allowed to have more financial 
resources and policy-making power. Moreover, the CCIs Law was passed in 
2010, which delegated administrative power to local governments, especially 
the five municipal governments, and gave them more funding for creating 
local CCI projects (Article 5). According to the recent status, the five 
municipalities contained 78.42 per cent of the total of CCI enterprises in 
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2011, and generated about 89.27 per cent of CCIs’ overall turnover in 2013, 
which far outstripped the other 17 counties and cities (MOC, 2014, pp.171-
172). Furthermore, Chung’s (2014) recent research found that the five 
municipalities played mediating roles between the state and the local 
residents to localise and reformulate the state’s CCIP in response to local 
needs and commercial businesses.  Consequently, the role of local 
government in the discursive-practical constitution of industrialisation 
deserves further investigation in future research.   
This research has examined the semiotic practice of industrialisation from 
1994 to 2012. Since 2012, the political, economic and social environment 
has dramatically changed, leading to a radical transformation of 
industrialisation. Some of the issues have been discussed in Chapter 6, but 
much more needs to be explored about the variation, selection and retention 
of industrialisation. As a follow-up to this research, it would be fruitful to 
analyse the development of two issues in recent years. Firstly, the 
hegemonic discourse of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; Culturalisation of 
Industries’ has varied according to the discourse of ‘industrialisation of Wen-
Chuang; Wenchuangisation of industries’ / ‘industrialisation of CCIs; CCIs-
alisation of industries’ (文創產業化；產業文創化). This discourse emerged 
from the MOC’s new CCIs project entitled ‘Value-Enhancing Industrialisation 
– the construction and innovation of value chain in cultural and creative 
industries’ (MOC, 2013c). The project was proposed in 2013 to continue the 
project of ‘Creative Taiwan’. The variation of discourse is significant as the 
term ‘culture’ was replace by the abbreviation ‘Wen Chuang’ / CCIs (文創).  
Secondly, the implications of the China Factor and the debates between free 
trade and cultural exception have raised a great deal of discussions since 
2014. The Sunflower movement, which started from student-led protesters 
occupying the Legislative Yuan and soon gained support from civil society, 
took place in 2014 to protest a service-trade agreement signed between 
Taiwan and China without any transparent process or adequate legislative 
review. During the 24-day occupation, the issues of ‘China Factor’, ‘Free 
Trade’ and ‘Cultural Exception’ were the main focuses in Taiwan’s society 
and brought unprecedented discussions and debates. The movement not 
only prevented the agreement but also led to a new discursive-structural 
condition for industrialisation in cultural policy. In particular, the agreement 
was planned to deregulate the investments in Taiwanese cultural industries, 
which might pose threats to the cultural autonomy and cultural diversity of 
Taiwan (Liu, 2015). Therefore, the cultural workers and groups asked the 
- 215 - 
MOC to adopt the principle of ‘cultural exception’ in this service-trade 
agreement and other free-trade protocols. In addition, the implications of the 
Sunflower movement led to further cultural campaigns and civil discourses. 
In the election of local governments in 2014 and the presidential election in 
2016, cultural groups held cultural forums and drafted the manifestos of 
culture to the main candidates (Liu, 2015; Ku, 2016). They emphasised the 
importance of cultural citizenship and proposed ‘cultural impact assessment’ 
in response to the controversy between free trade and cultural value.  
These latest structural changes, cultural development and variation of 
discourse are worth further exploration. This research has laid significant 
groundwork, so that future research can focus on investigating the semiotic 
struggle and the hidden variation of the hegemonic industrialisation 
discourse and further explore the structural context, the state’s intention and 
the implications for local practice.  
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List of Abbreviations 
ACE                                  Association of Community Empowerment 
BCDA                               Baimi Community Development Association  
CCA                                  Council for Cultural Affairs 
CCIs                                  Cultural and Creative Industries 
CCIs Promotion Team      Cultural and Creative Industries Promotion Team 
CCIs Law                          Law for the Development of Cultural and Creative 
Industries 
CCIP                                 Cultural and Creative Industries Project 
CC Park                            Cultural and Creative Park 
CC Village                         Cultural and Creative Village  
CCRM                               Chinese Cultural Renaissance Movement 
CEP                  Community Empowerment Project 
CEPD                 Council for Economic Planning and Development 
Challenge 2008                Challenge 2008 – Six-Year National Development 
Plan 
CPE                      Cultural Political Economy 
Creative Taiwan                Creative Taiwan – Development Program of 
Cultural and Creative Industries (2009-2013) 
Cultural Age                      Preparation Office of Cultural Age Foundation 
DPP                                  Democratic Progressive Party 
ECFA                 Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement 
KMT                    Chinese Kuomintang or Chinese Nationalist Party 
LCM                                  Local Cultural Museum 
MOC                                Ministry of Culture 
NHF                    New Homeland Foundation 
L’Orangerie                      ‘L’Orangerie International Art Consultant Co. Ltd. 
PRC                                 People’s Republic of China  
ROC                 Republic of China 
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SRA                                Strategic-Relational Approach 
TCDA                               Taomi Community Development Association 
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Appendix 1 
The List of Interviewees and Interview Questions 
 
[Insiders to cultural policy-making] 
Chen, Chi-Nan （陳其南） (29/03/2012) 
Deputy Head of the CCA from 1994 to 1997 
Consultant of the Executive Yuan from 2000 to 2004 
Chairperson of the CCA from 2004 to 2006 
Chen, Yu-Chiou （陳毓秀） (28/03/2012) 
Chairperson of the CCA from 2000 to 2004 
Kuo, Chi-Chou （郭紀舟） (15/11/2012) 
Secretary of Chen, Yu-Chiou from 2001 to 2004 
 
Interview Questions: 
1. Why did the CCA launch the projects of industrialisation in the field of 
cultural policy, including CEP, cultural industries, CCIP and New 
Hometown CEP?  
2. How did the CCA plan the projects of industrialisation in the field of 
cultural policy, including CEP, cultural industries, CCIP and New 
Hometown CEP? Did the CCA refer to relevant policy from other 
countries? If it did, why did the CCA choose to refer to the specific foreign 
policy? 
3. How did the CCA implement and promote the projects of industrialisation 
in the field of cultural policy, including CEP, cultural industries, CCIP and 
New Hometown CEP?  
4. Why did the CCA advocate the discourse of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’? 
5. How did the CCA define the meaning of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’?	
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[Outsiders to cultural policy-making] 
Hu, Yung-Fen （胡永芬） (19/11/2012) 
A member of Cultural Age 
Fang, Guo-Jian （方國健） (19/11/2012) 
General Manager of Taiwan Wen-Chuang No.1   
 
Interview Questions: 
1. What is your opinion of cultural industries and CCIs? 
2. How do you think of the state’s cultural policy related to the CCIs?   
3. Have you participated in any form of policy-planning processes? In what 
way? 
4. Does current policy affect or relate to you? In what way? Does it benefit 
or limit your industry?  
5. What is your opinion about the recent event of ‘Dreamers’?	
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Four Cases of Local Practice 
Case 1 : Baimi Clog Village 
Lin, Ray-Mu （林瑞木） (13/11/2012) 
Direct of Baimi Community Development Association 
Hsiao, Yu-Chu （蕭玉珠） (13/11/2012) 
Director of Tour in the Baimi Clog Museum 
 
Case 2 : Taomi Eco Village 
Liao, Chia-Chan （廖嘉展） (21/11/2012) 
Director of New Homeland Foundation 
Chung, Yun-Nuan （鐘雲暖） (21/11/2012) 
Director General of Taomi Community Development Association, 
 
Case 3: Dragonfly Beads Arts Studio 
Shih, Siou-Jyu （施秀菊） (26/11/2012) 
Funder of Dragonfly Beads Arts Studio 
 
Case 4 : Teihua Music Village 
Anonymity of Lovely Taiwan Foundation (16/11/2012) 
Fong, Jheng-Fa （豐政發） (20/11/2012) 
Manager of Teihua Music Village 
 
Interview Questions: 
1. Why did you choose the specific cultural industries/ CCI? 
2. How did you develop the specific cultural industries/CCI? Do you get any 
support from the public sector, the private business sector or non-profit 
organisations? 
3. Have you participated in any form of policy-planning processes? In what 
way?   
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4. Does current policy affect or relate to you? In what way? Does it benefit 
or limit your industry?  
5. What do you think of the meaning of ‘Industrialisation of Culture; 
Culturalisation of Industries’? How did you put this discourse into 
practice? 
6. What do you think of the meaning of ‘endogenous and indigenous 
approach’ and ‘endogenous and tourism approach’? How do you adopt 
the approach to your industries? In this process, how did the relevant 
project of industrialisation affect or relate to you? 
 
